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TRANSITIONING THE FAMILY BUSINESS 
Dwight Drake∗ 
Abstract: By any measure, family-dominated businesses are the backbone of the 
American economy. Although a large majority of family businesses are managed by senior 
family members who are older than age 55 and more than 80 percent of such senior family 
members claim that they want the business to remain in the family, less than 30 percent of 
such businesses have tackled the challenge of developing a plan for transitioning the business 
to the next generation. For over 90 percent of such families, this planning challenge is 
aggravated by the fact that they have no diversified wealth: the family’s wealth is the 
business. 
This article examines the technical challenges of designing such a transition plan that 
meets the specific objectives of the family, including the family’s tolerance for complexity. 
Through the use of a simple case study, this article reviews essential elements that should be 
carefully evaluated in the design of any transition plan and explains numerous technical traps 
that must be avoided in the plan design. These elements and the related traps include timing 
considerations, valuation discounts, marital deduction planning, life insurance structuring, 
entity limitation and conversion options, compensation opportunities, and co-shareholder 
planning. The comparative benefits and inherent limitations of alternative transition 
strategies and business restructuring options are also illustrated, including the complexities 
and unique challenges of incorporating advanced estate planning strategies into the plan 
design. The article explains and illustrates why certain popular estate tax savings strategies, 
including the grantor retained annuity trust, the intentionally defective grantor trust 
installment sale, the self-canceling installment note, and the family partnership, often become 
problematic, inadvisable, or merely supplemental when the bulk of the family’s wealth is tied 
up in a valuable family business. The tax benefits, challenges, and risks of each of these 
strategies and others are explained, along with the practical problems that surface with a 
family business. The article also explores alternative strategies for anticipating and resolving 
conflicting interests between children who work in the business and children who have no 
career ties to the business. 
The purpose of the article is help professionals better understand the importance, 
magnitude, and difficulty of the intergenerational transition challenges of family-dominated 
businesses. As the article demonstrates, these are not challenges that can be met with stock 
solutions or quick fixes. Each situation requires a custom, strategic plan that, when 
implemented wisely over an appropriate period of time, addresses the core objectives of the 
family and avoids destructive traps and useless complexities. The ultimate goal is to design a 
plan that effectively incorporates a mix of strategies that accomplish the highest priority 
objectives at a level of complexity that works for the family. 
 
 
                                                     
∗ Copyright 2008 Dwight Drake. All rights reserved. Mr. Drake teaches tax and business courses at 
the University of Washington School of Law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION⎯MOUNTAIN OR MARBLES 
Mom and Dad have labored a lifetime building a profitable business 
that services a market niche and regularly delivers a paycheck to two 
hundred hard-working employees. On paper, most would consider them 
rich, but they fully appreciate that the bulk of their wealth is tied up in a 
business operation that could be derailed by changing market conditions, 
a breakthrough technology, a new tenacious competitor, sloppy 
management, or a host of other factors. They have witnessed the demise 
of other businesses that were all considered “rock solid” at some point in 
their existence. The time has come for Mom and Dad to slow down, turn 
over the reins, and enjoy their retirement. One child is immersed in the 
business, fully prepared and anxious to run the show, and two other 
children are off pursing other careers. The family wants a plan that will 
ensure the parents’ financial security, treat all children fairly, protect the 
business, promote family harmony, and minimize all tax bites. It’s a tall 
order. 
Family business transition planning is big business. Oft-quoted 
statistics say it all. Family-dominated businesses comprise more than 80 
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percent of U.S. enterprises, employ more than 50 percent of the nation’s 
workforce, and account for the bulk (some estimate as much as 64  
percent) of America’s gross domestic product.1 According to a recent 
2007 survey of family businesses with annual gross sales of at least $5 
million, 60 percent of the majority shareholders in family businesses are 
55 or older, and 30 percent are at least age 65.2 And although more than 
80 percent of the senior family owners claim that they want the business 
to stay in the family, less than 30 percent acknowledge having a 
transition plan.3 The result is that most family businesses do remain in 
the family, but at a dear cost. Best estimates are that less than 30 percent 
of family-dominated businesses survive a second generation, and the 
survival rate is even uglier for those businesses that make it to 
generation three.4 
Strategic transition planning takes time, energy, and a willingness to 
grapple with tough family, tax, and financial issues. It cannot make a 
weak business strong or provide any guarantees of survival. But it can 
trigger an analytical process that prompts a frank assessment of available 
options, facilitates better long-term decision making, and saves taxes. 
Although many successful family business owners enjoy a net worth 
that rivals or exceeds that of other well-heeled clients, the planning 
dynamics usually are much different when a family business takes center 
stage. For many clients, wealth transition planning focuses on a 
potpourri of investment and business assets, packaged into a medley of 
partnerships, trusts, limited liability companies (LLCs), and corporate 
entities. The challenge is to analyze, reposition where necessary, and 
ultimately transition the various marbles in the most tax efficient manner 
possible, consistent with the family objectives of the owners. With a 
family business, it’s usually not about rearranging marbles; it’s about 
trying to move a mountain. In the recent survey referenced above, a 
                                                     
1. See generally M. F. R. Kets de Vries, “The Dynamics of Family Controlled Firms: The Good 
News and the Bad News,” ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Winter 1993, at 59-71; P.L. ROSENBLATT 
ET AL., THE FAMILY IN BUSINESS (1985); W.G. DYER, CULTURAL CHANGE IN FAMILY FIRMS (1986) 
59−71; Arthur Anderson/Mass Mutual, American Family Business Survey, 2002. 
2. LAIRD NORTON TYEE, FAMILY TO FAMILY: LAIRD NORTON TYEE FAMILY BUSINESS SURVEY 5 
(2007), http://familybusinesssurvey.com/pdfs/LNT_FamilyBusinessSurvey_2007.pdf. 
3. Id. The survey also indicated that (1) only 56 percent of the respondents have a written 
strategic plan; (2) nearly 64 percent do not require that family members entering the business have 
any qualifications or business experience; and (3) 25 percent do not believe that the next generation 
is competent to move into leadership roles. Id. at 5. 
4. See J.I. WARD, KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS HEALTHY XXIV, 12, 247–50 (1987).  This 
book suggests the survival rate to generation three is less than 15 percent. Id.  
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startling 93 percent of the senior business owners acknowledged that the 
business is their primary source of income and security.5 With little or 
no diversification, everything gets tougher. Strategies that easily 
accommodate marble shifting often become more challenging, 
sometimes impossible, when applied to a sliver of the mountain. And, 
more often than not, the process is further complicated by strong 
emotional ties to the mountain and historical perceptions regarding 
essential bonds between the family and the mountain. 
The initial challenge in the planning process is the threshold “Keep 
vs. Sell” question: Should the business be sold or kept in the family? 
Often, the parents automatically assume that the business is going to be 
transitioned to the next generation; no thought of selling has seriously 
crossed their minds. Some even regard the issue as a taboo subject that is 
not to be discussed. The advisor needs to be discerning in such a 
situation and assess the risks of saying nothing. A little artful devil’s 
advocacy may open minds and jumpstart the analytical process. 
Priorities, objectives, biases, family dynamics, and business risk factors 
continually evolve and change over time. So too, the answer to the keep-
sell decision may change with time. The patriarch who would never 
consider selling out at age 55 may have a very different perspective by 
age 70, particularly if he or she has been subjected to many enlightened 
discussions over the years that have focused on a number of key factors 
that impact the analysis and the ultimate decision.6 
This paper discusses the challenge of developing a transition plan 
once the decision has been made to keep the business in the family. The 
focus here is not “whether,” but “how.” A simple case study is used to 
explain essential plan elements and related planning traps and to 
illustrate and contrast strategic options for moving the mountain. The 
facts of the case study, summarized in Part II, are common to many 
successful family businesses: parents preparing to slow down; a 
successful business that represents the bulk of the parents’ estate; 
children inside and outside the business; looming estate tax problems; 
                                                     
5. See TYEE, supra note 2. 
6. Many factors can and often should impact the analysis, including the family’s emotional ties to 
the business, evolving external business risks, children who have committed their careers to the 
business, qualified heir challenges, the availability of viable sellout options, and key business 
indictors (i.e., strategic- vs. relationship-based, institutionalization potential, margin tolerances, 
asset composition, low-tech vs. high-tech, barriers to entry, and capital structure). For a discussion 
of the “Keep vs. Sell” decision, see DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD 
ENTERPRISES ch. 16 (2006). 
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and a compelling need to prepare for the future. Part III of the paper 
discusses seven key elements and related traps that should be carefully 
considered up front in the design of any transition plan. These are 
essential building blocks of the plan. They include: timing transition 
decisions to meet the objectives of the specific family; the smart use of 
valuation experts and precious valuation discounts; entity limitations and 
conversion options; coordinated life insurance planning and related 
structural traps that can compromise the entire liquidity plan; challenges 
of multiple family owners; marital deduction planning to defer the 
ultimate estate tax hit; and compensation planning opportunities. The 
discussion includes a review of specific traps that need to be anticipated 
and avoided in the plan design. 
Part IV discusses, illustrates, and compares strategies for transitioning 
stock in a family corporation—gifting options, redemption alternatives, 
cross-purchase structures, and business restructuring strategies. This 
discussion includes an analysis of the unique challenges that family 
businesses often encounter in dealing with popular marble shifting 
strategies, such as grantor retained annuity trusts and intentionally 
defective grantor trusts. Part V analyzes the challenges of integrating a 
family partnership or family LLC into the plan design. The wise use of a 
family partnership or LLC may facilitate income shifting, enhanced 
valuation discounts, wealth scattering, asset protection, and more. In 
recent years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has stepped up its 
efforts to challenge family partnership strategies that push the outer 
limits. As a result, existing tax limits and uncertainties must be 
anticipated and carefully factored into the plan design. Finally, Part VI 
reviews strategies for dealing with the conflicting interests between 
children who work in the business and children who have no career ties 
to the business. If not properly addressed, these conflicts can lead to bad 
business decisions, costly tax consequences, and intolerable family 
friction. In some situations, the conflicts can be eliminated by 
implementing a strategy that prevents the outside children from ever 
acquiring an interest in the business or fairly terminates any such interest 
that is acquired. Often, the sheer size of the business precludes this 
possibility: joint ownership of the business is unavoidable. The 
challenge then shifts to developing a strategy that will provide the inside 
children with the control and incentives they require while ensuring that 
the liquidity needs and financial interests of the outside children are 
satisfied. 
The plan design process for each family necessarily must be detail-
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oriented, strategic, and forward-focused. Care must be exercised to avoid 
planning traps and the temptation to tack on complicated strategies that 
offer little or nothing for the particular family. Each situation is unique 
and should be treated as such. There is no slam-dunk solution; all 
strategies have limitations and disadvantages that mandate careful 
evaluation, and some pose risks or legal uncertainties that many just 
cannot stomach. Above all, the specific objectives of the family must 
drive the planning process. The objectives, once identified, must be 
prioritized to facilitate an effective analysis of the trade-offs and 
compromises that inevitably surface in the planning process. The 
ultimate goal is to design a plan that effectively accomplishes the highest 
priority objectives over a period of time and at a level of complexity that 
work for the family. 
II. CASE STUDY: WILSON INCORPORATED 
The Wilson family owns a business that is going to be transitioned to 
the next generation. The sellout option is off the table. Wilson 
Incorporated is a privately owned C corporation that has been in a 
specialized distribution business for 26 years. It has an established 
reputation with its customers and suppliers. Earl Wilson, age 65, is the 
founder and President of the company and historically has been the 
principal force behind the company. Earl and his wife Betty, age 60, 
own as community property 90 percent of the outstanding common stock 
of the company. Betty serves on the board but spends no serious time in 
the business. Jeff Wilson, Earl and Betty’s oldest child, owns the 
remaining 10 percent of the outstanding stock. Jeff is married and has 
been actively involved in the business for years. Technically, Jeff is 
considered the second-in-command behind Earl, but all close to the 
company recognize that Jeff now is the driving force in the company. In 
addition to his strong financial background, Jeff has a proven knack for 
sales and marketing, is skilled in dealing with people, and is adored by 
key employees and valued customers. Jeff is anxious to take over the 
reins and wants to aggressively grow and expand the business. If Jeff’s 
involvement in the business was terminated for any reason, the loss to 
the business would be substantial. 
The company’s growth was dynamic in the earlier years, but recently 
the growth has been modest. Earl has been slowing down and has been 
reluctant to aggressively reinvest or borrow funds to expand the 
operation into new markets. This has been a frustration for Jeff, who 
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wants to conquer new frontiers. The business has consistently generated 
sufficient profits and cash flow to pay generous salaries and to allow 
Earl and Betty to draw approximately $400,000 from the business each 
year in compensation payments. 
Earl and Betty have two other children—Kathy and Paul. Both are 
grown and married, and neither has ever worked in the business. Paul is 
a dentist; Kathy used to work in commercial real estate before becoming 
a stay-at-home mom. Earl and Betty have four grandchildren and hopes 
for one or two more. All family members get along with each other. Earl 
is recognized as the family patriarch, although all acknowledge that the 
continued success and future of the business rest in the hands of Jeff. 
Earl estimates that the business is worth approximately $10 million. 
That’s the price that he believes the business could be sold for today. 
Earl and Betty’s total estate, inclusive of their share of the business, is 
valued at approximately $18 million. Their assets, all community 
property, include the building that houses the business. Earl and Betty 
own the building outside of the corporation and lease the building to the 
company.  The building has a value of $3 million. 
Earl and Betty have various personal hobbies and interests that they 
have neglected in the past to accommodate the demands of the business. 
They are anxious to move forward; they are looking forward to 
retirement. They would like to develop a plan that will accomplish the 
following objectives. 
• Earl will phase out of the business over the next year and will 
continue to receive payments from the business that will enable Earl and 
Betty to ride off into the sunset and enjoy their retirement for the rest of 
their lives. 
• Jeff will take over the control and management of the business. 
Earl wants some ongoing involvement as a hedge against the boredom of 
retirement and to ensure that the financial integrity of the business is 
protected for the sake of his retirement and Betty’s welfare. Earl will be 
freed of all day-to-day responsibilities. 
• Jeff will have the freedom to diversify and expand the business. 
Jeff would like the plan structured so that the value of all appreciation in 
the future will be reflected in his estate and will not continue to build 
Earl and Betty’s estates or the estates of other family members, 
specifically Kathy and Paul, neither of whom play any role in the 
business. 
• Earl and Betty want to make sure that, at their passing, each child 
receives an equal share of their estates. They are particularly concerned 
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about Kathy and Paul, the two children who do not participate in the 
business. They appreciate that the business represents the bulk of their 
estate. They want Jeff to control and run the business, but they want to 
make certain that Kathy and Paul are treated fairly. 
• Earl and Betty want to minimize estate taxes, consistent with 
their other objectives and their overriding desire to be financially secure 
and independent. They never want to be placed in a position of having to 
depend on their children, and they always want to know that their estate 
is sufficient to finance their lifestyle for the duration. They are willing to 
pay some estate taxes for this peace of mind. As a hedge against future 
estate taxes, they would like to start transitioning assets to other family 
members. They generally understand that, as of right now, their unified 
credits7 will shelter $4 million of their estate ($2 million each) from any 
federal estate tax exposure and that the excess will be taxed at a rate of 
45 percent. Given the value of their estate, the math is frightening. Their 
anxiety is only heightened by the reality that Congress will take some 
action to revise the estate tax by 2010. 
• All family members want to minimize negative income tax 
consequences to the fullest extent possible.8 
III. ESSENTIAL PLAN ELEMENTS: STARTING POINTS AND 
TRAPS 
The design of a business transition plan requires that certain key 
elements be carefully considered up front to ensure that the financial 
interests of the parents are protected, estate taxes are minimized and 
deferred, family liquidity needs are satisfied, adverse income tax hits are 
eliminated, and sloppy planning does not derail the effort. There are 
                                                     
7. The estate tax unified credit under I.R.C. § 2010 is presently $780,800, an amount sufficient to 
shelter $2 million of property (the applicable exclusion amount) from the federal estate tax. I.R.C. § 
2010 (2006). The applicable exclusion amount increases to $3.5 million in 2009 and, absent further 
action by Congress, goes away in 2010, along with the one-year demise of the estate tax. After 
2010, the applicable exclusion amount returns to its pre-2001 level of $1 million along with a full 
restoration of the estate tax. Most expect that the one-year disappearing act will never occur because 
Congress will be forced to take action before 2010. Depending on their state of residency, the 
Wilsons may also have a state inheritance tax burden. 
8. The Wilson family’s situation mirrors that of most successful family-owned businesses in 
America. According to the 2007 Laird Norton Tyee Family Business Survey, 60 percent of the 
responding family companies had a CEO over age 55, 71 percent had no succession plan, 97 percent 
had one or more additional family shareholders, 91 percent had at least one additional member 
employed by the company, and 74 percent had fewer than five shareholders. See TYEE, supra note 
3, at 5-15.  
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various planning traps that need to be avoided. 
A. Timing to Fit the Family 
Timing is a critical element in the design of any transition plan. The 
temperament and anxieties of the parents can impact all timing 
decisions. Some are anxious to move at full steam; many need to take it 
slow, to walk before they run. A variety of factors can influence 
important timing decisions, including the stability of the business, the 
parents’ capacity to accept and adapt to change, the demands and 
expectations of the children, the strength of the parents’ financial base 
outside of the business, the age and health of the parents, and personal 
relationships between specific family members. Often the pace of 
implementing specific plan elements will accelerate as circumstances 
change and as the parents become more comfortable with the transition 
process and their new roles. 
The planning process usually is helped by focusing on three 
timeframes: the period both parents are living, the period following the 
death of the first parent, and the period following the death of the 
surviving parent. So long as both Earl and Betty are living, top priorities 
must include their financial needs and security, their willingness to let go 
and walk away from the business, and their appetite for living with any 
fallout resulting from the transition of serious wealth and control to their 
children. From a tax perspective, all transfers during this timeframe are 
going to trigger either a transfer of the parents’ existing stock basis 
(often very low)9 or a recognition of taxable income predicated on such 
basis. 
The death of the first parent often creates more flexibility, particularly 
in a community property state such as Washington. A double tax benefit 
is realized on the death of the first parent—the income tax basis in all 
community property is stepped-up to its fair market value,10 and the 
marital deduction may be used to eliminate any estate taxes.11 Any gifts 
to other family members during this timeframe now will transfer high-
basis assets. Any sales will likely be income tax free. If the deceased 
                                                     
9. For all gifts of property, the donee’s tax basis in the transferred property equals the donor’s 
carryover basis plus the amount of any gift taxes paid with respect to the gift, but in no event may 
the basis exceed the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift. I.R.C. § 1015(a), (d). 
10. Id. § 1014(a), (b)(6). For non-community property, the basis step-up is applicable only to 
property acquired from the decedent. Id. § 1014(a). 
11. Id. § 2056. 
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parent had the strongest ties to the business (as is so often the case), 
officially surrendering total control may no longer be an issue. In our 
case, for example, Betty presumably would have no interest in being 
involved in the business following Earl’s death. Plus, if the life 
insurance planning correctly eyeballed the parent most likely to die first 
(Earl in our case), the receipt of tax-free life insurance proceeds12 may 
substantially reduce or completely eliminate the surviving parent’s 
financial dependence on the business. For these reasons, often a 
transition plan is designed as a “targeted first death plan” to shift into 
high gear the wealth transition process on the death of the first parent. 
Of course, the death of the surviving parent triggers the moment of 
truth for the two big consequences that have been the focus of the 
planning from the outset: (1) the ultimate transition of the business and 
the parents’ other assets, and (2) the estate tax bill. As regards the first, 
the goal is to ensure that the parents’ objectives for the family are 
satisfied without compromising the strength and survival prospects of 
the business. The objective for the second is to keep the bill as small as 
possible while ensuring a mechanism for payment that won’t unduly 
strain the business. 
If substantial death taxes are expected on the death of the surviving 
parent, it may be very important to structure the timing of various asset 
transitions to ensure that at least 35 percent of the surviving parent’s 
adjusted taxable estate consists of the company’s stock. Two valuable 
benefits may be triggered if this threshold is met. First, a corporate 
redemption of the stock held by the estate may qualify for exchange 
treatment under section 303 to the extent the redemption proceeds do not 
exceed the estate’s liability for death taxes (both federal and state) and 
funeral and administrative expenses.13 The result is that the redemption 
proceeds are income tax free to the estate because of the basis step-up in 
the stock at death. Absent this section 303 benefit, and to the extent any 
redemption proceeds exceed the 303 limits, the redemption proceeds 
likely will constitute taxable dividends to the estate under section 302 
                                                     
12. Id. § 101(a)(1). 
13. Id. § 303(a), (b)(2)(A). The 35-percent threshold may be satisfied by aggregating stock owned 
by the decedent’s estate in two or more corporations if at least 20 percent of the outstanding stock 
value of each corporation is included in the decedent’s gross estate. Solely for purposes of satisfying 
the requisite 20 percent ownership for an included corporation, the interest of the decedent’s 
surviving spouse in stock held as community property, joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, and 
tenants in common may be considered property included in the decedent’s gross estate. Id. 
§ 303(b)(2)(B). 
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because all stock owned by beneficiaries of the estate and their family 
members will be attributed to the estate.14 When corporate funds are 
needed to fund the estate’s tax burden, as is so often the case, this 
section 303 benefit becomes very important. Second, if the 35 percent 
threshold is met, the estate may elect under section 6166 to fund the 
federal estate tax burden over a period of up to 14 years at very 
favorable interest rates.15 In those situations where these two tax relief 
values are important, the timing of the parent’s stock transition program 
prior to death and the value of the parent’s non-stock assets must be 
carefully monitored to ensure that the 35 percent threshold will be met at 
death. 
B. Valuation: Expert Disappearing Acts 
An interest in a business must be valued for tax purposes before it can 
be transferred. The standard is “fair market value”⎯the price a willing 
buyer would pay a willing seller with neither being under any 
compulsion to deal and both having reasonable knowledge of the 
relevant facts.16 Although the standard has been around forever and the 
Service nearly a half century ago provided guidance on how it should be 
applied in valuing closely held business interests,17 serious valuation tax 
                                                     
14. The family and estate ownership attribution rules of section 318 usually make it impossible 
for the transaction to qualify as a redemption that is not essentially equivalent to a dividend under 
302(b)(1), that is a substantially disproportionate redemption under 302(b)(2), or that is a complete 
redemption of the estate’s stock under section 302(b)(3). Id. §§ 302(a), 302(b), 318(a)(1), (a)(3)(A). 
As a result, any redemption proceeds not protected by section 303 are taxed as dividends under 
section 301. Id. §§ 302(d), 301. 
15. The interest rate is two percent on the “2 percent portion,” a number adjusted annually, and 
45 percent of the normal section underpayment rate for any amounts over the “2 percent portion.” 
Id. § 6601(j). For 2008, the “2 percent portion” is $1,280,000. Rev. Proc., 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 
970. The favorable rate comes with a cost; the interest under section 6601 is not deductible for 
estate or income tax purposes. I.R.C. §§ 163(k), 2053(c)(1)(D). In Estate of Roski v. Commissioner, 
128 T.C. 113 (2007), the Tax Court held that the Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) had abused its 
discretion by requiring that all estates who elect the installment option of section 6166 provide a 
bond or security in the form of an extended tax lien. Roski, 128 T.C. at 115. In Notice 2007-90, 
2007-46 I.R.B. 1003, the Service announced that it had changed its policy and the requirement for 
security would be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
16. Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2031-1(b), 25.2512-1 (2006). 
17. In 1959, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, which set forth 
guidelines to be used in valuing the stock of a closely held corporation. The ruling did not use a 
mathematical formula. It discussed factors that should be considered in arriving at a fair market 
value. It recognized that the size of the block of stock was a relevant valuation factor in a closely 
held corporation, specifically noting that a minority interest would be more difficult to sell. Years 
later in Revenue Ruling 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327, the Service stated that the valuation principles of 
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disputes regarding family business interests routinely erupt.  
These disputes teach three important lessons. First, secure the services 
of a professional appraiser. Valuing a closely held business interest 
requires judgment calls that must be made by a professional. Second, get 
the best appraiser available. If a dispute breaks out, the quality, 
reputation, and competence of the appraiser may be the ultimate 
deciding factor. The Tax Court has consistently refused to accept an 
appraisal on its face; it has followed a practice of carefully examining 
the underlying details and assumptions and the quality of the appraiser’s 
analysis.18 A quality appraisal by a competent appraiser may shift the 
ultimate burden of proof to the government19 or result in a complete 
victory. In a celebrated case decided in 1980,20 the Tax Court refused to 
“split the difference” in a valuation dispute, opting instead to declare a 
winner based on a comparative assessment of the credibility of the 
experts on each side. With full knowledge of this winner-take-all 
approach, which has been followed in other key cases,21 an IRS agent 
must carefully size up the company’s appraiser in assessing the value of 
starting any fight.22 Finally, never get too aggressive on value; it can put 
                                                     
59-60 also would apply to partnership interests. 
18. See, e.g., Estate of Kaufman v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1779, 1784 (1999) (declining to 
accept petitioner’s valuation of stock and conducting own two-step inquiry into value); Rabenhorst 
v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2271, 2276 (1996) (holding that a party’s valuation cannot be 
accepted on its face without a consideration of its potential shortcomings). 
19. I.R.C. § 7491 (providing that in any court proceeding, the burden of proof with respect to any 
factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer shall shift to the Secretary [the 
IRS] if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue). In 2007, the Second 
Circuit refused to hold for the taxpayer even though credible evidence had been submitted to shift 
the burden of proof under section 7491 and the IRS had failed to submit a competent appraisal.  
Thompson v. Comm’r, 499 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2007), vacating T.C. Memo 2004-174. The Court 
stated, “[Section 7491] does not require the Tax Court to adopt the taxpayer’s valuation, however 
erroneous, whenever the Court rejects the Commissioner’s proposed value; the burden of disproving 
the taxpayer’s valuation can be satisfied by evidence in the record that impeaches, undermines, or 
indicates error in the taxpayer’s valuation.” Id. at 133. 
20. Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980), acq. 1982-2 C.B. 1. 
(“[E]ach of the parties should keep in mind that, in the final analysis, the Court may find the 
evidence of valuation by one of the parties sufficiently more convincing than that of the other party, 
so that the final result will produce a significant defeat for one or the other, rather than a middle-of-
the-road compromise which we suspect each of the parties expects the Court to reach.”).  
21. See, e.g., Spruill Estate v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1197 (1987), Estate of Gallo v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 
470 (1985), Estate of Daily v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. Memo 710 (2001), Estate of Strangi v Comm’r, 115 
T.C 478 (2000), Smith v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 745 (1999), Estate of Furman v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 2206 (1998); Kohler v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2006-152. 
22. Of course, in some cases the court weighs the competing appraisals and makes its own 
determination. See, e.g., Estate of Lauder v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 985, 1001 (1994) (court’s 
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in play a costly 20 percent penalty (computed on the tax understatement) 
if the value used by the client is 65 percent or less than the ultimate 
determined value.23 The penalty jumps to 40 percent if the client’s 
number falls to 40 percent or less.24 
In every situation involving a closely held business, valuation 
discounts become the name of the game and play an essential role in the 
plan design. In a very real sense, they are the ultimate disappearing act 
because big transfer taxes are saved as the values plummet. Usually, 
there is a dual focus in planning the valuation discounts. First, all stock 
transfers by the parents during life should be structured to qualify for the 
largest possible discounts. Discounts reduce the value of the stock 
transferred, which in turn reduces gift taxes or permits a greater 
leveraging of the gift tax annual exclusion25 and unified credit.26 In our 
case, for example, Earl and Betty will be able transition to Jeff, over 
time and gift tax free, a larger percentage of the company’s stock if the 
value of the shares transferred is heavily discounted. Second, the stock 
transition program should be designed to ensure that any stock 
remaining in a parent’s estate at death qualifies for the maximum 
discounts to minimize any estate tax burden attributable to the stock. 
The two most significant discounts associated with an interest in a 
                                                     
value nearly average of values asserted by respective parties); Estate of Fleming v. Comm’r, 74 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1049, 1051–55 (1997) (court valued company at $875,000, with Service arguing for 
value of $1.1 million and taxpayer asserting value of $604,000); and Estate of Wright v. Comm’r, 
73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1863 (1997) (court valued stock at $45 a share, with Service’s appraisal at $50 a 
share and taxpayer’s appraisal at $38 a share). In select instances, the Tax Court has rejected the 
appraisals submitted by both the Service and the taxpayer on the grounds that the appraisals were 
defective or unreliable. See Rabenhorst, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2276; Estate of Kaufman, 77 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 1784. When both appraisals are rejected, the Service prevails because the burden of proof 
ultimately is on the taxpayer. All the cases confirm the importance of having a quality appraisal 
from a reputable firm. 
23. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (g). 
24. Id.. § 6662(h). Section 6664(c)(1) provides that a taxpayer may avoid the penalties by proving 
reasonable cause and good faith. Reliance on a professional appraisal alone will not do the job. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2006). The taxpayer must show that the appraiser was a competent 
professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, that the taxpayer provided the appraiser 
with all necessary and accurate information, and that the taxpayer relied in good faith on the 
appraisal. Decleene v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 457 (2000). See also Thompson v. Comm’r, 499 F.3d 129, 
135–36 (2007), vacating T.C. Memo 2004-174 (holding that the penalty is mandatory absent proof 
from the taxpayer of good faith reliance). 
25. The annual gift tax annual exclusion is presently $12,000. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1). See infra 
Section IV.A. 
26. The gift tax unified credit is presently $345,800, an amount sufficient to shelter $1 million of 
value (the applicable exclusion amount) from gift taxes. I.R.C. § 2505(a). See infra Section IV.A. 
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closely held business enterprise are the minority interest (lack of control) 
discount and the lack of marketability discount. The minority interest 
discount recognizes that a willing buyer will not pay as much for a 
minority interest: there is no control. The lack of marketability discount 
reflects the reality that a willing buyer will pay less for an interest in a 
closely held business if there is no ready market of future buyers for the 
interest. Usually both discounts are applied in valuing the transferred 
interest.27 The size of the discounts is determined by appraisal. The 
average lack of marketability discount applied by the Tax Court over the 
last forty years is 24 percent.28 Often the two discounts total 35 to 40 
percent.29 These discounts can have a powerful impact in leveraging the 
use of annual gift tax exclusions and unified credits to transfer business 
interests to family members. In this regard (and this is real good news), 
there is no family attribution in applying the discounts.30 The fact that all 
the business interests stay in the family will not eliminate or reduce the 
discounts. Even the separate community property interests of spouses are 
not aggregated for valuation purposes.31 In one case where a 100 percent 
business owner transferred his entire ownership to 11 different family 
members, the Service recognized that each gift would qualify for  
minority interest and lack of marketability discounts.32 Absent such 
discounts, each family member would have received a business interest 
valued at more than nine percent of the total value (100/11 = something 
more than 9). Simply by breaking the ownership interest into minority 
                                                     
27. See generally Dailey v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. 710 (2001); Janda v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. 1100 
(2001); Barnes v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. 881 (1998). 
28. See Janda, 81 T.C.M. at 1104 (“Mr. Schneider [IRS’s expert appraiser] then listed various 
studies made on marketability discounts which are cited by Shannon Pratt in his book Valuing a 
Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely-Held Companies (2d ed. 1989). The studies, 
which deal with marketability discounts in the context of restricted, unregistered securities 
subsequently available in public equity markets, demonstrate mean discounts ranging from 23 
percent to 45 percent. Mr. Schneider also cited several U.S. Tax Court cases that established 
marketability discounts ranging from 26 percent to 35 percent. Finally, Mr. Schneider stated in his 
report that he had consulted a study prepared by Melanie Earles and Edward Miliam which asserted 
that marketability discounts allowed by the Court over the past 36 years averaged 24 percent.”).  
29. See, e.g., Dailey, 82 T.C.M. at 711 (holding that the applicable discount rate was 40 percent); 
Janda, 81 T.C.M. at 1105 (applying a discount rate of 40 percent both for lack of control and 
marketability to prediscount fair market value); Barnes, 76 T.C.M. at 889 (applying discount rates 
of 40 percent and 45 percent). 
30. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 CB 202; Mooneyham v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. 2445, 2447 (1991); 
Ward v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78, 107–08 (1986). 
31. See Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1005 (5th Cir. 1981). 
32. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.  94-49-001 (March 11, 1984). 
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pieces, the discounts reduced the value of each gift to less than six 
percent of the total.33 For tax valuation purposes, the math can be 
exciting: 100/11 = something less than 6. 
In the planning process, care must be taken to avoid the step 
transaction doctrine in structuring transactions to qualify for minority 
and lack of marketability discounts. If, for example, Earl and Betty 
transfer a minority stock interest in the corporation to Jeff and then have 
the corporation redeem the balance of their stock, the step transaction 
doctrine will kick in to deny any valuation discounts on the transfer to 
Jeff.34 A linking of the two transactions kills the discounts because Jeff 
ends up owning a controlling interest in the company. 
Care is required whenever voting control is transferred to a family 
member. The flipside to the discount game is that a control premium, 
often a much as 35 percent, must be considered when voting control is 
transferred.35 This results in a higher valuation and more taxes. The math 
can be just as weird, but in the wrong direction. In one case, the court 
sustained control premiums of 35 percent and 37.5 percent on two 
blocks of stock that aggregated 83 percent of the total stock.36 The net 
result apparently was a value arguably higher than the total value of all 
outstanding stock. When voting control is ultimately transferred and a 
premium value kicks in for tax purposes, the planning challenge is to 
have the control premium attach to the smallest equity interest possible. 
C. The Entity Form: Nothing Easy 
The form of entity usually has a significant impact in the plan design. 
Far and away, corporate entities are the preferred choice for family 
operating businesses. A 2002 survey of family businesses with average 
                                                     
33. Courts have consistently held that, where a donor makes gifts of multiple shares of the same 
security to different donees at the same time, each gift is to be valued separately. See Estate of 
Bosca v Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 62 (1998); Mooneyham v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2445 
(1991); Ward v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Carr v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 507 (1985); see 
also Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 CB 202, revoking Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981 C.B. 187.  
34. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200212006 (March 22, 2002) (“It is well established that where 
the steps of a donative transaction have no independent significance, the courts will collapse the 
individual steps in determining the substance of the transaction.”); see also Heyen v. United States, 
945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991); Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp.2d 700 (W.D. Tex. 1998); 
Estate of Bies v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-338; Senda v. Comm’r, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006). 
35. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 4.02(e); Treas. Reg. 20.2031-2(f) (2006); Rev. Rul. 
89-3, 1989-1 C.B. 278; Estate of Salisbury v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 1441 (1975). 
36. Lewis G. Hutchens Non-Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1993-600, 1599, 1612–
14, 1620 (1993). 
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annual sales of $36 million confirmed that over 89 percent were 
corporations, split relatively equally between C and S status.37 All entity 
forms present planning challenges; none is easy. For C corporations, it is 
the double tax structure that drives up the cost of redemption and 
dividend strategies, the locked-in stock basis that discourages lifetime 
gifting and puts a premium on the basis step-up at death, and the 
alternative minimum tax threat that complicates corporate funding of life 
insurance.38 For S corporations, it is the eligibility requirements that 
preclude partnerships, corporations and most trusts39 from owning stock 
and prevents the use of any preferred stock. For partnership-taxed 
entities, including limited liability companies, it is enhanced self 
employment tax burdens,40 the family partnership income tax rules, the 
                                                     
37. Arthur Anderson/Mass Mutual, American Family Business Survey, 2002. 
38. For a discussion of the relative tax advantages and disadvantages of each entity form, see 
DRAKE, supra note 8, at 33–51. Although the “choice of entity” analysis is heavily tax-driven, there 
are many important non-tax factors that can impact the ultimate decision. Some factors, deemed 
vitally important in the past, no longer impact the final outcome, and there are new issues that now 
must be factored into the mix. In most situations, the analytical process requires the family to 
predict and handicap the future and to consider and project earnings, losses, capital expansion 
needs, debt levels, the possibility of adding new owners, potential exit strategies, the likelihood of a 
sale, the estate planning needs of the owners, and a variety of other factors. The complexity of the 
challenge often is enhanced by the need to use multiple entities to accomplish specific family 
objectives, to protect assets from liability exposure, to limit or control value growth, to scatter 
wealth among family members, to segregate asset-based yields from operational-based risks and 
yields, to shift or defer income, to enhance tax benefits from recognized losses, to facilitate exit 
strategy planning, to satisfy liquidity needs, or to promote a structured discipline that helps ensure 
that all financial bases are covered. It complicates the process, but the benefits usually far outweigh 
any burdens of the added complexity. 
39. In defining S status eligibility, trusts have received serious Congressional attention over the 
years. There has been a constant expansion of the trust eligibility rules. Trusts that are now eligible 
to qualify as S corporation shareholders include: (1) voting trusts; (2) grantor trusts; (3) 
testamentary trusts that receive S corporation stock via a will (but only for a two-year period of 
following the transfer); (4) testamentary trusts that receive S corporation stock via a former grantor 
trust (but only for a two-year period following the transfer; (5) a “qualified subchapter S trust” 
(QSST), which generally is a trust with only one current income beneficiary who is a U.S. resident 
or citizen to whom is distributed all income annually and who that elects to be treated as the owner 
of the S corporation stock for tax purposes; and (6) an “electing small business trust” (ESBT), 
which is a trust whose beneficiaries are qualifying S corporation shareholders who acquired their 
interests in the trust by gift or inheritance, not purchase. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2), (d) (2006). An ESBT 
must elect to be treated as an S corporation shareholder, in which case each current beneficiary of 
the trust is counted as one shareholder for purposes of the maximum 100 shareholder limitation and 
the S corporation income is taxed to the trust at the highest individual marginal rates under the 
provision of section 641. Id. § 1361(c)(2), (e)(1)(A). 
40. Section 1402(a) of the Code specifically provides that a partner’s distributive share of income 
from a partnership constitutes earnings from self-employment. There is a limited statutory exception 
for retired partners and a broader exception for limited partners. Id. § 1402(a)(10), (a)(13). Limited 
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“real partner” requirement for family transfers, potential gift tax annual 
exclusion problems if the operating agreement is too restrictive, and the 
threat of a wealth “recycling” claim that may trigger enhanced estate tax 
exposure under section 2036.41 
Often a desire for a different entity form quickly surfaces in the 
planning process. The most common scenario is the family that is fed up 
with the double tax burdens of its C corporation and longs for the 
flexibility of a pass-through entity. For example, as discussed later, in 
Section IV.D, Wilson Incorporated may want to shed its C status in 
order to have more restructuring flexibility. Conversion from C status to 
partnership tax status via a partnership or a LLC is usually out of the 
question; it will trigger a prohibitively expensive double tax on the 
liquidation of the C corporation.42 Conversion to S status is the only 
                                                     
partners generally can escape self-employment taxes on partnership income that is not a guaranteed 
payment as remuneration for services rendered. Id. § 1402(a)(13). Thus, the key in a partnership 
structure is to fit within this limited partnership exception. 
As for a limited liability company taxed as a partnership that has no limited partners and no basis 
for relying on historical state law distinctions between limited and general partners, the Service’s 
first attempt to provide some guidance on the issue came in 1994 when it published its first 
Proposed Regulations. They provided that a member of a limited liability company could fit within 
the limited partner exception if the member lacked authority to make management decisions 
necessary to conduct the business and the LLC could have been formed as a limited partnership in 
the same jurisdiction. After public comment, new Proposed Regulations were issued in 1997 that 
defined the scope of the limited partnership exception for all entities taxed as a partnership, without 
regard to state law characterizations. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 13, 
1997). Under the 1997 Proposed Regulations, an individual would be treated as a limited partner for 
purposes of the self-employment tax unless the individual was personally liable for the debts of the 
entity by being a partner, had authority to contract on behalf of the entity under applicable law, or 
worked in the business for more than 500 hours during the taxable year. Id. at 1704. The 1997 
Proposed Regulations also drew criticism because LLC members who had authority to contract on 
behalf of the entity could never fit within the limited partner exception. The result was a statutory 
moratorium in 1997 on the issuance of any temporary or proposed regulations dealing with the 
limited partnership exception. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 935, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 883 
(need year). The legislative history confirms that Congress, not the IRS, ultimately must resolve the 
issue. The IRS has provided no additional guidance. 
For planning purposes, this history provides some guidance. Any general partner under state law 
is exposed to the tax. Any limited partner under applicable state law is probably safe. As for LLC 
members, any member who can fit within the 1997 Proposed Regulations’ definition is justified in 
relying on the statutory limited partner exception. Beyond that definition, it becomes more difficult 
and uncertain in evaluating the facts and circumstances of each situation. The risk escalates in direct 
proportion to the individual’s authority to act on behalf of the entity and the scope of any services 
rendered. 
41. I.R.C. § 2036. For a discussion of each of these issues in the context of transition planning, 
see infra Section V.B. 
42. Id. §§ 331, 336. If, for example, the corporation is subject to a 34 percent marginal tax rate 
and the shareholder pays a 15 percent capital gains rate, the combined tax burden on any distributed 
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viable option, but it is not free of hassles. 
A conversion from C status to S status creates potential tax traps that 
need to be carefully evaluated and monitored. If the company values its 
inventory under the last-in-first-out (LIFO) method, conversion to S 
status will trigger a recapture of the LIFO recapture amount, to be 
funded over a four-year period.43 Accumulated earnings and profits from 
the company’s prior C period will trigger a taxable dividend to the 
shareholders if shareholder distributions from the S corporation exceed 
earnings during the S period.44 A corporate level built-in gains tax will 
be triggered if assets owned by the corporation at time of conversion are 
sold within the ten-year period following the conversion.45 This will 
require a careful monitoring of any asset sales during the ten-year 
window. Finally, if the net passive income received by the S corporation 
exceeds 25 percent of its receipts during a period that it has undistributed 
earnings and profits from its C existence, a corporate level tax will be 
triggered and the S status could be put in jeopardy if the condition 
persists.46 
In many family situations, conversion from C to S status will help the 
transition planning process by opening up more restructuring options. 
                                                     
appreciation in the liquidation will be 43.9 percent [34 + (15 x (1-34))]. 
43. Id. § 1363(d). The LIFO recapture amount is the excess of what the inventory value would be 
under the first-in-first-out (FIFO) method over the LIFO valuation method used by the corporation. 
Id. § 1363(d)(3). The size of the recapture amount is a function of the historical increases in 
inventory costs and how fast the inventory turns. 
44. Id. § 1368(c)(2). The taxable dividend exposure is limited by the amount of the corporation’s 
earnings and profits from its C corporation existence and ends once the earnings and profits have 
been distributed. An S corporation, with the consent of all shareholders, may elect to accelerate such 
dividends by treating all distributions as earnings and profits distributions. Id. § 1368(e)(3). Such an 
acceleration may facilitate the use of the favorable 15 percent tax rate on dividends before its 
scheduled expiration in 2010. 
45. See generally id. § 1374. The tax is imposed at the highest corporate tax rate (presently 35 
percent) on the lesser of (1) the gain recognized on the sale or (2) the asset’s built-in gain at the time 
of the S conversion. This corporate level tax is in addition to the tax that the shareholder bears as a 
result of the S corporation’s gain being passed through and taxed to the shareholder. The only relief 
to this forced double tax is that the tax paid by the corporation is treated as a loss to the shareholders 
in the same year. 
46. See generally id. §§ 1375, 1362(d)(3). For purposes of these provisions, the term “passive 
investment income” includes interest, dividends, royalties, and rents. Id. § 1362(d)(3)(C). If the 25 
percent threshold is met, the highest corporate tax rate (presently 35 percent) applies to the excess of 
the net passive income over 25 percent of the total receipts. The actual calculation of the tax is 
complicated by factoring in any expenses directly connected to the passive income. Plus, an S 
corporation can lose its S status⎯a disaster⎯if it allows the condition to exist for three consecutive 
years. If the S election is lost, relief may be possible by timely showing that the circumstances 
resulting in the termination were inadvertent. Id. § 1362(f). 
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The potential tax traps described above, all of which are triggered by the 
conversion, prompt some to take the conversion option off the table. 
This is usually ill-advised. These traps should be viewed as serious 
nuisances that are capable of being monitored and often can be mitigated 
or eliminated entirely. Seldom will they justify rejecting a conversion 
that will provide needed planning flexibility in the given situation. 
D. Life Insurance: Structural Blunders 
The stock transition plan must be coordinated with the parents’ life 
insurance planning. In many family businesses, life insurance provides 
essential liquidity to pay the death taxes, to cover the cash needs of the 
family, and to free the business of cash burdens that otherwise might 
adversely impact operations or threaten its survival.47 A central 
challenge in the planning process is to ensure that the life insurance 
proceeds are not taxed in the parents’ estates. Usually, but not always, 
the best strategy to accomplish this essential tax objective is to park the 
ownership of the policy in an irrevocable trust that has no legal 
connection to the corporation. However, in many situations, the cash- 
flow pressures of funding the premiums and the interests of other 
shareholders result in the policy having close ties to the business. In 
every such situation, the policy ownership and beneficiary decisions 
need to be carefully evaluated up front to eliminate tax problems and 
unintended consequences. This usually requires some basic “what if” 
analysis to avoid blunders that can undermine the entire effort. The 
following are key traps to avoid. 
1. Constructive Premium Dividend Trap 
To illustrate how this trap surfaces, assume in our case study that Earl 
and Betty, owners of 90 percent of the corporation’s stock, enter into a 
cross-purchase buy-sell agreement48 with Jeff, the owner of the 
remaining 10 percent. To ensure funding of the cross-purchase on the 
death of a shareholder, the parties agree that corporate resources will be 
                                                     
47. In a 2002 survey of successful family business owners (average annual sales of $36.5 
million), nearly one-half (47.7%) of the responding owners listed life insurance as their primary 
source of funds to pay death taxes and listed life insurance trusts as the most frequently used estate 
planning technique. Arthur Anderson/Mass Mutual, American Family Business Survey, 2002. 
48. A cross-purchase buy-sell agreement is an agreement among the shareholders of a corporation 
in which the shareholders contractually agree to purchase the stock of a co-shareholder under 
defined conditions and on specific terms that are set forth in the agreement. 
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used to fund life insurance policies on Earl and Jeff. Jeff, the minority 
shareholder, owns a $9 million policy on Earl’s life to cover the 90 
percent of the stock owned by Earl and Betty, and Earl and Betty own a 
$1 million policy on Jeff’s life to cover the stock owned by Jeff. Absent 
careful planning, it is likely that the payments made by the corporation 
to fund the premiums on these policies owned by the shareholders will 
be treated as distributions with respect to stock for tax purposes. In a C 
corporation, these payments will trigger constructive taxable 
dividends—an added tax burden.49 In an S corporation, it is possible that 
the arrangement (which produces larger distributions for the benefit of 
the minority shareholder Jeff) could be considered a second class of 
stock that would kill the S election—a bombshell.50 Cash pressures often 
require that corporate resources be used to fund premiums on policies 
that are going to be owned by other parties, including life insurance 
trusts. Whenever this common condition exists, great care must be 
exercised to structure compensation and other arrangements that account 
for such premium payments in the most tax efficient manner possible. It 
adds complexity, but the complexity is essential in this situation. 
2. The Lopsided Cross-Purchase Disaster 
Assume the same cross-purchase scenario as described above, except 
the parties have eliminated the constructive dividend threat by 
implementing a compensation structure to account for the premium 
payments. Earl then dies, and Jeff uses the tax-free $9 million death 
benefit that he receives to acquire Earl and Betty’s stock. Soon after 
Jeff’s acquisition of the stock, he sells the company for its $10 million 
value. The income tax hit to Jeff on the sale is peanuts because of the 
high stock basis resulting from his purchase of the stock. Jeff walks from 
the sale with roughly $9.9 million after tax.51 In contrast, Earl and 
Betty’s heirs, including Jeff, collectively net less than $5 million from 
Earl and Betty’s 90 percent stock interest after the estate tax hit on the 
                                                     
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1316, 1322–24 (1980); Ashby v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 409, 
417 (1968); Hood v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 172, 179–81 (2000); Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42. 
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(i)(vi) ex. 6 (CCH 2007). If there is a binding agreement to 
use corporate funds to pay the premiums, the risk of a second class of stock finding is very high and 
the S status may be in jeopardy. See id. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(vi) ex. 6. See also Minton v. Comm’r, 2007 
T.C.M. (RIA) 2011, 2016 (2007) (“[T]he corporation ceases to qualify as an S corporation . . . upon 
the creation of a second class of stock.”). 
51. Jeff’s only income tax cost on the sale would be the capital gains hit on the gain recognized 
on the 10 percent stock interest that he has historically owned. 
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$9 million purchase price is absorbed.52 Jeff, having shed the business, 
nets a monstrous benefit from the company compared to his siblings, a 
result Earl and Betty may have never intended. The simple lesson is to 
carefully factor in family dynamics before ever adopting a buy-sell or 
insurance structure commonly used by unrelated parties. In this 
situation, fundamental family objectives likely would have been 
immeasurably improved by having a life insurance trust own the policy 
on Earl’s life under a structure that ensured freedom from income, 
estate, and generation-skipping tax consequences. 
3. The Majority Shareholder Trap 
Assume in the prior example that, to facilitate corporate funding of 
the premiums on the policy that insures Earl’s life, the corporation 
actually owns the policy. Thus, the corporation just pays premiums on 
an asset that it owns. The corporation, as the policy owner, then names 
Jeff as the beneficiary. If Earl owns more than 50 percent of the 
corporation’s outstanding voting stock on his death, the entire death 
benefit paid under the policy will be taxed in his estate because he will 
be deemed to have retained incidents of ownership in the policy by 
virtue of his majority stock position in the company.53 Earl’s gross 
taxable estate will have mushroomed even though the death benefit is 
paid to Jeff. This trap kicks in when the death benefit of a corporate-
owned policy insuring the life of a majority stockholder is paid to a party 
other than the corporation.54 The trap can be avoided by naming the 
policy’s corporate owner as the policy’s sole beneficiary or by making 
sure that the insured does not own a majority of the corporation’s 
outstanding voting stock. As regards the stock ownership threshold, the 
good news in a community property state is that, for purposes of this 
trap, an insured will not be deemed to own his or her spouse’s 
community property interest in any stock.55 
                                                     
52. The calculation assumes that the present 45 percent marginal federal estate rate is in effect. 
[$9 million x (1-.45) = $4.95 million]. 
53. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6). 
   54. Id.  
55. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-46-004 (Aug. 8, 1997) (ruling that the majority voting stock 
requirement was not met when the decedent and his spouse each owned a 36 percent community 
property interest in the corporation’s stock). 
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4. Corporate Ownership Traps 
As previously stated, if the corporation is the named beneficiary on a 
corporate-owned policy that insures the life of the majority stockholder, 
the death benefit paid to the corporation on the death of the majority 
shareholder will not be included in the shareholder’s estate.56 But, that is 
not the end of the story. The corporation’s ownership of the policy may 
trigger other burdens. First, the family usually needs to get the insurance 
proceeds out of the corporation to satisfy the cash objectives of the 
family. This often creates unpleasant dividend income tax burdens when 
a C corporation is involved. The same burdens exist, but not to the same 
degree, for an S corporation that has undistributed earnings and profits 
from a prior C corporation existence.57 Second, the death benefit may 
trigger an alternative minimum tax (“AMT”)58 for the corporation 
because the amount by which the death benefit exceeds the corporation’s 
basis in the policy will add to the corporation’s adjusted current earning 
for AMT purposes.59 Finally, although the death benefit of an insurance 
                                                     
56. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2), (6). 
57. The tax-free receipt of the life insurance proceeds by the S corporation does not increase the 
accumulated adjustment account of the S corporation. See I.R.C. §§ 101(a)(1), 1368(e)(1)(A) (West 
2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2. Any distributions by the S corporation in excess of its accumulated 
adjustment account (a likely result if life insurance proceeds are distributed) will trigger a taxable 
dividend to the shareholders to the extent the S corporation has any undistributed earnings and 
profits from its C corporation existence. See I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2). 
58. The corporate alternative minimum tax is structured to ensure that a C corporation that claims 
various tax benefits under the “regular tax” will pay a minimum tax amount.  The corporate AMT is 
20 percent of the amount by which the corporation’s alternative minimum taxable income exceeds 
the $40,000 exemption amount, reduced by the corporation’s alternative minimum foreign tax credit 
for the year.  See I.R.C. §§ 55(a), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), (c), (d)(2), 56. 
59. See id. § 55(g). Not all C corporations are subject to an alternative minimum tax. There are 
blanket exceptions for a C corporation’s first year of operation, any C corporation with average 
annual gross receipts of less than $5 million during its first three years, and any C corporation with 
average annual gross receipts of less than $7.5 million during any three-year period thereafter. Id. 
§ 55(e). The Pension Protection Act of 2006 added section 101(j), which subjects a portion of the 
proceeds paid on certain employer-owned life insurance polices to income taxation. If section 101(j) 
is applicable to a policy, the excess of the death benefit received over the total premiums and other 
amounts paid for the policy will be taxable income. The section applies to an “employer-owned life 
insurance contract,” which is generally defined to include any policy owned by and for the benefit 
of a business that insures the life of a person who was an employee of the business at the time the 
policy was issued. There are substantial exceptions that, as a practical matter, will render the 
provision irrelevant in most business and executive planning situations. The exceptions preserve 
tax-free treatment if the insured was an employee during the 12-month period before the insured’s 
death, if the insured was a director or highly compensated employee of the business, if the proceeds 
were payable to the insured’s estate, members of the insured’s family or a trust established for their 
benefit, or if the proceeds were used to acquire an equity interest in the business from the insured’s 
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policy owned by and payable to a corporation will not be included in the 
taxable estate of the shareholder, the value of the stock in the insured’s 
taxable estate may be adversely impacted by the corporation’s receipt of 
the insurance proceeds. Depending on the existence of a buy-sell 
agreement, its compliance with the section 2703 requirements,60 and the 
underlying purpose of the corporation’s ownership of the insurance, the 
valuation impact will vary, but in most cases the proceeds will not have 
a dollar-for-dollar impact.61 
5. Transfer-for-Value Trap 
Unraveling a corporate ownership life insurance structure may trigger 
a transfer-for-value trap that will destroy the income tax-free receipt of 
the death benefit. Assume, in our case, that the corporation is both the 
owner and the beneficiary of the policy insuring Earl’s life and that the 
family later determines that the AMT impacts and the tax problems 
created by having the death benefit paid to the corporation are 
intolerable. To remedy the situation, the corporation transfers ownership 
of the policy to Jeff as additional compensation or as part of a dividend 
                                                     
estate or members of the insured’s family. Id. §§ 101(j)(2), 414(q), 105(h)(5). The one potential trap 
is that an exception will apply only if the notice and consent requirements of the new provision are 
met before the policy is issued. These requirements mandate that, before the policy is issued, the 
company must provide a written notice to the insured of the company’s intention to own; be the 
beneficiary of the policy; the insured must consent in writing to being the insured on a policy that 
may continue after the insured’s termination of employment. Id. §§ 101(j)(2), 101(j)(4). 
60.  Id. § 2703. See related discussion in infra Section III.E.1. 
61. A leading case in dealing with the valuation issue in the context of key person insurance is 
Estate of Huntsman.v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 861 (1976), acq., 1977-2 C.B. 1. In Huntsman, the 
IRS claimed that all the proceeds of the insurance policies received by the corporation on the death 
of the decedent would have to be added in determining the value of the stock in the decedent’s 
estate. Id. at 869–70. In rejecting the IRS approach, the Tax Court held that the insurance proceeds 
should be given “consideration” in the valuation process. Id. at 874. Essentially, the court 
determined that, to the extent the valuation of the business was based upon the net assets of the 
business, the insurance proceeds should be included in the asset value calculation. Id. at 874–75. 
However, the court reasoned that, to the extent the stock valuation was based on a price/earnings 
multiple, the insurance proceeds may strengthen the cash position of the company, which in turn 
may impact the determination, but it would not be a dollar-for-dollar impact. Id. at 878. The most 
interesting aspect of the Huntsman case is the final result that surfaced after all the calculations were 
completed. In that case, the earnings multiple basis of valuation was weighted three times heavier 
than the net asset basis of valuation. Id. In addition, the court discounted the value of the decedent’s 
stock to reflect the loss of the decedent’s value to the corporation. Id. at 879. The bottom line was 
that, for the first corporation in the case, the ultimate value was increased approximately twenty-
four cents for each dollar of insurance received. See id. For the second corporation in the case, the 
ultimate valuation was increased approximately thirty-three cents for each dollar of insurance 
received. See id. 
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distribution. This shift in ownership will trigger the transfer-for-value 
rule62 under section 101(a)(2), effectively destroying Jeff’s capacity to 
receive the death benefit income tax free. It’s a disaster. Exceptions to 
this harsh result exist for transfers to the insured, gratuitous transfers 
from the insured, transfers to (but not from) a corporation in which the 
insured is a shareholder or officer, and transfers among partners.63 The 
lesson is to carefully set the best insurance structure up front. Changes 
can be costly and sometimes tax prohibitive. 
As stated above, often the smartest life insurance strategy is to use an 
irrevocable trust that has no legal ties to the corporation. The trust is 
both the owner and the beneficiary of the policy. The identity and rights 
of the trust beneficiaries need to be carefully coordinated with the entire 
transition plan to protect the respective interests of the inside and outside 
children. This structure avoids corporate ownership traps and tax 
burdens, ensures that a structure commonly used by unrelated business 
parties does not become the default option for the family, and, if done 
right, protects the death benefit from estate tax exposure.64 The premium 
funding burden might still exist; careful planning may be necessary to 
get funds out of the corporation and into the trust to cover the premiums 
on the policy. Often, this will require compensation payments or S 
corporation distributions to the parents, followed by annual gifts to the 
trust that are carefully structured to be gift-tax protected by the parents’ 
annual exclusions or unified credits.65 
                                                     
62. Amounts received under a life insurance contract generally are not taxable as income under 
section 101(a)(1). An exception to this broad income exclusion, known as the transfer-for-value 
rule, is triggered whenever a life insurance contract is transferred for valuable consideration. When 
such a transfer occurs, the portion of the proceeds excluded from the income tax may not exceed the 
sum of such valuable consideration and any premiums paid by the transferee.  I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). 
63. Id. § 101(a)(2). 
64. Life insurance proceeds will not be included in the insured’s taxable estate if the insured 
owned no incidents of ownership in the policy at death and owned no such incidents during the 
three-year period preceding death. Id. §§ 2035(a)(2), 2042. 
65. The challenge in many plans is to build provisions into the trust that will enable the gifts that 
are made to fund the premium burden to qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion. In almost all 
situations, this is done by including special Crummey withdrawal rights in the trust that convert a 
trust beneficiary’s future interest in the gifts to a present interest, which in turn qualify the gifts for 
the annual gift tax exclusion. This Crummey withdrawal right, named after the case that made it 
famous, Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968), is a special provision in the trust 
that gives each beneficiary, for a limited period of time, the right to withdraw a portion of any gift 
made to the trust. The existence of this right, even if it is not exercised and is allowed to “lapse,” 
will convert a future trust interest to a present trust interest so that the contribution will qualify for 
the annual gift tax exclusion under section 2503(b)(1). See Crummey, 397 F.2d at 86, 88. 
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E. Multiple Family Owners: More is Tougher 
The planning takes on a new dimension as multiple family members 
and trusts begin acquiring stock in the company. The rights and interests 
of the various shareholders need to be clarified by agreement to keep 
expectations in line, protect the business, and mitigate the risk of ugly 
confrontations. Plus, care must be exercised to avoid certain tax traps 
that can surface as the parents implement their stock transition plan. 
A buy-sell agreement between all the shareholders becomes essential 
once the transition process begins. The agreement should anticipate how 
and when the balance of the parents’ stock in the company will be 
transitioned. Often special provisions tailored to the unique needs of the 
parents and not applicable to the stock held by the children will be 
required. The agreement also must address the stock held by the children 
to ensure that all stock stays in the family and that a child has a fair exit 
sellout option if the child dies or needs to cash-in because of bankruptcy, 
divorce, disability, sibling discord, or some other compelling 
circumstance. This family buy-sell agreement should be carefully crafted 
to meet the specific needs of those family members who own, or in the 
future may own, stock in the company. 
1. Buy-Sell Valuation Trap 
The buy-sell valuation trap surfaces when the stock owned by a 
deceased family member is sold pursuant to the terms of a buy-sell 
agreement, but the price paid under the agreement is less than the value 
of the sold stock for estate tax purposes. The decedent’s estate ends up 
paying estate taxes on a value that was never realized. 
The key to avoiding this trap is to structure the buy-sell agreement so 
that it fixes the value of the company’s stock for federal estate tax 
purposes. The Service perceives buy-sell agreements as potential tools to 
abuse the valuation process, particularly in family situations.66 For this 
reason, section 2703 was added to the Code in 1990 to specify certain 
criteria that must be satisfied in order for a buy-sell agreement price to 
control for estate tax valuation purposes. Section 2703(b) imposes a 
three-part test: 
(1) The agreement must be a bona fide business arrangement; 
                                                     
66. See, e.g., St. Louis Bank v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982); Estate of Lauder v. 
Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1643 (1992); Carpenter v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1274 (1992); 
Seltzer v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1250 (1985). 
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(2) The agreement must not be a device to transfer property to 
members of the decedent’s family for less than full value and 
adequate consideration in money or money’s worth; and 
(3) The terms of the agreement must be comparable to similar 
arrangements entered into by persons in an arm’s-length 
transaction.67 
Each of the three requirements must be satisfied, along with the 
requirements imposed by regulations that existed before the adoption of 
section 2703.68 In most cases, the third requirement of section 2703 will 
prove to be the most difficult. The comparable arm’s-length 
determination is made at the time the agreement is entered into, not 
when the rights under the agreement are exercised.69 This third 
requirement will be satisfied if the agreement is comparable to the 
general practice of unrelated parties under negotiated agreements in the 
same industry.70 An effort must be made to determine what others in the 
same industry are doing. If multiple valuation methods are used in the 
industry, the requirement can be satisfied by showing that the valuation 
mechanism in the agreement is comparable to one of the commonly used 
methods.71 If there are no industry standards because of the unique 
nature of the business, standards for similar types of businesses may be 
used to establish the arm’s-length terms of the agreement.72 
Because section 2703 is targeted at abuses among family members, 
the regulations to section 2703 provide an exception in those situations 
where over fifty percent of the equity ownership interests in the business 
                                                     
67. I.R.C. § 2703(b). 
68. Three criteria established under applicable law before the adoption of section 2703 must be 
satisfied: (1) the price must be specified or readily ascertainable pursuant to terms of the agreement 
and the value must have been reasonable when entered into; (2) the decedent’s estate must be 
obligated to sell at death at the specified price; and (3) the decedent must have been restricted from 
selling or transferring the interest during life. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (2007). This third 
condition is not satisfied if the decedent had a right to transfer the interest by gift during life to a 
person who was not subject to the same restrictions. Id. As a minimum, this provision generally 
requires that the interest be subject to a right of first refusal at the fixed or determinable price under 
the agreement during the decedent’s life. Id. 
69. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(i); see also Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, 2006 T.C.M. (RIA) 539, 539 
(2006) (holding that evidence of price in other arm’s-length transactions may be used to sustain the 
burden of proof). 
70. Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(i). It is not necessary that the provisions parallel the terms of 
any particular agreement. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(ii). 
71.  Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(ii). 
72.  Id. 
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are owned by non-family members. 73 In order for the exception to apply, 
the equity interests owned by the unrelated parties must be subject to the 
same restrictions and limitations as those applicable to the transferor.74 If 
this fifty-percent test and the three pre-section 2703 basic structural 
requirements are met,75 the requirements of section 2703 are deemed 
satisfied and the value determined pursuant to the agreement will govern 
for estate tax purposes. 
2. Preferred Stock Traps 
In many situations, the parent’s desire to use preferred stock to 
facilitate the stock transition process to other family members. Extreme 
caution is required whenever preferred equity interests are considered in 
the plan design. The issuance of preferred stock will kill an S election, 
and the existence of preferred stock may make a future S election 
impossible if the holder of the stock is unwilling to surrender his or her 
preferred rights.76 Of far greater concern is section 2701, the provision 
that assigns a zero value to a retained preferred interest that does not 
contain a “qualified payment” right when there is a transfer of a common 
equity interest to a family member.77 Assume, for example, that a C 
corporation has outstanding common stock valued at $3 million and non-
cumulative preferred stock valued at $2 million, all owned by the parent. 
If the parent sold the common stock to an unrelated party for $3 million, 
the parent would simply report capital gain income on the excess of the 
$3 million sale price over the parent’s tax basis in the sold stock. If, 
however, the parent sold the common stock to a child for $3 million, the 
parent also would be deemed to have made a $2 million taxable gift to 
the child. This extreme result is mandated by section 2701, which 
requires that the preferred stock retained by the parent be valued at zero 
and the common stock sold to the child be assigned a value of $5 
                                                     
73. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(3). Family members include the transferor’s spouse, any ancestor of the 
transferor or the transferor’s spouse, any spouse of any such ancestor, and any lineal descendant of 
the parents of the transferor or the transferor’s spouse (but not spouses of such descendants). Id. 
§§ 25.2701-2(b)(5), 25.2703-1(b)(3). Broad entity attribution rules are used to determine ownership, 
with an interest being deemed a family interest if it is attributed to both a family and non-family 
member. Id. §§ 25.2701-6(a)(2)-(4), 25.2703-1(b)(3). 
74. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(3). 
75. For a summary of the three criteria established under applicable law before the adoption of 
section 2703, see supra note 68; see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h). 
76. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (2006). 
77. Id. § 2701(a)(3)(A). 
DRAKE-FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM 
Transitioning the Family Business 
151 
million. And the parent still owns the preferred! This taxable gift can be 
avoided only if the parties agree that qualified dividend payments 
henceforth will be made to the parent on a regular basis and actually 
make such payments.78 In that event, the retained preferred stock would 
be valued based on the size of the qualified payments, and the gift would 
be reduced accordingly. But such qualified payments can be 
burdensome; they trigger double-taxed dividend income to the parent, 
drain cash from the corporation, and pump up the parent’s taxable estate. 
The lesson is to keep a very close eye on section 2701 whenever 
preferred equity interests are part of the mix. 
3. Voting Stock Trap 
This trap is triggered when a parent transfers stock in a controlled 
corporation and, through some means, “directly or indirectly” retains the 
right to vote the stock. When this condition exists, section 2036(b) kicks 
in and the stock is brought back into the parent’s estate for estate tax 
purposes. The transfer will have done nothing to reduce the parent’s 
future estate tax burden. A corporation will be considered a “controlled 
corporation” if at any time after the transfer and within three years of 
death, the transferring parent owned, or is deemed to have owned under 
the broad family and entity attribution rules of section 318,79 at least 20 
percent of the total combined voting power of all stock80—a condition 
that is easily satisfied by nearly every family corporation. The “directly 
or indirectly” language extends the reach of the section 2036(b) trap to 
many situations, including those where the parent votes transferred stock 
held in trust, where the parent is a general partner of a partnership that 
owns the transferred stock, and where the parent, through an express or 
implied agreement, retains the right to reacquire voting authority or has 
the right to influence or designate how the stock will be voted.81 The 
safest way to avoid this trap is to transfer nonvoting stock, an option 
available to both C and S family corporations.82 Plus, in addition to 
avoiding section 2036(b) threats, use of nonvoting stock usually will 
                                                     
78. Id. § 2701(a)(3), (c)(3). 
79. See id. § 318. 
80. Id. § 2036(b)(2). 
81. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999 (June 7, 1999) (transferor general partner of 
partnership); Rev. Rul. 80-346, 1980-2 C.B. 271 (oral agreement with transferor). 
82. Use of nonvoting stock does not trigger the trap. See Rev. Rul. 81-15, 1981-1 C.B. 458; Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-2(a), 49 Fed. Reg. 35143 (Aug. 3, 1983). 
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buttress the application of a lack of control valuation discount. The need 
for nonvoting stock often requires a simple tax-free recapitalization to 
convert outstanding voting common stock to both voting and nonvoting 
stock. 
The transition planning process should anticipate and avoid problems 
with the family buy-sell agreement and the preferred stock and voting 
stock traps. As other family members begin acquiring stock, the process 
also should address the expectations of the new shareholders and their 
perceptions of their new wealth. They are no longer just family 
members; they are now owners. Usually there is a need for education 
and dialogue on a broad range of basic issues, including limitations 
imposed by the buy-sell agreement, the rationale for using nonvoting 
stock, cash flow expectations, future transition plans, and more. The goal 
is to keep all shareholders informed and to ensure that expectations are 
in line with reality. 
F. Marital Deduction Traps 
Smart use of the marital deduction is essential in most plans. It is the 
tool that eliminates any estate tax bite on the death of the first spouse, 
deferring all taxes until the survivor’s death. Although rationales are 
sometimes spouted for paying some taxes at the first death, they are 
always based on problematic assumptions and ignore the simple reality 
that most clients, particularly business owners, have no stomach for 
paying taxes any sooner than absolutely necessary. In most situations, 
the game plan is to transfer to a qualified terminable interest property 
(QTIP) trust the smallest portion of the deceased spouse’s estate 
necessary to eliminate all taxes in the estate.83 To qualify for the marital 
deduction, the QTIP must mandate that, during the life of the surviving 
spouse, all QTIP income will be currently paid to the surviving spouse 
and no person other than the surviving spouse may receive property 
distributions from the trust.84 A closely held business interest that 
comprises the bulk of the estate can trigger problems with a QTIP. 
                                                     
83. Although both a direct bequest to the surviving spouse and a bequest to a QTIP trust may 
qualify for the marital deduction and eliminate any estate tax liability on the death of the first 
spouse, the QTIP offers advantages that often make it the preferred option. With a QTIP, the first 
spouse to die can specify and limit the surviving spouse’s access to the principal (not income) of the 
trust, can designate how the trust remainder will be distributed on the death of the surviving spouse, 
can help protect the trust estate against creditor claims of the trust beneficiaries, and can help 
preserve valuable discounts. 
84. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7). 
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1. The Minority Discount QTIP Trap 
The Minority Discount QTIP trap surfaces when a controlling interest 
in the business is included in the estate of the first spouse to die, but only 
a minority interest in the business is used to fund the QTIP. The same 
specific shares in the estate are given a high value for gross estate 
valuation purposes and a lower discounted minority interest value for 
marital deduction purposes. This whipsawing nets a marital deduction 
that is too low, and the estate of the first spouse to die ends up with an 
unanticipated estate tax liability.85 Plus, if the underfunded marital 
deduction resulted in an overfunding of a credit shelter trust—a likely 
result in many cases—the surviving spouse may be deemed to have 
made a taxable gift to the credit shelter trust.86 And, there is more. If the 
surviving spouse has an income interest in the credit shelter trust, the 
property that constituted the constructive gift likely will be pulled back 
into the taxable estate of the surviving spouse at death under section 
2036.87 The key to avoiding all this mess is to make certain that if the 
estate owns a controlling stock interest in the business, the QTIP is 
funded with other estate assets or with stock that represents a controlling 
interest. 
The trap also can surface when a controlling stock interest is 
designated to pass directly to the surviving spouse under the will or 
living trust of the first spouse to die, but the surviving spouse disclaims a 
portion of the bequest88 and, as a result, ends up receiving a minority 
stock interest. In calculating the estate tax on the first death, the size of 
the marital deduction will be predicated on the discounted minority 
valuation of the stock, triggered by the surviving spouse’s disclaimer.89 
Again, the same shares are given a higher valuation for gross estate 
inclusion purposes than for marital deduction purposes. 
There is a flipside to this trap that may produce a positive result in the 
right situation. If the QTIP is funded with a controlling interest in the 
                                                     
85. See Estate of DiSanto v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1226–27 (1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 90-50-004 (Aug. 31, 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-47-065 (July 12, 1991). 
86. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-16-003 (Dec. 27, 1990). 
87. See I.R.C. § 2036(a); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-16-003 (Dec. 27, 1990). 
88. Such a disclaimer is effective for transfer tax purposes if (1) it is in writing and delivered 
within 9 months of the date the property interest is created, (2) the disclaiming party has not 
accepted the property interest or any related benefits, and (3) the property interest passes without 
any direction by the disclaiming party. I.R.C. § 2518. 
89. See Estate of DiSanto v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1226–27 (1999). 
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stock and the credit shelter trust is funded with a minority stock interest, 
the stock passing to the QTIP may qualify for a control premium for 
marital deduction valuation purposes. The end result is that fewer shares 
may need to pass to the QTIP to secure the needed martial deduction, 
leaving more shares for the credit shelter trust.90 
2. The Buy-Sell QTIP Trap 
The buy-sell QTIP trap may be triggered when the QTIP is funded 
with corporate stock that is subject to a buy-sell agreement. If the 
agreement gives other family members the right to buy the stock 
pursuant to a price established under the agreement and the requirements 
of section 2703 are not satisfied,91 the price paid for the stock under the 
agreement will not be controlling for estate tax purposes. As a result, the 
value of the stock for estate tax purposes, as ultimately determined, may 
be greater than the price paid under the buy-sell agreement. In that event, 
the buyers of the stock may be deemed to have received an economic 
benefit from the QTIP during the life of the surviving spouse by virtue 
of their right to buy the stock for less than full consideration, and the 
entire QTIP marital deduction may be blown.92 The key to avoiding this 
trap is to ensure compliance with the section 2703 requirements or to 
make certain that any stock passing to the QTIP is not subject to a buy-
sell agreement. 
3. The Non-QTIP Trap 
Assume in our case study that, at Earl’s death, his estate owns 45 
percent of the stock and Betty owns 45 percent of the stock. The 45 
percent owned by the estate would constitute a minority interest for 
estate tax purposes.93  Assume that Earl’s will or living trust mandates 
that a portion of his stock pass directly to Betty in order to secure a 
marital deduction to eliminate any estate tax liability. Betty would end 
up directly owning a controlling interest in the stock, which would be 
valued as such for estate tax purposes on her death. In contrast, assume 
                                                     
90. See Estate of Chenoweth v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1577, 1588–90 (1987). 
91. See supra Section III.E.1. 
92. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II); Estate of Rinaldi v. United States., 97-2 U.S.T.C. 60,281 
(Fed. Cl. 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-065 (Aug. 30, 1991). 
93. See Estate of Bright v. United States., 658 F.2d 999, 1002–03 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Rev. 
Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202; Mooneyham v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2445, 2447 (1991); Ward 
v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78, 107–09 (1986). 
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that Earl had left the requisite marital deduction stock to a QTIP trust to 
secure the marital deduction. The stock owned by the QTIP, although 
not owned by Betty, would be taxed in her estate. Both Betty and the 
QTIP would own minority stock interests that, if aggregated, would 
constitute a controlling interest. Even though both interests would be 
taxed in Betty’s estate, they would be valued for estate tax purposes as 
two separate minority interests, not one controlling interest.94 The lesson 
is that use of a QTIP in designing any gift or testamentary marital 
deduction components of the plan may preserve valuable discounts that 
otherwise would be lost with direct inter-spousal transfers. 
4. The Permission Sale QTIP Trap 
This trap occurs when the QTIP trust is funded with stock of the 
family corporation and the trustee of the QTIP is restricted from selling 
the stock without the consent of a third party. Suppose, for example, that 
Earl dies and a portion of his stock is used to fund a QTIP trust that is 
intended to qualify for the marital deduction, and the family buy-sell 
agreement prohibits any family member or trust from selling stock 
without the consent of Jeff, the CEO. Such a consent requirement likely 
would destroy the QTIP trust from qualifying for the marital deduction. 
A key QTIP requirement is that all income of the trust must be paid to 
the surviving spouse at least annually.95 To protect this right of the 
surviving spouse, regulations provide that the QTIP trust must require 
the trustee to convert stock into income producing property on the 
request of the surviving spouse.96 The Service has ruled that this 
requirement will not be satisfied if any stock sale is conditioned on the 
consent of another family member.97 The key to avoiding the trap is to 
ensure that any stock consent requirements imposed by the family buy-
sell agreement are not applicable to the trustee of any QTIP trust. 
The QTIP trust is an essential element of most transition plans. It 
bridges the gap between the deaths of the parents, eliminates estate taxes 
on the death of the first parent, ensures that each parent can control the 
ultimate disposition of his or her property, provides management and 
creditor protection benefits, and preserves precious valuation discounts. 
                                                     
94. Estate of Bonner v. United States., 84 F.3d 196, 197–98 (5th Cir. 1996); Estate of Mellinger 
v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 26, 32–37 (1999), action on dec., 1999-006 (Aug. 30, 1999). 
95. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I). 
96. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (as amended in 2003). 
97. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-47-065.(July 12, 1991).  
DRAKE-FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:123, 2008 
156 
Although it adds complexity on the death of the first spouse, in most 
cases the QTIP will be far superior to the alternative of leaving stock 
directly to the surviving spouse. The challenge is to customize each 
spouse’s QTIP to meet the parents’ objectives and to avoid the technical 
traps that compromise the all-important marital deduction. 
F. Compensation Transition Opportunities 
In most situations, one or more children are key officers in the 
company at the time the transmission plan is put in motion. Frequently 
the fear is that stock passing to these children will be deemed to be 
taxable compensation, not gifts that are income tax-free. In our case 
study, for example, this could be a concern as Jeff starts receiving more 
stock. In fact, usually it is preferable to actually structure the stock 
transfers as compensation income from the corporation. Although such 
transfers trigger taxable income to the child,98 the corporation receives 
an offsetting tax deduction,99 and, in nearly all cases, the corporation’s 
income tax savings will equal or exceed the child’s income tax cost.100 
The result is a zero net income tax burden, and a simple gross-up cash 
bonus can be used to transfer to the child the corporation’s tax savings to 
cover the child’s income tax hit.101 So from a current income tax 
                                                     
98. Under section 83(a), recognition of taxable income is deferred so long as the stock is subject 
to a substantial risk of forfeiture unless the recipient makes an election under section 83(b) to 
accelerate the recognition of income.  See I.R.C. § 83(a), (b). 
99. See id. § 83(h). Note, however, that if the service provided is capital in nature, the corporation 
will have to capitalize the expenditure. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(4) (as amended in 2003). 
100. This common outcome is a result of the comparative marginal tax rates applicable to C 
corporations and individuals. A C corporation will be subject to a marginal rate of at least 34 
percent once its annual income exceeds $75,000. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(C) (2006). For an individual 
joint-income filer in 2008, the taxable income thresholds for the 28 percent rate, the 33 percent rate, 
and the maximum 35 percent rate are $131,450, $200,300, and $337,700, respectively. 
101. The “gross up” is accomplished by the corporation agreeing to use the cash benefit from its 
deduction to pay the child a cash bonus to cover his or her tax hit on the stock and the cash bonus. 
With marginal corporate rates in the 34 to 35 percent range after the low-end brackets (brackets for 
the first $75,000 of earnings) and top individual marginal rates in the 33 percent to 35 percent range, 
such a gross-up cash bonus often can be made with no after-tax cash cost to the corporation. The 
formula for calculating the gross-up bonus is as follows: 
 [Stock Value / (1 – Executive Marginal Tax Rate)] – Stock Value = Gross-Up Bonus 
Assuming the child is in a 33 percent marginal tax bracket, the formula would produce a gross-up 
bonus of $49,254 on a transfer of stock valued at $100,000 [[100,000 / (1 - .33)] – 100,000]. If the 
corporation is subject to a 34 percent marginal rate, the cash tax savings to the corporation would be 
$50,746 (34 percent of $149,254), which more than covers the cash bonus to child. As an alternative 
to such a gross-up bonus, the corporation could use its tax cash savings to loan the child the funds 
needed to cover his or her tax hit in the year of recognition, with the understanding that the loan 
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perspective, the compensation structure usually is no worse than a push 
with the gift option. But the compensation structure offers two big 
advantages that could never be realized with a gift. First, unlike a gift 
where the child takes the parent’s carryover basis in the stock,102 a 
compensation transfer results in the child receiving a basis in the stock 
equal to its fair market value at time of transfer.103 Second, with the 
compensation structure, the parent has no gift tax concerns, and there are 
no gift tax opportunity costs. The transaction does not consume any of 
the parent’s gift tax annual exclusion or unified credit benefits. 
Often there are opportunities to use the compensation process to 
dramatically accelerate the equity transition process. Suppose, for 
example, that in lieu of receiving more stock, or perhaps in addition to 
receiving additional stock, Jeff is given a contractual right to 
compensation that is structured to provide the same economic benefits as 
stock. A deferred compensation contract is used to pay benefits based on 
Jeff’s hypothetical ownership of a designated number of common stock 
shares. The written contract offers a medley of economic benefits based 
on the “phantom” stock, including dividend equivalency payments and 
payments based on the value of the phantom shares (determined at the 
time of the event) if the company is sold or merged or if Jeff dies, 
becomes disabled, or otherwise terminates his employment.104 The 
arrangement offers a number of tax benefits. First, there is no threat that 
Jeff will end up having to report taxable income without having received 
a like amount of cash, a “phantom income” condition that is often 
triggered when stock is transferred to an employee as compensation.105 
Because all amounts paid to Jeff are compensation under a contract, Jeff 
will not have any taxable income until he actually receives payment. 
Second, there are no gift tax concerns for Earl and Betty even though the 
rights under the contract transferred substantial value to Jeff. Third, 
because all amounts paid to Jeff represent compensation, the company 
receives a full deduction at the time of payment.106 In many ways, such a 
contractual arrangement is one of the most efficient strategies, from a tax 
                                                     
amount plus accrued interest would be repaid at some point in the future. Obviously, the child 
would much prefer the bonus structure. 
102. See I.R.C. § 1015(a). 
103. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-4(b) (1978); I.R.C. § 1012. 
104. For a discussion of the planning opportunities and traps of such arrangements, see supra 
DRAKE, supra note 8, at ch. 12. 
105. See I.R.C. § 83(a). 
106. See id. § 162(a). 
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perspective, for transferring equity value. 
Are there any tax disadvantages to such an arrangement? Historically, 
the biggest disadvantage has been the absence of any capital gains break 
for the child. Because the child never receives real stock under the 
contract, there is no possibility of creating a capital gain at time of sale. 
To sweeten the deal for the child, an added bonus may be provided to 
produce a net after-tax yield to the child that is equal to the yield that 
would result if the phantom stock payment was taxed as a capital gain. 
Again, the company gets a full deduction for all amounts paid. Often this 
capital gains “make-up” bonus can be paid with the company still 
incurring a net after-tax cost that is less than would be incurred if it 
issued real stock and later had to purchase the real stock under a buy-sell 
agreement. For example, assume in our case that Jeff’s marginal 
ordinary income tax rate is 33 percent and his capital gains rate is 15 
percent. Jeff would net 85 cents on every dollar of capital gain 
recognized on the sale of real stock to the corporation under a buy-sell 
agreement. Under a phantom stock contract with a capital gain gross-up 
bonus, the corporation would have to pay Jeff $1.27 to net Jeff the same 
85 cents after Jeff’s 33 percent marginal ordinary rate is applied. But if 
the corporation is subject to a marginal rate of 34 percent, the $1.27 
payment would cost the company only 84 cents on a net after-tax basis, 
which is 16 percent less than the after-tax cost the company would need 
to expend to buy real stock from Jeff under a buy-sell agreement. 
With any such deferred compensation plan, great care must be taken 
to ensure that it avoids the reaches of new section 409A, added by the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.107 Generally, this will require (1) 
that any compensation deferral elections of the employee be made before 
the close of the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which the 
related services are actually rendered, (2) that the authorized events that 
may trigger payment of benefits under the contract (i.e. separation from 
service, specified time, change in control, unforeseen emergency) be 
specified in the contract (no elections as to timing of payments), (3) that 
there be no acceleration or further deferral of benefits, (4) that assets not 
be placed in a trust or other arrangement outside of the United States to 
pay benefits under the contract, and (5) that assets not be restricted to the 
payment of benefits under the contract based on changes in the 
company’s financial health.108 
                                                     
107. See id. § 409A. 
108. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.409A-2(a), (b), 1.409A-3 (2007); I.R.C. § 409A(b)(1), (2). 
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IV. CORPORATE TRANSITION STRATEGIES 
The plan design usually includes a program for transferring stock to 
other family members while one or both of the parents are living. The 
strategic options include gifts of stock to other family members or trusts 
established for their benefit, sales of stock to the corporation, and sales 
of stock to other family members or trusts. No option is clearly superior 
to the others; each has disadvantages and limitations that need to be 
carefully evaluated. Often a combination approach is the best alternative. 
Plus, in some cases the need to actually transfer stock may be mitigated 
by business restructuring techniques that have the effect of transitioning 
future value without actually transferring stock. 
A. Gifting Strategies 
The gift strategy is clearly the simplest and easiest to comprehend. 
The parents seek to reduce their future estate tax exposure by gifting 
stock and other property to family members. The challenge is to 
structure the gifts to avoid or minimize all gift taxes on the transfers. In 
our case study, Earl and Betty could commence a program of gifting 
Wilson corporate stock to Jeff, the child involved in the business, and 
gifting other assets to other family members. For gift tax purposes, the 
value of any gifted stock may qualify for lack of marketability and 
minority interest discounts, which together may equal as much as 40 
percent.109 
Earl and Betty each have a gift tax annual exclusion that shelters from 
gift taxes any gifts of present property interests up to $12,000 to a single 
donee in a single year.110 All gifts of stock and other assets that fall 
within the scope of this $12,000 annual exclusion will be removed from 
Earl and Betty’s estates for estate tax purposes.111 Earl and Betty have 10 
potential donees in their immediate family—three children, three 
spouses of children, and four grandchildren. At $24,000 per donee 
($12,000 for each parent), Earl and Betty’s annual gift tax exclusions 
would enable them to collectively transfer tax-free $240,000 of 
discounted value each year to immediate family members. If discounts 
                                                     
109. See, e.g., Rakow v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2066, 2073 (1999); Estate of Dailey v. 
Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 710, 712 (2001); Janda v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1100, 1101, 
1104–05 (2001). 
110. See I.R.C. § 2503(b). 
111. See id. §§ 2001, 2503(b). 
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are factored in at 40 percent, this simple strategy could shift up to 
$400,000 of value out of Earl and Betty’s estates each year. During a 
ten-year period, the future value of property removed from Earl and 
Betty’s taxable estates and transitioned tax-free with their annual gift tax 
exclusions could reasonably be expected to exceed $5.8 million.112 
Simple 2503(c) trusts could be used for all heirs under age 21 to avoid 
future interest problems that would otherwise compromise the 
availability of the annual exclusion. If grandchildren are the trust 
beneficiaries, care should be taken to meet the requirements of section 
2642(c)(2) to ensure an inclusion ratio of zero for generation skipping 
tax purposes and no generation skipping tax liability.113 
In addition to their annual gift tax exclusions, Earl and Betty each 
have their lifetime gift tax unified credits and their generation skipping 
tax (GST) exemptions.114 The gift tax unified credit enables each of 
them to make tax-free gifts of up to $1 million that are not otherwise 
sheltered by the annual exclusion. The GST exemption permits each of 
them to make GST tax-free transfers of up $2 million during life or at 
death. If the company stock and other gifted assets are expected to grow 
in value (a reasonable assumption in most cases), early use of the gift tax 
unified credits and the GST exemptions will produce future estate and 
generation skipping tax benefits because all appreciation in the value of 
the gifted property accruing subsequent to the date of the transfers will 
be excluded from the parents’ taxable estates.115 
Gifts also have income tax consequences. As the common stock is 
transferred, any income rights attributable to that stock also are 
transferred. If, as in our case study, the corporation is a C corporation, 
any future dividends attributable to the gifted stock will be paid and 
taxed to the family members who own the stock. If the entity is an S 
corporation, the pass-through tax impacts attributable to the gifted stock 
will flow to the children and grandchildren who own the stock. 
                                                     
112. This assumes that the annual gift tax exclusion continues to escalate in $1,000 increments as 
it has done in the past and that the value of the business grows at a rate of 6 percent per annum. 
113. The grandchild must be the sole beneficiary of the trust during life, and the trust assets must 
be included in grandchild’s estate if the grandchild dies before the trust terminates. See I.R.C. 
§ 2642(c)(2). 
114. See id. §§ 2505, 2631. 
115. Because the tentative estate tax calculated under I.R.C. § 2001(b) and (c) is based on the 
amount of the decedent’s taxable estate and the amount of adjusted taxable gifts made by the 
decedent, any appreciation accruing on gifted property subsequent to the date of transfer is excluded 
from the calculation. 
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1. Gift Taxes Now? A Hard Sell 
Many parents have an interest in the gifting strategy so long as no gift 
taxes need to be paid. The strategy becomes much less appealing when 
the possibility of paying gift taxes is factored into the mix. In our case 
study, should Earl and Betty consider making taxable gift transfers—
transfers that exceed the limits of their annual exclusions and their gift 
tax unified credits⎯in hopes of avoiding larger estate tax burdens down 
the road? There are two potential benefits to such transfers. First, all 
future appreciation on the gifted property will be excluded from the 
donor’s taxable estate. Second, if the gift is made at least three years 
before death, the gift taxes paid by the transferring parent are not subject 
to any transfer taxes, resulting in a larger net transfer to the donee.116 For 
example, if Betty dies with an additional $1 million included in her 
taxable estate that is subject to a 45 percent marginal estate tax rate, the 
net after-tax amount available to her heirs will equal $550,000. In 
contrast, if Betty had expended that same $1 million at least three years 
prior to her death by making a gift of $689,000 to a child and paying gift 
taxes at the rate of 45 percent on such gift ($311,000), the child would 
end up netting an additional $139,000 (the taxes otherwise imposed on 
the gift taxes), plus any appreciation on the property occurring 
subsequent to the gift. If the donor parent dies within three years of the 
gift, section 2035(b) pulls the gift taxes paid by the parent back into the 
parent’s taxable estate, and the tax benefit is lost. 
Do these potential benefits justify writing a big gift tax check now in 
hopes of saving bigger estate taxes down the road? Most private 
business owners have little or no appetite for this potential opportunity. 
Their reluctance to seriously consider the possibility is bolstered by their 
understandable desire to defer any and all taxes as long as possible and 
wishful dialog they have heard regarding the potential demise of the 
federal estate tax. As a result, many families confine their gifts of stock 
to transfers that are fully tax-protected by the annual exclusion or the 
unified credit. 
2. Gifting Disadvantages 
Although the gifting strategy may result in a reduction of future estate 
taxes and a shifting of income, it has its disadvantages and limitations. 
                                                     
116. Any gift taxes paid within three years of death are taxed in the decedent’s estate. See id. § 
2035(b). 
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For many parents, the biggest disadvantage is the one-way nature of a 
gift; they receive nothing in return to help fund their retirement needs 
and provide a hedge against an uncertain future. In our case study, for 
example, the strategy does nothing to address Earl and Betty’s primary 
goal of having a secure retirement income from the business for the 
balance of their lives. Their insecurities may be heightened as they see 
their stock being gifted away over time. The receipt of life insurance on 
the death of the first spouse may reduce or eliminate the insecurities of 
the survivor, but so long as they are both living and trying to adjust to 
their new, less-involved life style, their financial security will be priority 
one. To help secure their retirement income, the company may agree to 
pay Earl ongoing compensation benefits for consulting services or 
perhaps an agreement not to compete. There are disadvantages to this 
compensation approach. There always is the risk that the payments will 
not be recognized as deductible compensation for income tax purposes, 
but rather will be characterized as nondeductible dividends.117 Plus, 
compensation payments will trigger ongoing payroll taxes.118 
Another option for securing a steady income for Earl and Betty is to 
pay dividends on the stock that they have retained. There are a number 
of disadvantages with the dividend alternative. First, it produces a 
double tax⎯one at the corporate level and one at the shareholder level. 
Although the pain of this double tax has been softened by the reduction 
of the C corporation dividend tax rate to 15 percent, there is still a 
double tax, and the 15 percent dividend break, absent future action by 
Congress, will expire at the end of 2010. Conversion to S status may 
help eliminate the double tax hit moving forward, but, as explained 
above, the conversion itself is not tax-hassle free.119 Second, since 
children will be receiving stock, corresponding pro rata dividend 
payments will need to be made to the children. This just aggravates the 
double tax problem and does nothing to accomplish the parents’ 
objectives. 
Another disadvantage of the gifting strategy relates to Jeff’s plan for 
the future. Because a gifting strategy is usually implemented in 
incremental steps over a lengthy period of time to maximize use of the 
                                                     
117. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-7, 1.162-8 (2006). 
118. The 2008 payroll tax burden is 15.3 percent of the first $102,000 of compensation and 2.9 
percent of the compensation paid in excess of $102,000. SSA Pub. No. 05-10003, Jan. 2008, ICN 
451385. 
119. See supra Section III.C. 
DRAKE-FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM 
Transitioning the Family Business 
163 
annual gift tax exclusion and to ensure that the parent’s have retained at 
all times sufficient stock for their future needs, the plan may frustrate or 
at least badly dilute Jeff’s goal of garnering the fruits of his future efforts 
for himself. If Jeff is successful in expanding and growing the business, 
his success will be reflected pro rata in the value of all of the common 
stock, including the stock retained by Earl and Betty and any common 
stock gifted to Kathy and Paul and other family members. 
Finally, there’s an income tax disadvantage to the gifting strategy. 
The tax basis of any stock owned by a parent at death will be stepped up 
to the fair market value of the stock at death.120 If Earl and Betty make 
gifts of stock, their low basis in the stock will be carried over to their 
donees,121 and the opportunity for the basis step-up at death is lost 
forever. This can be significant if a donee sells the stock down the road. 
In a community property state, this disadvantage is substantially 
eliminated for all gifts made after the death of the first spouse because 
all community property (even the surviving spouse’s interest) receives a 
tax basis step-up on the death of the first spouse.122 
These potential disadvantages need to be carefully evaluated in the 
design of any transition plan. The result in many situations is a gifting 
program that starts slowly, perhaps geared to the limits of the annual gift 
tax exclusion, then accelerates as the parents become increasingly more 
secure in their new “uninvolved” status, and then shifts into high gear 
following the death of the first spouse. In other cases, the fear of future 
estate taxes prompts the parents to aggressively embrace the gifting 
strategy and explore options for enhancing their stock gifting options. 
Following is a description of enhanced stock gifting strategies that are 
often considered. 
3. The GRAT⎯A Square Peg? 
The grantor retained annuity trust (“GRAT”) is a proven darling in 
the estate planning world. For large estates wrapped up in the challenge 
of juggling many valuable marbles, its allure often is irresistible. Its 
value in transitioning a family business, a mountain, is far more 
problematic. Often, when all factors are fairly considered, the GRAT 
ends up being the proverbial square peg that just doesn’t fit the situation. 
                                                     
120. I.R.C. § 1014(a). 
121. Id. § 1015(a). 
122. Id. § 1014(a), (b)(6). 
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With a GRAT, the parent transfers property to a trust and retains an 
annuity, expressed as either a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of the 
fair market value of the property transferred, for a specified timeframe, 
expressed as a term of years, the life of the grantor, or the shorter of the 
two. The annuity must be paid at least annually, and its payment may not 
be contingent on the income of the trust.123 That is, if necessary, annuity 
payments must be funded out of trust principal. The trust may not issue a 
“note, other debt instrument, option, or other similar arrangement” to 
pay the annuity.124 No additional property may be contributed until the 
annuity term ends,125 nor may payments be made to any person other 
than the grantor. 
The contributed property is deemed to have two valuation 
components for gift tax purposes. The first component (Annuity 
Component) has a value based on the size of the designated annuity 
payment and the annuity tables under section 7520, which incorporate an 
interest rate equal to 120 percent of the applicable federal midterm 
rate.126 The value of the second component (“Remainder Component”) is 
the excess of the value of the property transferred to the trust less the 
value of the Annuity Component. At the time the trust is created, the 
parent is deemed to have made a gift equal to only the value of the 
Remainder Component. At the end of the annuity term, all remaining 
property in the trust is transferred to the designated beneficiaries, usually 
children, with no further gift tax consequences. Plus, the property is 
removed from the parent’s estate for estate tax purposes. 
A GRAT creates two key risks⎯a mortality risk and a yield risk. The 
mortality risk is that all tax objectives will be lost if the parent dies 
before the end of the designated annuity term. If the parent dies 
prematurely, the entire value of the property will be subject to estate 
taxes in the parent’s estate under section 2036(a).127 The entire effort 
will have produced nothing. The yield risk recognizes that the GRAT 
                                                     
123. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(d) (2006). 
124. Id. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(i). 
125. Id. § 25.2702-3(b)(5). 
126. I.R.C. § 7520. 
127. Section 2036(a) is triggered because the parent will possess a retained income interest at 
death. Although technically section 2039 would also be triggered on death because the annuity 
payments likely will continue after the death of the parent, the Service recently issued Proposed 
Regulation § 20.2036-1(c) that mandates the application of section 2036(a), not section 2039, in 
such a situation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(c), 72 Fed. Reg. 31487 (July 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2007-28_IRB/ar13.html. 
DRAKE-FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM 
Transitioning the Family Business 
165 
will not produce any net transfer tax benefit if the yield on the property 
held in the trust (including its growth in value) during the annuity term 
does not exceed the section 7520 rate used to value the Annuity 
Component. If the property’s yield cannot beat the 7520 rate, the parent 
would be better off for transfer tax purposes if he or she, in lieu of the 
GRAT, had simply made a completed gift of property equal in value to 
the Remainder Component free of any mortality risk factor.128 For the 
GRAT to pay off, the parent must beat both risks – live longer than the 
annuity term and have the trust property produce a yield superior to the 
7520 rate.129 
a. The Real Goal⎯Something for Nothing 
Given the mortality and yield risks, often the GRAT is a tough sell if 
a substantial gift tax burden is triggered on its creation. Because the 
Remainder Component is a future interest, the gift tax annual exclusion 
is not available. The parent’s unified credit is usually better spent on 
other transfers (e.g. life insurance dynasty trust insurance premiums) that 
are guaranteed to produce real transfer tax benefits; the opportunity cost 
of expending the credit on a risk-laden GRAT often just does not pencil. 
And, the thought of actually paying significant gift taxes on a transfer 
that might produce no estate tax benefits is rejected outright by many as 
absurd. So, the strategy of choice often is to structure the annuity so that 
the Annuity Component nearly equals the value of the contributed 
property, and the Reminder Component has little or no value. This 
“zero-out” strategy, made possible by the Tax Court’s 2000 decision in 
Walton v. Commissioner,130 is accomplished by structuring the annuity 
                                                     
128. There are other differences that could favor a direct gift when the yield risk is a problem. A 
direct gift may qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion under section 2503(b); a future interest 
transfer to a trust has no hope of qualifying. Plus, any appreciation on property subject to a direct 
gift will be excluded from the donor’s taxable estate; any trust property may be taxed in the donor’s 
estate under section 2036(a) at its full date of death value.  I.R.C. § 2036(a). 
129. Arguments are sometimes advanced for the proposition that, in extreme situations, a GRAT 
may pay in the end even if it does not beat the yield risk. Examples include a situation where a large 
block of marketable stock subject to a blockage discount is transferred to a GRAT and then sold off 
in pieces or where large losses in a transferred portfolio are recognized before larger gains. See, e.g., 
Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Diana S.C. Zeydel, Comparing GRATs and Installment Sales, 41ST 
ANNUAL HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING, 2-1, 2-9 (Tina Portuondo ed., 2007). Such 
theories, although potentially applicable to marble shifters, are of no help with a transition plan for a 
closely held family corporation. 
130. 115 T.C. 589 (2000). In Walton, the Tax Court struck down old Example 5 in regulation 
25.2702-3(e) by holding that an annuity payable for a term of years to a grantor or the grantor’s 
estate is a qualified annuity for a specified term of years and can be valued as such, regardless of 
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to be paid to the parent or the parent’s estate for the designated term and 
setting the annuity payments high enough to create the desired Annuity 
Component value. When this strategy is used, the GRAT becomes a 
“Heads I Win, Tails I Break Even” scenario. If either the mortality or the 
yield risk becomes a problem, the parent, although back to square one, 
has lost nothing because no gift tax costs (either real or opportunity) 
were incurred. If, however, both risks are avoided and any property 
remains in the GRAT at the end of the annuity term, that property will 
pass to the designated remainder beneficiaries free of all transfer taxes. It 
offers a clear shot at “something for nothing.” With this “zero-out” 
strategy, even the mortality risk can be mitigated by setting a short 
annuity term131 and mandating big annuity payments that, in large part, 
will be funded from trust principal. The Service does not like this zero-
out strategy; it will not issue a private letter ruling on the qualification of 
a GRAT if the Reminder Component has a value of less than 10 percent 
of the contributed property.132 Many are not deterred by this position of 
the Service and pursue the zero-out strategy on the theory that it is 
consistent with the regulations to section 2702 and that any future 
changes to the regulations likely would be applied on a prospective basis 
only. Others build a formula into the GRAT that would automatically 
adjust the retained annuity if there is a subsequent determination as to 
the legally required value of the Remainder Component. 
b. The GRAT and Closely Held Stock 
Stock of a closely held corporation may be used to fund a GRAT. 
Even stock in an S corporation will work because a grantor trust is an 
eligible S corporation shareholder,133 and the GRAT can qualify as a 
grantor trust by requiring that the annuity payments first be paid out of 
                                                     
whether the grantor survives the term. Id. at 603. The case opened the door to zero-out GRAT’s 
because the fixed term can be used to value the Annuity Component. The result was a new Example 
5 and 6, which are commonly referred to as the “Walton” Regulations. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(e), 
exs. (5) & (6). 
131. The minimum term of a GRAT is a concern of some, based on an earlier position of the IRS 
that it would not rule on any GRAT that had a term of less than five years. The GRAT in the famous 
Walton case, supra note 130, was two years; the Service did not challenge the 366 day term of a 
GRAT in Kerr v. United States, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), aff’d, 292 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2002), and the 
Service ruled favorably on a two-year GRAT in PLR 9239015. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9239015 (Sept. 
25, 1992). 
132. Rev. Proc. 2008-3, 2008-1 I.R.B. IRB 28-1, § 4(51). See also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem 2003-
72, 2003-44 IRB 964. 
133. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2). 
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trust income.134 But the issue isn’t whether it can be done; it’s whether it 
makes any sense to do it. There will be situations where the company’s 
growth and cash flow prospects are so strong that the GRAT will offer 
an excellent vehicle to leverage the parents’ unified credits or even the 
payment of gift taxes. But the cash and yield demands of the GRAT may 
prove troublesome for many mature family businesses that are struggling 
to maintain market share while sustaining a modest growth curve. 
Suppose, for example, that Earl forms a GRAT, names Jeff as the 
reminder beneficiary, transfers nonvoting Wilson common stock to the 
GRAT equal to 24 percent of the outstanding stock, and determines that 
the maximum annual cash distributions the company could afford to 
make to the shareholders going forward is $500,000. An amount equal to 
24 percent ($120,000) of these annual distributions would be paid on the 
stock held in the GRAT to fund Earl’s annuity and the balance would be 
paid to the other shareholders, principally Earl and Betty. The value of 
the transferred stock for gift tax purposes (assuming a 40 percent 
minority interest and lack of marketability discount) would be 
$1,440,000.135 If the annuity term was set at five years (remember Earl is 
now 65) and the 7520 rate was 5.4 percent (based on the November 2007 
applicable federal rate), the Reminder component would trigger a 
taxable gift of $926,160 based on an annual annuity of $120,000.136 If 
the mortality risk was extended to 10 years, the Remainder Component 
gift tax value would drop to $531,132.137 
Any person who contemplates funding a GRAT with family stock 
should carefully focus on following four practical questions that, if 
ignored or understated, may result in the family spending a great deal of 
effort and money on a structure that backfires in the end. 
First, how is the trust going to fund the annuity payments? Many 
businesses may conclude that double-taxed dividends from their C 
corporation or single-taxed income from their S corporation will not do 
the job unless the annuity term is very long (thus escalating the mortality 
risk beyond any reasonable period) or the parent incurs substantial gift 
tax costs (either real or opportunity) up front against the risks inherent in 
the GRAT. And if a decision is made to bail out corporate earnings as 
                                                     
134. Id. § 677(a). 
135. Computation: $10,000,000 x .24 x. 60 = $1,440,000.  
136. Computation: $1,440,000 – [$120,000 x 4.282 (Table B five year factor)] = $926,160. This 
assumes the annuity is paid annually and the Table K value is 1. 
137. Computation: $1,440,000 – [$120,000 x 7.5739 (Table B ten year factor)] = $531,132. This 
assumes the annuity is paid annually and the Table K value is 1. 
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fast as possible to help the GRAT, what impact will this bail out strategy 
have on other shareholders and the strength of the business? And if large 
sums of cash are regularly withdrawn from the business, what will be the 
resulting negative impacts on the value of the business which, among 
other things, might magnify many times the yield risk factor of the 
GRAT? For example, if Earl’s GRAT described above has a five-year 
term and an annual annuity obligation of $120,000, the company would 
have to distribute $2.5 million to its shareholders over the next five years 
against the hope that Earl will outlive the five-year term and that the 
compounded annual growth of the company (even with these 
distributions) will still beat the 7520 rate and the resulting impact in the 
growth in Earl’s estate resulting from his share of the distributions. 
Second, does the zero-out strategy (the play that gets so many so 
excited) make any sense in the situation? If the GRAT is structured to 
have a “zero-out” Remainder Component by funding large annuity 
payments out of principal, the trust likely will end up transferring stock 
back to the parent to fund the annuity. If, for example, Earl desires to 
have the GRAT described above structured as a zero-out GRAT with a 
five-year term, the annual annuity payment would need to be 
$336,291.138 If funded by cash from the company, this would require 
annual shareholder cash distributions of $1,401,212,139 a total of more 
than $7 million over five years. For most companies presently valued at 
$10 million, such numbers would be impossible and certainly would 
make no sense if the expectation is that the company will grow in value 
and thereby produce transfer tax savings through the GRAT. So the only 
hope of zeroing out the Remainder Component is to transfer stock back 
to Earl to fund the huge annuity payments. This stock recycling will 
necessitate costly annual stock valuations that will serve conflicting 
objectives. For GRAT purposes, it will be desirable to have such 
valuations confirm high growth to beat the GRAT’s yield risk, when in 
fact such high growth confirmations likely will create larger transfer tax 
problems on all other fronts, not the least of which is the future estate tax 
impacts of the very shares that are being transferred back to the parent in 
the form of annuity payments. 
Third, will the need to beat the yield risks inherent in the GRAT be at 
cross purposes with other efforts that the family takes to facilitate 
                                                     
138. Computation: $1,440,000 / 4.282 (Table B five year factor) = $336,291. This assumes the 
annuity is paid annually and the Table K value is 1. 
139. Computation: $336,291 / .24 = $1,401,212. 
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transition planning by holding down the stock value? Such efforts, for 
example, may include strategies to segregate new expansion growth 
opportunities and to adopt equity-based compensation structures for key 
children in the business. 
Finally, what will the GRAT say to key inside children, such as Jeff, 
who are anxious to take over the reins and build the business? “We are 
going to expend real effort and money on a complicated trust structure 
that possibly may save some taxes and net you a few shares many years 
down the road if Dad can outlive the term of the annuity, if we can blow 
big money out of the corporation, and if we can still demonstrate that the 
value of the stock is escalating at a fast pace that may make other 
transfer strategies more difficult and may result in higher estate taxes 
when Dad dies.” The inside child might start looking for a new job. 
The forgoing questions should be carefully evaluated whenever a 
GRAT is being considered as an element of a family business transition 
plan. Often, though not always, the analysis will quickly demonstrate 
that the GRAT serves no critical objectives of the family. For many 
families, it will once again confirm the reality that stock of the family 
business often should not be treated the same as a portfolio of publicly 
traded securities. 
4. The Preferred Stock Freeze⎯A Very Rare Fit 
Another enhanced gifting strategy is the preferred stock freeze. It 
requires that the family corporation be recapitalized140 with both 
preferred and common stock. All of the growth in value is reflected in 
the common stock that is gifted or sold to children over time. The 
parents retain significant voting and income rights through the preferred 
stock that has a fixed value. The goal is to reduce future estate taxes by 
                                                     
140. The recapitalization can be accomplished as a tax-free reorganization. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E) 
(2006). If common stock is exchanged for common and preferred stock, the shareholders will not 
recognize any gain under section 354, and the corporation will be entitled to nonrecognition 
treatment. Id. § 354. Each shareholder’s basis in his or her old common shares will carryover and be 
allocated to the new common and preferred shares based on their respective fair market values. Id. 
§ 358(a), (b); Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(2) (2007). The preferred stock received in the 
recapitalization will be considered “Section 306 stock” if the effect of the transaction was 
substantially the same as the receipt of a stock dividend. I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(B). The regulations 
mandate a cash substitution test for the dividend “effect” determination—if cash had been received 
instead of preferred stock—would it have been treated as a dividend under section 356(a)(2)? See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d) (2007). Thus, if each shareholder receives a proportionate amount or 
common and preferred stock, a likely scenario in a family corporation recapitalization, the preferred 
stock will be section 306 stock. 
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transferring the future growth in the business to the children through the 
common stock. Note that this preferred stock strategy will not work for 
an S corporation because of the single class of stock eligibility 
requirement.141 
This freeze strategy will work only if the valuation rules of section 
2701 of the Code are satisfied.142 Under these rules, the value of the 
common stock transferred to the children for gift tax purposes is based 
on a subtraction method of valuation, which subtracts the value of the 
parent’s retained preferred stock and other non-transferred family equity 
interests from the fair market value of all family-held interests in the 
corporation.143 If the income rights of the preferred stock retained by the 
parents are not “qualified payment” rights, such preferred stock will be 
deemed to have a zero value under section 2701.144 In such event, the 
transferred common stock’s value for gift tax purposes will be based on 
the value of the parents’ entire equity interest⎯a disastrous gift tax 
result. 
Section 2701 applies to transfers among family members.145 For the 
preferred stock to have a value under section 2701 (and thus reduce the 
value of the gifted common stock), the preferred stock must mandate a 
“qualified payment,” which is defined as a fixed rate cumulative 
dividend payable at least annually.146 The value of the preferred stock 
                                                     
141. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). 
142. See id. § 2701. 
143. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-1(a)(2). The subtraction method requires application of a four-step 
procedure. See id. § 25.2701-3(a)−(d). 
144. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A). 
145. Family members include the transferor’s spouse, lineal descendants of the transferor or the 
transferor’s spouse, and spouses of such descendants. Id. § 2701(e)(1). 
146. Id. § 2701(c)(3). A fixed rate includes any rate that bears a fixed relationship to a specified 
market interest rate. Id. § 2701(c)(3)(B); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(b)(6)(ii). Election options are 
available to treat, in whole or in part, a qualified payment right as not qualified, in which event it 
will be valued at zero under section 2701, or to treat a nonqualified payment right as a qualified 
payment, in which event it will valued at its fair market value under section 2701. I.R.C. 
§ 2701(c)(3)(C)(i),(ii); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(c)(2)(i),(ii). The determination to elect in or out of 
qualified payment status depends on the certainty of the fixed payments actually being made. If the 
interests are valued as qualified payments and the fixed payments are not made, additional transfer 
taxes are imposed on a compounded amount that is calculated by assuming that the unpaid amounts 
were invested on the payment due date at a yield equal to the discount rate used to value the 
qualified payments. I.R.C. § 2701(d); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4. Because gift or estate taxes on 
unpaid qualified payments can be painful under this compounding rule, some may choose to forgo 
the qualified payment status and avoid the tax risks of nonpayment. Similarly, against the risk of 
this compounding rule kicking in for nonpayment, an election may be made to treat a nonqualified 
payment right (i.e. noncumulative preferred stock dividend right) as a qualified payment right and 
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under section 2701 is based on the fair market value of the qualified 
payment.147 An appraisal will set the value by considering all relevant 
factors, including comparable rates paid on publicly traded preferred 
stock. Thus, as a practical matter, the preferred stock must pay a market-
rate dividend in order for its value for gift tax purposes to equal the face 
value of the preferred. If the preferred stock is valued under section 2701 
based on a “qualified payment” right, the value of the common stock 
transferred to the children for gift tax purposes may not be less than a 
special “minimum value.”148 The special minimum value is the 
children’s pro rata value of all common stock if all the outstanding 
common stock had a value equal to 10 percent of all equity interests in 
the corporation.149 
The strategy triggers two tough challenges that preclude its use except 
in the rarest circumstances. First, the cumulative dividend requirement 
on the preferred stock is an expensive burden from both a business and 
tax perspective. Many closely held corporations simply can’t afford the 
cash drain. And all cash distributed will trigger a double tax hit—first at 
the corporate level when the income is earned and then at the 
shareholder level when the dividends are paid. It is one of the most tax-
expensive strategies for moving income. Second, for many mature 
businesses, the fair market value of the preferred stock (set by appraisal) 
will equal the face value of the preferred only if the fixed dividend rate 
on the preferred is set at a level that, as a practical matter, exceeds the 
projected annual growth rate of the business. So the preferred dividends 
paid to the parents will continue to increase the value of the parents’ 
taxable estate at least as fast as the status quo. The result is that the 
strategy may start producing an immediate double income tax hit with 
little or no transfer tax savings. For these reasons, the strategy, although 
useful in very unique fast-growth situations, does not fit most family 
businesses. 
                                                     
value it as such under section 2701 on the assumption that it always will be paid. 
147. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(C). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-1(e) ex. 1. If the preferred stock that 
contains the qualified payment also contains a liquidation, put, call, or conversion right, the value of 
the preferred stock must be the lowest value based on all such rights. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(B); Treas. 
Reg. § 25.2701-2(a)(3). 
148. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(A). 
149. Id. 
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5. The Three-Year GRIT⎯A Potential Add-On 
The three-year grantor retained income trust (“GRIT”) strategy may 
be helpful in those situations where a parent has decided to pay gift taxes 
now in hopes of saving bigger estate taxes in the future. If the parent 
makes a taxable gift and then dies within three years of the gift, all gift 
taxes paid by the parent will be subject to estate taxes in the parent’s 
estate under section 2035(b). However, the gifted property itself is not 
brought back into the parent’s estate and, therefore, does not receive a 
stepped-up tax basis under section 1014. If the parent lives for three 
years after the gift, the gift taxes are not pulled back into the estate and 
avoid all transfer taxes.150 
A three-year GRIT may be used to generate a basis step-up if the 
parent dies within three years and the gift taxes are subject to estate 
taxation. It works by transferring the gifted stock to a trust that requires 
that “all income” of the trust be paid to the parent for three years. At the 
end of the three-year term, the property passes to a designated donee, 
presumably a child. The annuity component of the trust will have a zero 
value because the annuity is not specified as a fixed dollar amount or a 
percent of the contributed property.151 So the remainder interest for gift 
tax purposes will equal the full value of the property.152 If the parent dies 
during the three-year term, the property and all gift taxes paid will be 
taxable in the parent’s estate, the estate will receive a credit for the prior 
gift taxes, and the donee’s basis in the property will be stepped-up to its 
fair market value at the parent’s death.153 If the parent outlives the three-
year term, the GRIT will end, and the risk of the paid gift taxes being 
included in the estate will have ended. 
The disadvantage of this strategy is that, if death occurs within three 
years of the gift, any appreciation in the value of the gifted property 
from the date of the gift to the date of death will generate an added estate 
tax burden. This disadvantage needs to be balanced against the value of 
the stepped-up basis to the donee. The 3-year GRIT may make sense in 
those rare situations where gift taxes are paid, the basis of the gifted 
property is very low in relation to its value, and meaningful appreciation 
during the three-year term is unlikely. 
                                                     
150. For an illustration of this transfer tax savings, see supra Section IV.A.1. 
151. I.R.C. § 2702(a),(b); Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2702-1–3, 25.2702-2(d) ex. 1. 
152. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2702–1(b). 
153. I.R.C. §1014. 
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All gifting strategies, enhanced or not, require the parents to transfer 
something for nothing. Many parents want or need something in return. 
They need a strategy that will convert their stock into cash to fund their 
retirement and that will stop or slow down the growth in the value of 
their taxable estates. A sale of stock might do the job. If the company is 
going to stay in the family, the potential buyers include the corporation, 
the children, or a trust established for the children. 
B. The Redemption Strategy⎯A Complete Goodbye 
A corporate redemption can be used to transition stock in a family 
business. It works best in those situations where other family members 
already own a substantial percentage of the corporation’s outstanding 
stock, the company’s cash flow is strong, the prospects of future stock 
value growth are high, and the parents have fully surrendered the reins to 
the business or are prepared to do so. It is not a viable option for many. 
In our case study, the corporation would contract to purchase⎯to 
redeem⎯all of Earl and Betty’s stock in the corporation for a price equal 
to the fair market value of the stock. The corporation would pay the 
purchase price, plus interest, over a long period of time, as much as 15 
years.154 Immediately following the redemption, the only outstanding 
stock of the corporation would be the stock owned by Jeff. Although not 
a party to the redemption, Jeff would end up owning 100 percent of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation and would be in complete control. 
The corporation would have a large debt that would be payable to its 
former shareholders, Earl and Betty.155 This debt would be retired with 
                                                     
154. The IRS ruling guidelines indicate that the Service will not issue a favorable ruling on a 
redemption if the note payment period exceeds 15 years or if the stock is held in escrow or as 
security for the corporation’s obligation to make payments under the note. Rev. Proc. 2008-3, 
§§ 3.01(31), 4.01(20), 2008-1 I.R.B. 110. If the note term is too long, the risk is that the parents will 
be deemed to have retained an equity interest that (1) violates the “creditor only” requirement of 
section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), (2) precludes waiver of the family attribution rules of section 318(a)(1) and 
a complete termination of the parents’ interest within the meaning of section 302(b)(3), and (3) 
results in the amounts distributed to the parents being taxed as dividends. I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(3), 
302(c)(1)–(2), 302(d), 318(a)(1). The Tax Court has been more forgiving. In Lisle v. Commissioner, 
35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627, 636–40 (1976), the court found that a valid section 302(b)(3) complete 
termination had occurred even though the payment term was 20 years, the shareholder retained 
voting rights through a security agreement, and the stock was held in escrow to secure the 
corporation’s payment obligation. 
155. In any such redemption, the applicable state corporate law must be carefully analyzed to 
ascertain any applicable restrictions and impacts on the parents. Often appraisals are necessary. The 
Model Business Corporation Act, adopted in whole or part as the corporation statute of 30 states, 
prohibits a “distribution” (broadly defined to include proceeds from a redemption, MCBA § 
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corporate earnings over an extended period of time. The interest and 
principal payments on the indebtedness would provide Earl and Betty 
with a steady stream of income during their retirement. If they die prior 
to a complete payout of the contract, the remaining amounts owing on 
the contract would become part of their estates and, together with their 
other assets, would be allocated to their children in equal shares. 
The primary tax challenge that always exists with a corporate 
redemption is determining the character of the payments made by the 
corporation to the departing shareholders: will they be taxed as corporate 
dividends or as true principal and interest payments made in exchange 
for stock? If the payments are treated as dividends, they will be fully 
taxable to the extent of the corporation’s earnings and profits, and there 
will be a tax hit at both the corporate and shareholder levels on the 
distributed income. Although the Bush tax cuts reduced the maximum 
tax rate on C corporation dividends to 15 percent through 2010,156 it is 
anyone’s guess as to what the tax rate on dividends will be after 2010. 
However, even with this dividend rate relief, in many situations the 
double tax hit will be unacceptable. And if the tax rate on dividends 
bounces back up to a level at or near the ordinary income rate, the 
dividend scenario tax burden will be intolerable for most. On the other 
hand, if the payments are treated as stock consideration payments, the 
parents will be allowed to recover their basis in the transferred stock tax-
free, the interest element of each payment will be deductible by the 
corporation, and the gain element of each payment to the parents will be 
taxed as a long-term capital gain. In nearly all cases, the planning 
challenge is to structure the redemption to ensure that the payments 
qualify as consideration for stock, not dividends. 
The answer to this challenge is found in Section 302(b) of the 
                                                     
1.40(6)) if, “after giving it effect: (1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they 
become due in the usual course of business; or (2) the corporation’s total assets would be less than 
the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount 
that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the distribution, to 
satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose preferential rights are superior 
to those receiving the distribution.” MBCA § 6.40(c). These two tests, referred to as the “equity 
insolvency test” and the “balance sheet test,” have been widely incorporated into state corporate 
statutes. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.06.400 (2008), which adopts both tests and 
provides that the balance sheet test may be based “either on financial statements prepared on the 
basis of accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances or on a fair 
valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances . . . .” 
156. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11), added by P.L. 108-27 and amended by P.L. 108-311. 
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Code,157 which specifies the conditions that must be met in order for the 
redemption to qualify for exchange treatment. In a family situation, the 
only hope is to qualify the redemption as a complete termination of the 
parents’ interests under section 302(b)(3). For the Wilson clan, this 
would essentially require that Earl and Betty (1) sell all of their stock to 
the company in the transaction, (2) have no further interest in the 
business other than as creditors, (3) not acquire any interest in the 
business (other than through inheritance) during the ten years following 
receipt of all payments made to them, (4) not have engaged in stock 
transactions with family members during the last 10 years with a 
principal purpose of avoiding income taxes, and (5) sign and file with 
the Secretary of the Treasury an appropriate agreement.158 If all of these 
conditions are met (and they often are), then the family attribution rules 
are waived and the parents are able to treat the payments as 
consideration for their stock, not dividends. 
Usually the most troubling condition is the requirement that the 
parents have no interest in the corporation other than that of creditors 
following the redemption.159 In our case, neither Earl nor Betty could be 
an officer, director, employee, shareholder, or consultant of the 
corporation following the redemption.160 It must be a complete goodbye. 
This requirement is often viewed as an insurmountable hurdle by a 
parent who is departing and turning over the reins with the hope that 
payments will keep coming over a long period. One of Earl’s prime 
objectives was to stay involved enough to hedge the boredom of 
retirement and to ensure that the business remains strong during the 
payout period. To qualify for tax exchange treatment under a redemption 
strategy, this objective would have to be abandoned. 
The redemption approach offers a number of advantages that need to 
                                                     
157. I.R.C. § 302(b). The family ownership attribution rules of section 318 usually make it 
impossible for a family transaction to qualify as a redemption that is not essentially equivalent to a 
dividend under section 302(b)(1) or as a substantially disproportionate redemption under section 
302(b)(2). The only hope is to qualify for a waiver of the family attribution rules and, thereby, 
qualify the redemption as a complete redemption of the parent’s interest under section 302(b)(3). Id. 
§§ 302(a), 302(b), 318(a)(1)–(a)(3)(A). 
158. These are the conditions imposed by section 302(c)(2) to secure a waiver of the family 
attribution rules and qualify the redemption as a complete termination under section 302(b)(3). Id. 
§§ 302(b)(3), 302(c)(2), 318(a). 
159. Id. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). 
160. See, e.g., Lynch v. Comm’r, 801 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding taxpayers who provide 
post-redemption services, either as an employee or independent contractor, as holding prohibited 
interests in the corporation). 
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be carefully evaluated in each situation. It provides a long-term payment 
stream directly from the corporation to the parents. It effectively freezes 
the value of the business in the parents’ estates, subject to the 
accumulation of interest income that is paid on the installment note. In 
our case, all future growth in the stock value would pass to Jeff, the sole 
shareholder. Finally, it makes it easy for the accumulated proceeds paid 
on the debt and the unpaid balance of the debt to be transferred to the 
children in equal shares at the appropriate time, thereby accomplishing 
the parents’ objective of giving each child an equal share of their estates. 
There are also some compelling disadvantages with the redemption 
approach that provide a strong incentive for many families to look for an 
alternative. First, the principal payments made to Betty and Earl on the 
indebtedness will need to be funded by the corporation with after-tax 
dollars. This may create an intolerable cash burden for the corporation in 
redeeming the stock. Second, even though large sums of after-tax dollars 
will be paid to the parents for their stock, Jeff, the sole stockholder of the 
corporation, gets no increase in the tax basis of his stock. Because the 
corporation is redeeming the stock and making the payments, there is no 
basis impact at the shareholder level. Third, as previously stated, Betty 
and Earl are precluded from having any further involvement in the 
management and affairs of the company if they want to meet the 
requirements of section 302(b)(3) and qualify for exchange tax 
treatment. For many family patriarchs, this complete goodbye 
requirement alone will kill the strategy. Fourth, the amounts payable to 
Betty and Earl will terminate when the note is paid off. Given the size of 
the payout in our case, it is unlikely that this potential disadvantage will 
be significant. In many smaller situations, the parents may want and 
need a regular cash flow that will last as long as one of them is living. 
Fifth, if the parents die before the contract is paid in full, the children 
who inherit the unpaid contract will pay income taxes on their receipt of 
interest and principal payments under the contract. The contract 
payments are treated as income in respect of a decedent for income tax 
purposes.161 There is no step-up in basis for the children: the income tax 
burden survives the parents’ deaths. Sixth, the company takes on a 
tremendous debt burden in redeeming the stock. The company may not 
have the cash flow to foot such a huge bill and the associated tax 
burdens. At a minimum, the cash burden of the debt may adversely 
impact Jeff’s capacity to move the company forward or to secure 
                                                     
161. See I.R.C. § 691(a). 
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financing that may be necessary to expand the business and accomplish 
his objectives for the business. 
These disadvantages cause many families to reject the redemption 
strategy in the plan design. They prefer a strategy that can be 
implemented on an incremental basis over time and that will allow the 
parents to have a continuing, but reduced, role in the business. 
C. Cross-Purchase Strategies⎯Where Is the Cash? 
A cross-purchase is similar to a redemption, with one big twist: The 
purchasers of the parents’ stock are the other shareholders, not the 
corporation. In our case, Earl and Betty would still be paid principal and 
income payments for a long term, but the payments would come from 
Jeff. How does a cross-purchase strategy compare with the redemption 
approach? The cross-purchase offers two significant benefits over the 
redemption. First, the section 302 dividend fear for the parents goes 
away because they are not receiving payments from the corporation. 
This means that the parents can stay involved in the business as much as, 
and for as long as, they want. Earl can remain on the board and keep his 
hands in the operation to the extent he chooses. Plus, there is no 
requirement that all of the parent’s stock be sold in a single transaction. 
Piecemeal sales work. Thus, the biggest impediment to the redemption 
strategy—the complete goodbye—is gone. Second, Jeff’s tax basis in the 
purchased stock will equal the purchase price he pays for the stock.162 
Unlike the redemption scenario, the amounts paid to Earl and Betty in a 
cross-purchase produce a basis increase for the other shareholders. 
Apart from these benefits, the cross-purchase approach has many of 
the same limitations and disadvantages as the redemption approach. 
Principal payments on the installment note must be funded with after-tax 
dollars. Jeff’s credit capacity may be tapped. The payouts to the parents 
will not extend beyond the contract term. Any basis step-up on the 
parents’ deaths is lost. Payments under the contract received by other 
family members following the deaths of the parents will be taxed as 
income in respect of a decedent. 
Plus, the cross-purchase approach presents a whole new problem. 
Where is Jeff going to get the cash to cover the payments for the stock? 
This problem, alone, eliminates the cross-purchase option in many 
situations. If Jeff has an independent source of income or cash that he is 
                                                     
162. See id. § 1012. 
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willing to commit to the deal, this funding problem may be solved. 
Absent such an independent source, Jeff will be forced to turn to the 
corporation for the cash. The challenge then becomes getting enough 
corporate cash to Jeff on an ongoing basis to fund the current payments 
on the installment note. This can be a tough, often insurmountable, 
problem. The extra compensation payments to Jeff must be large enough 
to cover the current interest payments on the note, the after-tax principal 
payments on the note, and the additional income and payroll taxes that 
Jeff will be required to pay as a result of the increased compensation. 
Beyond the cash burden to the corporation, if the compensation 
payments to Jeff are unreasonably high, there may be a constructive 
dividend risk that could put the corporation’s deduction in jeopardy.163 
An S election will help the tax situation, but there is still a cash drain on 
the company and the double tax risk of a constructive dividend is 
avoided only to the extent of earnings during the S corporation period.164 
Corporate loans to Jeff might be an option, but corporate loans always 
present independent problems. First, the loans will need to be repaid at 
some point down the road with after-tax dollars. Figuring out how the 
repayments to the corporation will be funded may be more difficult than 
Jeff’s current funding challenge with his parents’ note. The loan 
approach may simply defer and magnify the problem. Second, the loans 
themselves need to be funded with corporate after-tax dollars. The 
corporation must pay current income taxes on the funds it loans. And 
third, there is always the risk that substantial shareholder loans may 
trigger an accumulated earnings tax.165 That is, the corporation may be 
forced to unreasonably accumulate earnings to fund the loans. The 
bottom line is that the shareholder loan approach to solve the funding 
problem in a cross-purchase situation generally is not a satisfactory 
solution. 
This funding challenge often requires a combination approach that 
integrates a cross-purchase with a gift or redemption strategy, or both. 
                                                     
163. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-8, 1.301-1(j) (2007); see, e.g., Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 
196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999); Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1983); 
Charles McCandless Tile Serv. v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 108, 112–115 (1970). 
164. Even with an S election, a taxable dividend exposure remains to the extent of the 
corporation’s earnings and profits from its C corporation existence. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2). The 
exposure ends once the earnings and profits have been distributed. An S corporation, with the 
consent of all affected shareholders, may elect to accelerate such dividends by treating all 
distributions as earnings and profits distributions. Id. § 1368(e)(3). 
165. See generally id. §§ 531−537; Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(c)(1) (2007) (loans to shareholder for 
shareholder’s personal benefit may indicate that earnings are being unreasonably accumulated). 
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The parents may gift some stock and have the balance of their stock 
redeemed by the corporation or purchased by other family members. It is 
possible to structure a corporate redemption of a portion of the parents’ 
stock and a cross-purchase of the balance of the parents’ stock and still 
qualify the redemption for exchange treatment under section 302(b).166 
The benefit of a combination approach is that the disadvantages of each 
strategy are watered down because only a portion of the stock is subject 
to the strategy. For example, only the gifted shares will do nothing to 
provide a retirement income to the parents; only the redeemed shares 
will need to be funded with corporate after-tax dollars and will not 
increase the other shareholders’ stock basis; and only the shares subject 
to the cross-purchase obligation will create a funding challenge for the 
other shareholders. 
There are circumstances where the cross-purchase funding challenge 
is not a big deal. This may be the case, for example, if the entity is an S 
corporation with strong earnings, if other family members already own a 
substantial percentage of the outstanding stock or, as previously stated, if 
other family members have substantial investment assets unrelated to the 
company. When a cross-purchase is the strategy of choice in the plan 
design, two options for enhancing the strategy are often considered.167 
These are the intentionally defective grantor trust installment sale and 
the self-canceling installment note. 
1. The IDGT Sale⎯A Dream Deal? 
With the intentionally defective grantor trust installment sale strategy, 
the parent establishes a trust that names one or more children as 
beneficiaries. However, the trust is structured so that the parent is 
deemed to be the owner of the trust property for income tax purposes, 
but not for estate and gift tax purposes. The trust is an income tax 
nullity, but triggers real gift and estate tax consequences. The strategy 
requires that one have some capacity to speak out of both sides of the 
                                                     
166. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113–
114. 
167. The private annuity, a cross-purchase strategy that has been popular in the past, is not 
discussed because recent regulations proposed by the Internal Revenue Service have effectively 
eliminated the tax deferral benefit of the annuity and, thereby, destroyed the private annuity as a 
viable transition option. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(j) (providing that any person who sells 
property in exchange for any annuity contract will be deemed to have received “property in an 
amount equal to the fair market value of the contract, whether or not the contract is the equivalent of 
cash”). 
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mouth. The entire basis of the strategy is the incongruity between the 
income tax grantor trust rules168 and the estate tax rules applicable to 
grantor-retained interests.169 Although there is a broad overlap between 
these rules, there are a few instances where a trust may be crafted to fall 
within the income tax rules without triggering the estate tax inclusion 
rules. One such instance (commonly used to achieve the desired result) 
is where the parent retains a non-fiduciary power to reacquire trust 
property by substituting other property of equivalent value. With such a 
power, the parent may be deemed to be the owner of the trust for income 
tax purposes,170 but not for estate and gift tax purposes.171 
The parent then sells his or her corporate stock to the trust in return 
for an installment note that has a principal balance equal to the fair 
market value of the transferred stock. The principal balance of the note, 
together with interest at the applicable federal rate (a rate that generally 
is less than the section 7520 rate applicable to annuities), is paid by the 
trust to the parent over the term of the note. The trust’s income and any 
other assets owned by the trust are used to fund the amounts due to the 
parent under the installment note. The strategy can be used with either C 
or S corporation stock because a grantor trust is an eligible S corporation 
shareholder.172 
a. The Dream Scenario 
Here’s the dream tax scenario of this strategy. Because the trust is an 
income tax nullity, the parent does not recognize any taxable income on 
the sale of the stock to the trust. For income tax purposes, the transaction 
is treated as a sale by a person to himself or herself—a nonevent. Under 
the same rationale, the interest and principal payments on the installment 
note from the trust to the parent trigger no income tax consequences. 
Any income recognized by the trust on the stock or other trust assets is 
taxed to the parent as the owner of the trust. Ideally, the parent’s sale to 
the trust triggers no gift tax consequences because the trust is deemed to 
have paid full value for the stock in the form of the installment note. 
Similarly, the parent’s payment of income taxes on the trust income will 
                                                     
168. I.R.C. §§ 671–679. 
169. Id. § 2036. 
170. See id. § 675(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1(b)(4) (2007). 
171. Estate of Jordahl v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 92, 100 (1975), acq. 1977-2 C.B. 1; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 9227013 (Mar. 30, 1992). 
172. See I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(i). 
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not trigger a gift tax. When the parent dies, the stock is not included in 
the parent’s estate under section 2036(a) because the parent is deemed to 
have sold the stock for full consideration. Thus, all future growth in the 
value of the transferred stock is removed from the parent’s estate. The 
one disadvantage is that the parent’s income tax basis in the stock (often 
very low) will probably transfer over to the trust and ultimately to the 
children. But even this negative result might be eliminated if the parent, 
before death, uses the retained non-fiduciary asset substitution power to 
trade high-basis assets (e.g., cash) for the low-basis stock at equal 
values, thus ensuring that the reacquired low-basis stock is included in 
the parent’s estate at death and thereby receives a full basis step-up. The 
trust will still have accomplished its estate tax goal of removing the 
growth in the stock’s value from the parent’s estate because the 
substituted cash pulled from the estate will equal the higher stock value. 
And, once again, no income tax consequences will be triggered on the 
substitution because the parent will still be deemed the owner of the trust 
for income tax purposes. 
b. Key Question: Will It Work? 
There are some aspects of the strategy that seem relatively certain. 
First, a retained non-fiduciary power to reacquire trust assets by 
substituting other property of equivalent value should make the trust a 
grantor trust for income tax purposes.173 Second, such a power, in and of 
itself, probably should not trigger estate tax inclusion. To remove any 
doubt regarding the estate inclusion issue related to this power, some 
recommend giving this non-fiduciary power to a party other than the 
grantor.174 Third, no gain or loss will be recognized by the parent on the 
sale of appreciated property to a grantor trust in return for a promissory 
note that bears a rate of interest equal to the applicable federal rate.175 
Fourth, the stock should not be included in the parent’s estate if the 
parent dies after the note has been fully paid.176 Finally, the parents’ 
payment of income taxes on the trust’s income will not trigger a gift 
                                                     
173. See I.R.C. § 675(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1(b)(4). 
174. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-27-013 (Mar. 30, 1992); Estate of Jordahl v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 
92 (1975).  
175. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. 
176. Because the parent will not be receiving any payments at death, there is no risk of estate tax 
inclusion under section 2036(a). 
DRAKE-FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:123, 2008 
182 
tax.177 
Beyond these relative tax certainties, there are two fundamental 
questions that are troubling. First, how will the promissory note be 
valued for gift tax purposes? Second, if the parent dies while the note is 
outstanding, will the parent be deemed to have retained a life estate in 
the stock, such that it will be taxed in the parent’s estate at death? If the 
answer to the first question is that the note will be valued in the same 
manner as a retained equity interest under section 2701 (fair market 
value), a substantial gift tax will be triggered when the stock is 
transferred because the applicable federal rate will likely be far below 
the market rate needed to give the note a market value equal to the 
transferred stock. The net effect will be that the strategy will be no more 
effective than a preferred stock freeze under section 2701 because it will 
be subject to the same yield challenges. The answer to the second 
question turns on the potential application of section 2036(a), which 
requires that any property transferred by the decedent during life be 
taxed in the decedent’s estate if the decedent owned an income interest 
in the property at death.178 If the answer to this second question is “Yes,” 
the whole effort will produce no estate tax savings if the parent does not 
outlive the note. The existing cases and rulings suggest that the answer 
to both questions likely will turn on whether the note will be considered 
real debt or rather be viewed as disguised equity.179 This will be a fact 
question in each situation. If the only source for payment of the interest 
and principal on the note is income generated on the stock owned by the 
trust, the equity risk goes way up and the entire transaction is put in 
jeopardy.180 For this reason, many sensibly believe that when stock in a 
closely held corporation is the asset sold to the trust, the parent would be 
                                                     
177. See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7. 
178. See I.R.C. § 2036(a). 
179. In Sharon Karmazin, Tax Court Docket 2127-03, the Service took the position that both 
2701 and 2702 were applicable because the note was not real debt, but the case was settled. See 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9515039 (Jan. 17, 1995) (real debt only if trustee/obligor has other assets); 
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9251004 (section 2036 applied where closely held stock was only source of 
note payment and plan was to have trust retain stock for family purposes); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
9639012 (June 14, 1996) (no section 2036 inclusion where note would be paid off in three years 
from earnings on S corporation stock); Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. M. (CCH) 1220, 1237 
(2006) (loans from partnership characterized as retained interests that trigger 2036 inclusion); 
Dallas v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 313 (2006) (notes not challenged; trust funded with other asset 
that exceeded 10 percent of stock purchase price). 
180. See Robert S. Keebler & Peter J. Melcher, Structuring IDGT Sales to Avoid Sections 2701, 
2702, and 2036, Estate Planning, Oct. 2005, at 19. 
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well advised to transfer other income-producing assets to the trust that 
have a value equal to at least one-ninth of the value of the stock.181 Even 
with such a transfer of additional assets, there is no guarantee that the 
equity risk will be eliminated. Also, the client should understand that an 
unfavorable answer to one or both of these critical questions would 
probably result if Congress or the Service decided to attack this strategy 
(a justifiable fear given the blatant attempt to secure huge tax benefits by 
taking advantage of a technical incongruity in the Code). 
If the parent dies before the note is paid off, there are a few tax 
questions that can only be answered with guesswork at this time. The 
trust will cease to be a grantor trust on the parent’s death but will 
continue to owe the parent’s estate (or its beneficiaries) payments on the 
note. First, will such payments be treated as income in respect of a 
decedent under section 691, triggering income to the recipients as paid? 
The payments do not fit the technical definition of income in respect of a 
decedent,182 but logically it’s difficult to justify income tax-free 
treatment to the parent’s heirs. Second, what will be the trust’s basis in 
the stock on the parent’s death? The options are: (1) the amount of the 
note at time of purchase (a purchase step-up), (2) the fair market value of 
the stock at the parent’s death (full basis step-up), or (3) the parent’s 
transferred basis in the stock.183 The best guess is the carryover basis 
provision of section 1015 because of its technical “transfer in trust” 
language and the fact that the whole strategy is predicated on the 
theories that there is no sale for income tax purposes (which is 
inconsistent with a basis step-up under section 1012) and that the stock 
is not part of the grantor’s estate (which makes a step-up under section 
1014 a real stretch). But wait, who said anything about being consistent? 
Maybe talking out of three sides of the mouth to get a basis step-up will 
work. Finally, will the parent’s death before the note is paid off trigger 
any taxable gain to the parent’s estate because the trust has ceased to be 
a grantor trust? Most think not.184 
Often an IDGT is compared to a GRAT. In some respects, they are 
                                                     
181. See id. at 24. 
182. Because the parent never treated the sale as a taxable event under the rationale of Rev. Rul. 
85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, the post-death payments do not fit the technical definition of “income in 
respect of a decent (IRD)” under section 691. 
183.  I.R.C. §§ 1012, 1014 , 1015. 
184. See Laura H. Peebles, Death of an IDIT Noteholder, Trusts & Estates, Aug. 2005, at  28, 29; 
Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans, & Hugh H. Jacobson, Income Tax Effects of 
Termination of Grantor Trust Status by Reason of Grantor’s Death, 97 J. TAX’N  149, 149 (2002). 
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close cousins; they both involve a transfer of property to a grantor trust, 
followed by the trust making payments to the grantor over a defined 
period of time. But in no sense are they twins. There are many key 
differences, some of which can be compelling for a family business. 
First, a GRAT is specifically authorized by the Code and Regulations; an 
IDGT is a quasi-freak creation of an incongruity in the Code that triggers 
uncertainties. Thus, a GRAT may be viewed as a “legally safer” option. 
Second, a GRAT creates a mortality risk: the grantor must outlive the 
GRAT term for the GRAT to produce any transfer tax savings. No such 
mortality risk is mandated by an IDGT; ideally only the unpaid portion 
of the installment note at the grantor’s death will be taxed in the 
grantor’s estate. Third, although both a GRAT and an IDGT impose a 
yield risk, the IDGT hurdle rate is presumably easier because the 
applicable federal rate, required by the IDGT, is always lower than the 
section 7520 rate required for the GRAT. Fourth, the GRAT produces 
less valuation discount leveraging benefits because such benefits will be 
lost for any stock that is transferred back to the grantor as required 
annuity payments. Fifth, the risk of an inadvertent gift or estate tax is 
higher with an IDGT because of existing uncertainties regarding the 
potential application of Code sections 2701, 2702, and 2036(a). Finally, 
although the IDGT will require the commitment of other assets to the 
trust to hedge the disguised equity characterization risk of the 
installment note, the periodic payment burden of an IDGT often will be 
far less than a GRAT because the presumed lack of a mortality risk will 
allow the payments on the note to be stretched out over a long term.185 
Often when the GRAT and the IDGT are laid side by side in the 
planning process, the IDGT will appear the most attractive in spite of its 
inherent legal uncertainties and the need for other assets. The presumed 
absence of a mortality risk, the lower yield hurdle rate, the greater 
discount-leveraging benefits, and the smaller periodic payment burden 
will carry the day. But even if the IDGT wins its beauty contest with the 
GRAT, it may not be a sensible candidate for many family transition 
plans. 
c. Family Business Factors to Consider 
The potential benefits of the IDGT cross-purchase strategy are 
compelling. A few key factors should be carefully considered before 
                                                     
185. See generally Blattmachr & Zeydel, Comparing GRATs and Installment Sales, Heckerling 
Institute on Estate Planning, ch. 2 (2007). 
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employing the strategy in a family business transition plan. First, a 
threshold issue is whether a cross-purchase of stock funded primarily 
with income from the corporation is the best strategy for the family and 
the business, given the other transition strategies that are available. If so, 
using a grantor trust as the purchaser may be justified. The key is to not 
let the allure of the grantor trust strategy short circuit the analysis of 
other options that may, in the end, do a better job of accomplishing the 
family’s objectives. Obviously, if a grantor trust purchase is used, it will 
be easier with S status because the double dividend income tax hit 
triggered in C corporation situations is avoided. 
A second factor is whether the client has the means and the gifting 
capacity to fund the trust with other income-producing assets equal to at 
least one-ninth of the value of the stock sold to the trust. If not, the gift 
and estate tax risks of the whole effort may just be too much. The 
significance of fudging on this protective measure should not be 
understated. For many, this requirement will be too burdensome. 
Third, if the basis of the parent’s stock is high (such as would occur 
on the first death of a spouse in a community property state186), the value 
of the strategy is reduced significantly. Compared to a straight cross-
purchase with a child, the only real significant benefit of a grantor trust 
purchase in such a situation is the tax-free shift of value resulting from 
the parent’s payment of income tax on corporate income that would 
otherwise be taxed to the child.187 Even this potential benefit is watered 
down if the child’s marginal income tax rate is lower than the parent’s 
marginal rate, a likely condition in many situations. So the net benefits 
of the strategy will be substantially reduced in cross-purchase 
transactions targeted to occur after the death of the first parent. 
Finally, the client’s capacity to stomach tax uncertainty must be 
factored into the mix. The whole strategy is predicated on a technical 
incongruity that could be easily eliminated on a retroactive basis. A 
vulnerable element of the strategy is the basis of valuing the note for gift 
tax purposes. The argument would be that because the transaction is 
considered a nullity for income tax purposes, the note should not be 
valued against the applicable federal rate standards used to assess 
income tax impacts in family loan situations, but rather should be valued 
as a retained interest against market standards to access the real gift tax 
impacts by comparing the value of the transferred asset (the stock) 
                                                     
186. I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6). 
187. See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7. 
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against the true value of the retained asset (the note). If this were done, 
the strategy would trigger a significant gift tax hit (if the rate on the note 
equaled the applicable federal rate) or would require that the note rate be 
set at a high market rate that would significantly reduce (if not entirely 
eliminate) the transfer tax benefits of the entire effort (ala section 2701). 
The strategy offers mystery, uncertainty, and a potential dream 
ending. Its allure will be irresistible to some, but for many families it 
will demand too much and promise too little. 
2. The SCIN⎯A Bet Against Life 
The self-canceling installment note (SCIN) is a cross-purchase 
enhancement strategy that may produce an additional estate tax benefit if 
the parent dies before the note is paid off. The parent sells stock to a 
child or a grantor trust in return for a promissory note. The note, by its 
terms, provides that all amounts due under the note will be canceled if 
the parent dies before the note is paid. The benefit to the obligor on the 
note (child or trust) is that the obligation ends on the parent’s death. 
From the parent’s perspective, no residual note balance will be included 
in the parent’s taxable estate,188 nor will any taxable income in respect of 
the decedent be paid to the parent’s estate or heirs. 
The key to the SCIN is valuing the self-canceling feature. The 
determination of this amount (the Premium) requires an actuarial 
calculation that is impacted by the parent’s age, the length of the note 
term, and the size of the periodic payments.189 The value of the Premium 
must reflect the economic reality of the given situation if, for example, 
the parent has a short life expectancy due to poor health.190 If the note 
itself is not adjusted for the Premium, the parent will be deemed to have 
made a taxable gift equal to the amount of the Premium. This gift tax 
impact can be eliminated by increasing either the interest rate or the 
principal balance of the note, or both, so that the value of the Premium is 
reflected in the terms of the note. If the parent dies before the note is 
fully paid, the note is canceled, but the basis in the stock is not 
                                                     
188. See Estate of Moss v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1239, 1247 (1980), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 1; Rev. Rul. 
86-72, 1986-1 C.B. 253; Estate of Frane v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 341 (1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Frane v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993). 
189.  Presumably, the Premium calculation could be based on Table H in the Alpha Volume of 
the IRS actuarial tables or Table 90CM of such tables. 
190. See, e.g., Estate of Musgrove v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 657, 658 (1995). 
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reduced.191 However, any unrealized gain in the note must be included in 
the first income tax return of the parent’s estate as income recognized on 
the cancellation of an installment obligation under section 453B(f).192 
There are some potential disadvantages with a SCIN. If the parent 
outlives the note, the strategy will have produced no benefits but will 
have triggered added tax costs—the parent’s taxable income and taxable 
estate will have been increased by the amount of the Premium or the 
parent will be deemed to have made a taxable gift equal to the Premium. 
Plus, if the note is adjusted to incorporate the Premium, the purchaser 
will have paid more and will have received no tangible economic benefit 
in return. Finally, in situations where multiple children are beneficiaries 
of the estate, a self-canceling note in favor of only one child may 
conflict with the parents’ overriding objective to give each child an 
equal share of the estate. 
The forgoing discussion of gifting, redemption and cross purchase 
strategies assumes a need for the parents to rid themselves of their stock. 
Often this is necessary and desirable to reduce future estate tax burdens, 
to provide a secure retirement income stream to the parents, and to 
provide the children with the necessary incentives to carry the business 
forward. But there are circumstances where the business can be 
restructured to facilitate these essential family objectives without the 
parents having to aggressively sell stock. Such a restructuring may allow 
the parents to phase-out without selling out. 
D. Business Restructuring⎯Phase-Out Options 
Often some simple business restructuring can help immensely in the 
design of a family transition plan. Suppose, for example, that Wilson 
Incorporated is restructured to take advantage of two basic realities. 
First, the distribution of S corporation earnings presents no double tax 
issues.193 Second, Jeff’s desire to expand into new markets and to garner 
all of the benefits of expansion for himself can be accomplished by 
having him form and operate a new business that finances the expansion, 
                                                     
191. Estate of Frane v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 341 (1992), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 998 F.2d 567 
(8th Cir. 1993). 
192. I.R.C §§ 453B(f), 691(a)(5)(A)(iii) (2006); Estate of Frane, 98 T.C. 341. 
193. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1). If the distributions exceed the S corporation’s accumulated adjustment 
account, a taxable dividend exposure remains to the extent of the corporation’s earnings and profits 
from its C corporation existence. Id. § 1368(c)(2). The exposure ends once the earnings and profits 
have been distributed. 
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takes the risks of expansion, and realizes all of the benefits. The 
restructuring may be implemented as follows: 
• Wilson Inc. would make an S election. The stockholders of the 
company would remain the same, at least for the time being. Earl and 
Betty would keep their stock for now. Earl would make plans to retire 
and ride off with Betty. 
• The company would either employ Jeff as its CEO, or it would 
contract with the new company to be formed by Jeff (described below) 
to provide top-level management for the company. The compensation 
structure would be designed to provide attractive bonus incentives to Jeff 
if the income of the company is improved under the new management. It 
may include deferred compensation tied to increases in the value of the 
company’s stock. 
• Jeff would form a new company. This new company would be 
structured to finance and manage the growth and expansion of the 
business. It would take the risks; it would reap the benefits. Appropriate 
provisions would be drawn to ensure that the new company does not 
adversely effect Wilson Inc.’s present operation, but that it has the 
latitude to enhance the existing markets and expand into new markets. 
Preferably, the new company would be a pass-through entity⎯an S 
corporation or a limited liability company. Jeff would select the entity 
form that works best for him. 
• Earl and Betty would structure a gifting program to transfer to 
their children Wilson S corporation stock and possibly other assets if and 
when they determine that they have sufficient assets and income to meet 
their future needs. These gifts, when made, would be planned to 
maximize use of their annual gift tax exclusions and the unused gift tax 
unified credits of Earl and Betty. 
• Earl and Betty’s wills or living trust would be structured to leave 
each child an equal share of their estate. Jeff would have a preferred 
claim to the Wilson S stock, and Kathy and Paul would have a priority 
claim to the other assets in the estate. If it becomes necessary to pass 
some of the Wilson stock to Kathy and Paul to equalize the values, the 
will or living trust would include buy-sell provisions that would give 
Jeff the right to buy the Wilson stock passing to Kathy and Paul under 
stated terms and conditions. Jeff’s management rights would remain 
protected by the existing employment or management contracts. 
This simple restructuring would offer a number of potential benefits. 
First, because Earl and Betty would retain their stock, they would have 
an income for life, and, if that income grew beyond their needs, they 
DRAKE-FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM 
Transitioning the Family Business 
189 
would have the flexibility to begin transferring stock (and the related 
income) to their children and grandchildren as they chose. Because the 
cash distributions would be stock-related distributions, the unreasonable 
compensation risk would be eliminated, as would any payroll tax 
burdens. Second, by virtue of the S election, the income distributed to 
Earl and Betty each year would be pre-tax earnings, free of any threat of 
double taxation. As long as the corporation had sufficient current 
earnings, this income would be taxed only once. No longer would a 
party be forced to make payments with after-tax dollars to another 
family member. Third, Jeff’s management and control rights would be 
protected by the employment and management agreements. Earl could 
play as much or as little of a role in the business as he chose. The parties 
could sculpt their control and management agreement in any manner that 
they chose, free of any tax restrictions or limitations. Fourth, Jeff would 
be the primary beneficiary of the future growth in the business through 
the new business entity. The operating lines between the old company 
and the new company would need to be clearly defined. The goal would 
be to preserve the existing business operation for the old company and 
its shareholders (principally Earl and Betty) and to allow any new 
operations and opportunities to grow in the company that would be 
owned, financed, and operated by Jeff. Fifth, stock owned by Earl and 
Betty at their deaths would receive a full step-up in income tax basis.194 
Sixth, future increases in the value of Earl and Betty’s estate could be 
limited and controlled by (1) the incentive employment and management 
contracts with Jeff; (2) the new company owned, financed, and operated 
by Jeff; and (3) a controlled gifting program implemented by Earl and 
Betty. Finally, hopefully the income stream for Earl and Betty would be 
insulated from some or all of the financing risks taken by Jeff to expand 
into new markets. These financing risks would be in the new company, 
not the old company. 
There are limitations and potential disadvantages with such a 
restructuring approach that would need to be carefully evaluated and 
may require some creative solutions. First, Jeff may need the operating 
and asset base of Wilson Inc. to finance the expansion efforts. Various 
factors may influence this issue, including historical success patterns, the 
likelihood of future success, Jeff’s track record and expertise, and other 
assets owned by Jeff. If this condition exists, it may significantly 
complicate the situation. Workable alternatives usually are available, 
                                                     
194. Id. § 1014(a)(1). 
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depending on the flexibility of the lenders and Earl and Betty’s 
willingness to take some risk to help with the financing. But clearly this 
can be a troubling complication. 
The second potential disadvantage is the possibility that the value of 
Earl and Betty’s common stock in the old company may continue to 
grow, with a corresponding increase in their estate tax exposure. There 
would be no automatic governor on the stock’s future growth in value. 
Hopefully, this growth fear could be mitigated or entirely eliminated 
with a carefully implemented gifting program, the operation of Jeff’s 
new company, and special incentives under the employment or 
management agreements. 
A third potential disadvantage is that the employment or management 
contracts for Jeff would be subject to a special provision in Section 
1366(e) of the Code that requires that a family member who renders 
services to an S corporation be paid reasonable compensation for those 
services.195 Presumably, this requirement would not be a problem 
because the goal would be to adequately compensate Jeff and to provide 
him with attractive economic incentives to preserve the existing 
operations for the security of Earl and Betty. 
Fourth, conversion to S corporation status likely would create 
additional tax challenges that usually are regarded as serious nuisances, 
not reasons for rejecting the strategy. These challenges are discussed in 
Section III.C. above. An immediate tax hit will be triggered if the 
company values its inventory under the LIFO method.196 Additional 
taxes may be incurred in the future if shareholder distributions from the 
S corporation exceed earnings during the S period,197 if assets owned by 
the S corporation at time of conversion are sold within the 10-year 
period following the conversion,198 or if the net passive income received 
by the S corporation exceeds 25 percent of its receipts during a period 
that it has accumulated earnings and profits from its C existence.199 
Usually, these tax risks of conversion can be reduced to acceptable 
levels or eliminated entirely with careful monitoring and planning. 
The plan design process should include an evaluation of business 
restructuring options that address specific family objectives. This may 
                                                     
195. Id. § 1366(e). 
196. Id. § 1363(d). 
197. Id. § 1368(c)(2). 
198. See generally id. § 1374. 
199. See generally id. §§ 1375, 1362(d)(3). 
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allow the parents to rethink or slow down their stock transitions or to 
target the transitions to occur at key times, such as the death of the first 
parent. Although the tax challenges of a stock redemption require a 
complete disposition of the parents’ stock, gifting and cross-purchase 
options may be implemented on a piecemeal basis to complement the 
business restructuring and to flexibly accommodate changed 
circumstances. 
V. THE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP OR LLC⎯A COMPANION 
PLAY 
Many family business owners want financial and estate plans that 
protect assets, preserve control, and save taxes. Perhaps no planning 
tools historically have been more effective in meeting these basic family 
objectives than the family partnership and the family limited liability 
company (“LLC”). These are flexible tools that can be crafted to 
accomplish specific, targeted objectives, including shifting income to 
other family members, maximizing wealth scattering gifting 
opportunities, protecting assets from creditors, and (the one that really 
drives the Service crazy) creating valuation discounts in the parents’ 
estate by repackaging investment assets into discounted limited 
partnership interests. The wise use of a family partnership often can 
boost the performance of other planning tools, such as children and 
grandchildren trusts, dynasty trusts, and structured gifting programs. 
If the family business is operated in corporate form, as most are, the 
family partnership or LLC usually will not be a vehicle for directly 
transitioning the stock of the corporation. A partnership or LLC may not 
own stock of an S corporation. And although stock of a closely held 
family C corporation could be contributed to a partnership or LLC, the 
benefits of doing so are highly questionable. There are three compelling 
tax problems. First, any earnings of the C corporation distributed as 
dividends to the shareholders, including the partnership, will be subject 
to both a corporate level tax hit and a shareholder dividend tax hit. This 
double tax burden eliminates the pass-through income benefits that 
partnership-taxed entities typically enjoy and will increase the expense 
and hassle of trying to use the partnership vehicle to shift income to 
other family members. Second, all losses generated by the C corporation 
will be trapped inside the corporation and will not pass through to its 
shareholders. Thus, the typical loss pass-through benefits of a 
partnership will not exist. Third, and of far greater concern, there is a 
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high risk that section 2036(a) would be applied to deny the parents the 
benefits of any valuation discounts that they may seek to claim as a 
result of the partnership structure. As discussed in Section E.2. below, 
section 2036(a) has been the most potent weapon used by the Service in 
racking up a series of victories against family partnerships in cases 
where the family has been unable to prove a legitimate and significant 
non-tax reason for the partnership.200 If stock of a closely held family C 
corporation was transferred to a partnership in hopes of securing any 
valuation discount benefits on the death of a parent, a compelling 
argument could be made that the partnership served no legitimate and 
significant nontax purpose because the partnership simply held stock in a 
closely controlled family corporation, never functioned as a business 
enterprise, never engaged in any meaningful business activities, did not 
provide any additional limited liability or significant asset protection 
benefits, and was nothing more than a “recycling” vehicle motivated 
entirely by tax considerations. This was the reasoning that the Service 
argued and the Tax Court adopted in Estate of Bongard v. 
Commissioner,201 a 2005 case where section 2036(a) was applied to tax 
the decedent’s estate interests in a limited liability company that had 
been transferred to a family limited partnership and thereby denied any 
valuation discounts claimed with respect to the partnership. 
The formidable obstacles of using a family partnership or LLC to 
transition stock in a family corporation does not preclude such 
partnership or LLC from being part of the transition plan in many cases. 
If the family business is operated in a partnership or LLC or as a sole 
proprietorship, use of a partnership or LLC as the primary transition 
vehicle is a given. But in the great bulk of cases, those where the family 
business is conducted in a C or S corporation, the family partnership or 
LLC will serve a companion or supplemental transition strategy for 
valuable assets held outside the corporation that are ultimately targeted 
for those children who do not have career ties to the business. For 
example, in our case study Earl and Betty could form a limited 
partnership and transfer the real property that houses the business to the 
                                                     
200. Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 (2006); Estate of Rector v. Comm’r, 
T.C.M. (RIA) 1955 (2007); Estate of Erickson v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 757 (2007); Estate of 
Bigelow v. Comm’r, 503 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 
2005); Estate of Hillgren v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1008 (2004); Kimbell v. United States, 371 
F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004); Estate of 
Bongard v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 95 (2005). 
201. 124 T.C. 95 (2005). 
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partnership in return for limited partnership units. Kathy and Paul, the 
outside children, would transfer other assets to a newly formed S 
corporation that they would own and control. The S corporation, in turn, 
would transfer its newly acquired assets to the partnership in return for 
general partner units. The S corporation, owned by Kathy and Paul, 
would be the sole general partner and have complete management 
authority of the partnership, and Earl and Betty would start out as the 
sole limited partners of the partnership. With this tiered structure, all 
parties would have limited liability protection for the activities of the 
partnership. Earl and Betty, the retiring parents, would be relieved of the 
burden of having to manage the real estate and negotiate with Jeff on 
matters related to the company’s use of the real estate. Kathy and Paul, 
the children targeted to ultimately own the real estate with their families, 
would directly manage and control all issues relating to the real estate. 
This partnership structure may provide some valuable tax saving 
opportunities. Earl and Betty could maximize the use of their annual gift 
tax exclusions and unified credits by transferring limited partnership 
units each year to their children and to trusts established for their 
grandchildren.202 Because the limited partnership units have no control 
rights, the units would qualify for substantial lack of marketability and 
minority interest discounts. Lower values would permit more units to be 
gifted within the dollar limitations of the annual gift tax exclusion and 
unified credits. The gifts would not deplete Earl and Betty’s more liquid 
investment assets, nor would they dilute the control rights vested in 
Kathy and Paul. As the gifts are made, the gifted units would be 
removed from Earl and Betty’s taxable estates, and all distribution rights 
and income attributable to the gifted units would be shifted and taxed to 
other family members. Plus, any limited partnership units remaining in 
Earl and Betty’s estates at death also may qualify for substantial lack of 
marketability and minority interest discounts because those units would 
have no control rights. 
The potential to generate these valuation discounts makes the family 
partnership an attractive candidate in many transition plans. In 1959, the 
                                                     
202. For grandchildren under age 21, simple 2503(c) trusts can be used to avoid future interest 
characterizations that would otherwise compromise the availability of the annual gift tax exclusion. 
I.R.C. § 2503(c). Plus, care should be taken to ensure that the each grandchild’s trust is structured to 
avoid the generation skipping tax by having an inclusion ratio of zero. Id. § 2642(c)(2). Generally, 
this will require that the grandchild be the sole beneficiary during his or her life, and that the trust 
assets be included in the grandchild’s estate if the grandchild dies before the trust terminates. 
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Service issued Revenue Ruling 59-60,203 which set forth guidelines to be 
used in valuing the stock of a closely held corporation. Years later, in 
Revenue Ruling 68-609,204 the Service stated that the valuation 
principles of 59-60 also would apply to partnership interests. The two 
most significant discounts associated with a minority interest in a closely 
held business enterprise are the minority interest (lack of control) 
discount and the lack of marketability discount. In devising a discount 
strategy for a family partnership, it helps to keep in mind differences 
between a partnership interest and stock in a closely held corporation. 
Both state law and the partnership agreement govern a partner’s rights in 
a partnership, and it is not uncommon for both of these to impose 
substantial transfer restrictions. However, as discussed below, in 
devising a discount strategy, it is advisable to consider only state law 
restrictions. 
The powerful tax benefits of family partnerships and LLCs have made 
them a popular target of the Service. The heat has been turned up over 
the last ten years as the Service has pulled out all the stops to shut down 
techniques that are designed to produce extreme tax savings. Some 
courts, including the Tax Court, have been willing accomplices on a few 
occasions. Key uncertainties still loom. Unfortunately, the thrust of the 
fighting has made everything harder. This is not to suggest that the 
family partnership or LLC is doomed as a planning tool or is only suited 
for those who have a cast-iron stomach and the will to invite an 
encounter with the government. What it does confirm is the importance 
of careful attention to detail, reasonable expectations, and a willingness 
to not push the evolving limits. Below is a review of some of the key 
elements that should be carefully evaluated in the design of any plan that 
incorporates a family partnership or LLC. Although the discussion 
continually references a “family partnership,” the issues are the same for 
any family LLC that is taxed as a partnership. 
A. The “Real Partner” Requirement 
A family member will be deemed to be a partner for income tax 
purposes only if that individual is determined to be a “real partner,” 
which requires that the transaction vest the family member with 
dominion and control over the partnership interest.205 The Service has 
                                                     
203. Rev. Rul. 59-60 1959-1 C.B. 237. 
204. Rev. Rul. 68-609 1968-2 C.B. 327. 
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii) (2006). 
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established a number of guidelines for determining whether a particular 
family member is a “real partner.”206 No single guideline will determine 
whether a particular partner passes or fails the test. All factors need to be 
considered. Usually there is not a serious problem, but care should be 
taken in structuring the partnership or LLC agreement to ensure that it 
does not contain any one of a number of weird or unusual features. 
Following is a brief description of certain risky provisions that should be 
avoided in drawing the partnership agreement: 
1. The partnership agreement should never state that there will be no 
cash distributions or that a particular partner will not receive any cash 
distributions. The family member who is precluded from participating in 
cash distributions likely will not be considered a real partner.207 
Generally, it is advisable to state in the partnership agreement that all 
cash in excess of the operating needs of the partnership will be 
distributed. If there is a need for the partnership to accumulate funds for 
a specific purpose, that need should be carefully documented from time 
to time. 
2. Generally, it is not advisable to preclude a general partner from 
participating in the management of the partnership. That individual may 
not be considered a “real partner.”208 The use of a limited partnership to 
preclude any control by limited partners, in and of itself, will not create a 
problem.209 For this reason, it is generally advisable to use the limited 
partnership format when there is a desire to preclude certain family 
members from participating in the management. 
3. A family partnership agreement should not contain severe buy-sell 
restrictions that prevent a partner from disposing of his or her interest in 
the partnership. Such provisions may preclude the partner from being 
considered a “real owner” for tax purposes.210 The buy-sell provisions in 
the agreement may provide that, if a partner desires to dispose of his or 
her interest in the partnership, the other partners will have a first right to 
acquire such interest and other rights associated with the disposition of 
such interests. The key is not to be too strict in controlling the transfer of 
family partnership interests. 
4. It is never advisable to allow minors to directly own interests in the 
                                                     
206. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2). 
207. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(a). 
208. Id. §§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(d), 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix). 
209. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix). 
210. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(c). 
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partnership. Minors usually do not have the legal business capacity to 
protect themselves and may not be regarded as “real partners” for tax 
purposes.211 A minor child’s partnership interest should be held in a trust 
for the minor, held by a guardian, or held by a custodian under the 
applicable Uniform Transfer to Minors Act. 
B. Most Suitable Assets 
Families often have flexibility in selecting the assets that will be 
transferred to a family partnership. Following are a few key points to 
keep in mind in selecting the best assets in a given situation: 
1. Investments that generate income based on services rendered by a 
family member are completely inappropriate for a family partnership. As 
discussed below, the family partnership rule of section 704(e) generally 
requires that capital, as distinguished from personal services or labor, 
must be a material income-producing factor in the partnership.212 
2. The stock of an S corporation should never be transferred to a 
family partnership. A partnership is not a qualified shareholder of an S 
corporation.213 Any such transfer to a partnership will destroy the S 
election for the corporation. 
3. Property that is expected to depreciate in value is not a good 
candidate for a family limited partnership. In most situations, gift 
transfers of partnership units to other family members will be sheltered 
from the gift tax through the use of the annual gift tax exclusion or 
through consumption of the parents’ unified credits. If the property 
depreciates following the transfer, all or a portion of these gift tax 
benefits will have been wasted. 
4. Usually, it is not advisable to transfer to a family partnership assets 
that are expected to generate income tax losses for a period of time. In 
most situations, the parents will want to retain such assets in order to 
enjoy the write-offs. 
5. Great care should be taken in transferring to a partnership real 
estate and other assets that are subject to a mortgage or other 
indebtedness. The transfer itself may trigger creditor’s rights under a due 
on sale clause or require some form of special consent from the lender. 
                                                     
211. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(vii). 
212. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv). 
213. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B). 
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C. Income Shifting Limitations 
When partnership units are transferred to another family member, the 
income allocated to those units flows to that other family member. But 
there is a trap that should be watched whenever a family partnership is 
used to shift income among family members. The trap, found in Section 
704(e) of the Code, can eliminate or dilute the income shifting 
advantage.214 Four requirements must be satisfied to avoid the trap.215 
1. Capital, as distinguished from personal services, must be a material 
income-producing factor in the partnership.216 The capital can be in the 
form of tangible or intangible assets. Capital is not an income-producing 
factor when the partnership’s income consists principally of fees, 
commissions, or other compensation for personal services. If the income 
is from investment assets or a business that requires substantial 
inventories or substantial investments in plant, machinery, or other 
equipment, this requirement usually will not be an issue.217 
2. The partnership must be structured so that each partner really owns 
his or her capital interest—has dominion and control over the interest. 
This is the “real partner” requirement previously discussed. A limited 
partnership structure itself will not cause a problem under this “real 
partner” requirement.218 Make certain that none of the unusual or weird 
provisions referenced above are included in the partnership agreement. 
3. The donors, usually the parents, must be adequately compensated 
for services that they render to the partnership. If, for example, a parent 
works for a business that is owned by the partnership, the parent must be 
paid reasonable compensation for the services actually rendered.219 If the 
parent is not fairly compensated, the trap kicks in to deny any allocation 
of the parent’s service-related income to the children. 
4. The partnership agreement may not allocate to the donee partners 
                                                     
214. The section 704(e) provisions are not exclusive and do not provide a safe harbor against 
general assignment of income principles that may be applied to reallocate income among family 
members in extreme situations. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(i)(b). See Woodbury v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 
180 (1967). 
215. Section 704(e) applies to all gifts, including those made to non-family members. Plus, any 
partnership interest acquired by purchase from a family member is considered a gift for purposes of 
the section 704(e) provisions. I.R.C. § 704(e)(2) (2006). Family members include one’s spouse, 
ancestors, and lineal descendents, and any trusts for the primary benefit of such persons. 
216. Id. § 704(e)(1). 
217. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv). 
218. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix). 
219. I.R.C. § 704(e)(2). 
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(the children or grandchildren trusts) an interest in the partnership’s 
income that is greater than their respective interests in the partnership’s 
capital.220 This requirement prohibits the use of special allocations that 
have the effect of allocating disproportionately large income shares to 
the donee children. The partnership income allocated to any donee 
should be proportionate to the capital owned by the donee. Some 
advisors question whether this requirement precludes special allocations 
of deductions within a family partnership agreement (i.e. depreciation 
deductions) that otherwise meet the requirements of section 704(b) and 
that have the indirect effect of allocating a proportionately larger share 
of the partnership’s income to the donee children.221 The safest and 
wisest approach is to assume that this requirement prohibits any such 
special allocations.222 
D. Creditor Protection Benefits. 
A family limited partnership, if properly structured and funded, can 
become a nuisance for judgment creditors. In most states, a judgment 
creditor is limited to obtaining a charging order against the partnership 
units and then petitioning to have the charging order “liquidated.”223 The 
charging order gives the creditor the right to receive income from the 
partnership when and if the income is distributed. It does not give the 
creditor the right to control or gain access to the assets that are actually 
held by the partnership.224 The liquidation enables the creditor to become 
the owner of the limited partnership interest, but gives the creditor no 
access to the partnership property, no voting control or power, and no 
power to compel cash distributions. The nuisance factor of the limited 
partnership can be enhanced by transferring partnership units to other 
family members or to trusts strategically organized in states that have 
asset protection statutes or in select foreign countries. A combination of 
                                                     
220. Id. § 704(e)(2). 
221. See WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHITMORE, FEDERAL 
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS § 15.05[1][c] (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the issue and 
concluding that the section 704(e) limitations should trump any 704(b) allocation). 
222. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(iii). 
223. See REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7.03 (1976). 
224. The creditors’ rights are those of a transferee, which are limited to the partner’s right to 
receive distributions from the partnership. See section 7.02 of the Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act. For a description of the practical impacts of a charging order and how it often 
yields “little or nothing,” see Author’s Comments 8 & 9 of Section 504 or the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act. 
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steps can be taken to create a number of obstacles that may discourage 
any creditor. 
There is one additional aspect of the limited partnership device that 
makes it an even greater nuisance for the judgment creditor. Based on 
Revenue Ruling 77-137,225 if a creditor secures a charging order against 
the partnership units, there is a high probability that the creditor will be 
taxed on its share of the partnership income as the owner of the units. If 
that income is retained in the partnership, the creditor may end up 
having to book phantom income for tax purposes. In effect, the charging 
order may become a poison pill for the creditor. If the creditor becomes 
a limited partner by having the charging order liquidated, there is little 
question that the income, phantom or real, will be taxed to the creditor. 
E. IRS Attacks on Family Partnerships 
Since the early 1990s, the IRS has used a variety of theories to attack 
the tax benefits of family limited partnerships. For simplistic purposes, 
these theories are lumped here into three categories. 
The first category is the rejected theories. In the 1990s, the Service 
issued a host of Technical Advice Memorandums that denied valuation 
discounts on the theory that a family partnership was a sham 
transaction.226 The theory was a loser in court, and the Service threw in 
the towel on the theory when, after a string of losses, the tax court 
awarded attorneys fees to an estate that was forced to defend against the 
theory.227 The Service also has unsuccessfully argued that section 2703 
(the Chapter 14 valuation provision for transfer restrictions) requires that 
partnership law restrictions should be disregarded in valuing transfers of 
property to limited partnerships and transfers of limited partnership 
interests.228 Finally, the Service has futilely advanced a “gift on 
creation” argument, based on the theory that the excess of the value of 
the property contributed to a limited partnership over the discounted 
value of the partnership interest received in return constitutes a gift from 
                                                     
225. Rev. Rul. 1977-1 C.B. 178. 
226. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-36-004 (June 6, 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-35-003 (May 
8, 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-30-004 (Apr. 3, 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-25-002 
(Mar. 3, 1997). 
227. Estate of Dailey v. Comm’r, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) 1816, 1818 (2002).  See also Estate of 
Thompson v. Comm’r, 246 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (2002); Knight v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 506 (2000). 
228. See Church v. United States, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-804 (W.D. Texas 2000), aff’d, 268 F.3d 
1063 (5th Cir. 2001); Estate of Strangi v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 478, 448–89 (2000), aff’d, 293 F.3d 
279 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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the contributing partner to the other partners. This theory, like the other 
two, has gone nowhere in the courts.229 
The second theory category is the traps. These have some substance, 
but can be easily avoided with some simple planning. These are traps for 
the uninformed. The first is the application of the valuation limitations of 
section 2704(a) for lapsed voting or liquidation rights in the partnership 
agreement.230 The key is to ensure that no person has the unilateral right 
to dissolve the partnership, that the death of a general partner will not 
dissolve the partnership, and that distributions must be made in cash out 
of the cash flow of the partnership (no in-kind distributions). The second 
is the application of the valuations limitations of section 2703 (the 
Chapter 14 valuation provision for transfer restrictions) to deny the 
valuation impact of restrictions in a partnership agreement to the extent 
that they exceed state law restrictions. To date, one district court has 
bought the theory.231 What this means, as a practical matter, is that the 
discount valuation appraisals should specifically identify discounts 
based solely on state law restrictions, which in most cases will do the 
job. Finally, if a partner makes an additional contribution to a family 
partnership and receives no additional partnership interests, the Service 
will argue (successfully) that the contribution is an indirect gift to the 
other partners.232 The planning point is to ensure that additional 
partnership interests are issued to any partner who contributes property 
to the partnership. 
The third category is the scary theories. These theories potentially 
have real teeth in select situations and, if sustained, can undermine the 
value of the entire effort. The first relates to the denial of the annual gift 
tax exclusion on the gift of family limited partnership interests. The 
second relates to the application of section 2036(a) (the retained interest 
estate tax provision) to bring the value of the transferred partnership 
property back into the taxpayer’s estate. These theories need to be 
carefully evaluated in each situation. 
                                                     
229. See Church, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-804; Strangi, 115 T.C. at 490–93. 
230. I.R.C. § 2704(a) (2006). Under this section, certain lapses in voting and liquidations rights 
are treated as transfers for gift and estate tax purposes by the persons holding the rights. The holder 
of the right and his or her family members must control the partnership both before and after the 
lapse in order for the section to apply. Id. § 2704(a)(1). Any interest that is held directly or 
indirectly may fall within the scope of section 2704. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-1(a)(2) (2007). 
231. Smith v. Comm’r, 94 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-5627 (W.D. Pa. 2004). 
232. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2002-12-006 (Nov. 20, 2001); Shepherd v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 376, 
388–90 (2000), aff’d, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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1. Family Partnership Interests and the Annual Gift Tax Exclusion 
The gift tax annual exclusion is applicable only to transfers of a 
present interest, not future interest transfers.233 The Service has 
previously ruled that the transfer of a limited partnership interest would 
qualify as a gift of a present interest by virtue of the general partner’s 
fiduciary duty to the limited partners and the limited partner’s right to 
sell or assign the interest.234 In 1997, the Service denied the annual 
exclusion (and found no present interest) in a case where the partnership 
agreement gave the general partner unlimited discretion over 
distributions (“for any reason whatsoever”) and effectively prohibited 
the limited partners from assigning their interests.235 
This was followed in 2002 by Hackl v. Commisioner,236 where the 
Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit held that no present interest was 
transferred on gifts to forty-one donees where, among other things, the 
LLC would not produce any cash flow for many years and the donor, as 
the manager of the LLC, had control of all cash flow distributions, had 
the power to appoint his successor, had approval rights over any 
member’s withdrawal, and had consent rights in his “absolute 
discretion” over any member interest sales. The court held that a transfer 
of an interest in a business entity did not automatically qualify as a 
present interest. A present interest would exist, according to the Tax 
Court, only if the donee received “an unrestricted and noncontingent 
right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment” of the transferred 
property or income from the property.237 Unfortunately, neither the Tax 
Court nor the Seventh Circuit opinions clarify much for planning 
purposes. Surely, there is no requirement that the property be income-
producing in order for the interest to qualify as a present interest if the 
donee has the power to sell the interest. And will the right to assign the 
interest suffice if the transferee has no right to become a substitute 
member or partner? 
For planning purposes, what is clear is that, at a minimum, care 
should be exercised to spell out an objective standard for cash 
distributions, the general partner’s fiduciary duty with respect to 
                                                     
233. I.R.C. § 2503(b). 
234. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Jan. 12, 1994); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Apr. 
30, 1991). 
235. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-51-003 (Aug. 28, 1997). 
236. 118 T.C. 279 (2002), aff’d, 335 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2003). 
237. Id. at 293. 
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distributions, and the rights of partners to transfer or assign their 
interests subject only to a right of first refusal. As an added precaution, 
some believe that a partner’s transfer rights should include the absolute 
right of the purchaser to become a substitute partner or member. In those 
situations where no income will be generated for a period of time and 
there is no market for the interests (a common scenario), an added 
precaution would be to offer the donee a Crummey-type withdrawal 
right for a limited period of time after the gift to strengthen the present 
interest argument.238 The entity would agree to buy back the interest for 
a limited period of time for its fair market value and would be authorized 
to borrow funds to finance any such purchase. All the normal Crummey 
procedures would be followed. It might make sense in select situations. 
2. Partnership Donor’s Status Under Section 2036(a) 
Section 2036(a) requires that a decedent’s estate include any property 
transferred by the decedent during life if the decedent retains (1) the 
possession or enjoyment of the property or the income from the property 
or (2) the right (alone or in conjunction with others) to designate the 
persons who would enjoy the property. There is an exception that makes 
the provision inapplicable if the transfer is a bona fide sale for adequate 
and full consideration.239 This provision is now the Service’s most 
effective weapon against “bad fact” family partnership situations. It has 
been used recently to string together a series of victories against 
taxpayers who have pushed the limits.240 If section 2036(a) is deemed to 
apply, the property transferred to the partnership is brought back into the 
decedent’s estate for estate tax purposes and any gift tax exclusions and 
credits used in connection with gifts of limited partnership interests will 
have been wasted. 
The starting point in the analysis is the exception. For it to apply so 
that section 2036 is rendered moot, there must be a “bona fide sale” and 
“full consideration.” In the context of a family limited partnership, the 
                                                     
238. N. Choate, Leimberg, Estate Planning Newsletter (April 4, 2002). For a brief description of 
Crummey withdrawal rights, see supra note 65. 
239. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2006). 
240. Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 (2006); Rector Estate v. Comm’r, 2007 
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2007 367; Estate of Erickson v. Comm’r, 2007 T.C.M. (RIA) 2007, 107; Estate of 
Bigelow v. Comm’r, 503 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 
2005); Estate of Hillgren v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008 (2004); Kimbell v. United States, 371 
F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004); Estate of 
Bongard v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 95 (2005). 
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Tax Court and the circuit courts that have addressed the issue have held 
that the “bona fide sale” condition will exist if, as an objective matter, 
the transfer of property to the partnership serves a “substantial business 
or other non tax purpose.”241 Subjective intentions of the parties will not 
suffice. Nor will non-tax purposes that are factually implausible or not 
supported by objective evidence. It is a factual issue that ultimately turns 
on whether the partnership has a bona fide business purpose or is just a 
vehicle to recycle the taxpayer’s wealth in hopes of securing big tax 
valuation discounts. Negative factors include the taxpayer’s ongoing 
financial dependence on income from the partnership’s property, the 
transfer of substantially all the decedent’s assets to the partnership, the 
commingling of personal and business assets, the failure to observe 
partnership formalities, the failure of the partnership to conduct any 
business activities, the transfer of only passive investments to the 
partnership, and the lack of any business rationale to support a plausible 
hypothesis that the partnership’s operations will produce an economic 
benefit at least as great as the claimed value loss triggered by the 
contributions to the partnership.242 
If the “bona fide sale” condition is satisfied, the “full consideration” 
condition usually will be met if all corporate formalities are respected 
and, in exchange for the property transfer to partnership, the taxpayer 
receives a proportional interest in the partnership.243 Thus, as a practical 
matter, the presence of a legitimate non-tax business purpose is the key 
to both requirements. If both requirements are satisfied, the transfer of 
property to the partnership will not trigger the application of section 
2036. 
If the exception does not apply for any reason, the issue becomes 
whether the taxpayer retained a “substantial economic benefit” from the 
property within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1). This requires an 
express or implied agreement that the taxpayer will retain possession or 
enjoyment of the property transferred to the partnership.244 It too is a 
factual issue that usually turns on whether the evidence supports the 
existence of an implied understanding or assurance that the partnership 
assets would remain available to meet the personal needs of the 
                                                     
241. See supra note 231. 
242. Id.; see also Estate of Harper v. Comm’r, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2000, 202. 
243. Strangi, 417 F.3d 468; Kimbell., 371 F.3d 257. 
244. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (2007); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); Estate of 
Bigelow v. Comm’r, 503 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); Rosen, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220; Strangi, 417 
F.3d 468. 
DRAKE-FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:123, 2008 
204 
taxpayer. Examples of negative facts include: partnership distributions to 
pay personal expenses; the taxpayer’s free use of partnership property 
(i.e. a residence); the taxpayer’s inability to support himself or herself 
after transfers to the partnership; the commingling of personal and 
partnership assets; the failure to maintain partnership capital accounts or 
observe other formalities; the absence or waiver of fiduciary duties 
relating to partnership distributions; partnership decisions based on the 
personal needs of the taxpayer; the taxpayer’s right to change a general 
partner who is not subject to fiduciary duties; the taxpayer’s power to 
liquidate the partnership; the taxpayer’s power to control the income 
flow to the partnership; the use of partnership property to secure debts of 
the taxpayer; disproportionate distributions to the taxpayer; and payment 
of excessive management fees to the taxpayer.245 The bottom line is that 
the taxpayer must be in a position to show that the partnership operates 
as a business in accordance with sound business practices and not as a 
personal tool of the taxpayer. 
Even if the taxpayer is not deemed to have retained a substantial 
economic benefit, there may still be a problem under section 2036 if the 
taxpayer is deemed to have retained the right to designate the persons 
who could enjoy the property within the meaning of section 2036(a)(2). 
The application of this provision to a family limited partnership is 
unclear, at best. The few cases that have considered the issue involved 
extreme facts where the taxpayer had broad discretion to distribute 
income free of any fiduciary restraints or broad powers to remove or 
replace general partners or liquidate the partnership.246 Nevertheless, 
some of the dicta in these cases suggest that this provision could prove 
troublesome even in more vanilla scenarios where the taxpayer owns a 
substantial interest in the general partnership. Some (including myself) 
do not believe the provision should apply in such situations so long as 
there is an objective standard for making distributions, the taxpayer is 
subject to normal general partner fiduciary duties, and the taxpayer 
possesses no special rights to liquidate the partnership or access 
partnership assets. Additional precautions may include vesting 
distribution decisions in a general partner who is not the taxpayer or 
                                                     
245. Strangi, 417 F.3d 468; Estate of Hillgren, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008; Kimbell, 371 F.3d 257; 
Thompson, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004); Bongard, 124 T.C. 95; Bigelow, 503 F.3d 955; Rosen, 91 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1220. 
246. Strangi v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (2003), aff’d on other grounds, 417 F.3d 468 
(5th Cir. 2005); Kimbell v. Comm’r, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700 (N.D. Tex. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 
371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004). 
DRAKE-FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM 
Transitioning the Family Business 
205 
having the taxpayer own no interest in the general partnership.247 
The uncertainty associated with section 2036(a)(2) is particularly 
disturbing in those common scenarios where limited partnership interests 
are gifted. Such gifts will never fall within the “bona fide sale” 
exception, but generally should not present a retained economic benefit 
problem under section 2036(a)(1) if there is no evidence suggesting that 
the taxpayer retained any right to enjoy the transferred partnership 
interest or the partnership assets attributable to the interest. Whether the 
right “to designate” prohibition can be extended to snare common, non-
abusive uses of the family limited partnership is yet to be determined. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the provision’s application to 
trusts in the famed case of United States v. Byrum,248 coupled with the 
fact that the issue has surfaced only in factually “bad fact” difficult 
family partnership cases that have raised all the section 2036 issues, 
suggest that the provision should not be applied in such a broad fashion. 
F. The Family Partnership “Freeze” 
Great care should be exercised in the design of any transition plan that 
may include a family partnership freeze transaction where fixed 
preferred partnership interests are retained by the parent and growth 
partnership interests are transferred to the children. This freeze structure 
is the partnership equivalent of the corporate preferred stock freeze 
discussed in section IV.A.4 above. The only difference is that the 
preferred equity interest is offered in a partnership context and thus 
avoids the double income tax burdens of preferred stock. Like the 
preferred stock freeze, the gift tax impacts of the structure are governed 
by section 2701. That section requires that the value of the preferred 
interest retained by the parents be based on the fair market value of a 
fixed cumulative rate of return on such preferred interest,249 and that the 
subtraction method be used to determine the corresponding value of the 
growth interest for gift tax purposes.250 Plus, the same 10 percent 
minimum value of the growth interest transferred to the children is 
                                                     
247. See generally Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Strangi: A Critical Analysis and 
Planning Suggestions, 100 TAX NOTES 1153 (Sept. 1, 2003); Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of 
Disappearing Wealth Revisited: Using Family Limited Partnerships to Reduce Estate and Gift Tax, 
1 PITT. TAX REV. 155 (2004). 
248. 408 U.S. 125 (1972). 
249. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A), (c)(3) (2006). 
250. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2701-1(a)(2), 25.2701-3 (2007). 
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applicable.251 
The section 2701 limitations are an insurmountable barrier in many 
situations. Often the fair market value of the preferred interest retained 
by the parents (which is set by appraisal) will have a value equal its face 
value only if the fixed distribution rate on such preferred interest is set at 
a level that, as a practical matter, exceeds the projected annual growth 
rate of the business. In such a situation, the freeze transaction will 
produce no transfer tax savings benefits. For this reason, the freeze 
strategy should be considered only in those rare situations where there is 
a real expectation of extraordinarily large future asset appreciation that 
will balloon an existing estate tax exposure. If the qualified income 
interest on the preferred units retained by the parents is not properly 
structured, any transfer of growth interests to the children may trigger an 
unwelcome gift tax. 
VI. INSIDE/OUTSIDE CHILDREN⎯AVOIDING A WAR 
Transitioning a family business usually is tougher when some 
children work in the business and others do not. This is a fairly common 
scenario. In our case study, Earl and Betty own a business that they 
worked their entire lifetimes to build. They have three children; Jeff is a 
key insider, and Kathy and Paul have careers outside the business. Like 
many parents in this situation, Earl and Betty view the business as an 
economic investment that has become part of the family culture. Since 
the business represents the bulk of their estate, they assume that each 
child will eventually inherit an interest in the business. 
Problems often surface in any family business owned by inside and 
outside children. The problems can lead to imprudent business decisions, 
costly tax consequences, and conflicts that can and often do drive a 
permanent wedge into sibling relationships. The planning challenge is to 
anticipate the potential conflicts, based on an honest assessment of the 
specific facts, and then implement one or more strategies that may 
mitigate any adverse effects. Often the best strategies are those that 
eliminate the source of the conflict—joint ownership of the business. 
Each child receives a fair share of the parents’ estate, but the insiders 
end up with sole ownership of the family business. When this is not 
possible, other strategies, often perceived as less attractive, may be used 
to mitigate adverse tax and control issues triggered by the joint 
                                                     
251. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(A). 
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ownership by inside and outside children. Following is a review of the 
select strategies that may be considered.  
A. The Insider Installment Sale 
The insider installment sale strategy assumes that the parents, Earl 
and Betty in our case, are willing to exit the business while they are 
living. With this strategy, the parents sell all of the stock to the company, 
a grantor trust, or the insiders and take back a long-term note. If the 
company is the purchaser, the parents should have no further role in the 
business.252 When the parents die, the note becomes part of their estate 
and passes to all their children, along with the other assets of their estate. 
Although often used, this strategy has some significant disadvantages. 
The sale will trigger an income tax burden for the parents and any 
children who inherit the unpaid note obligation.253 The lifetime sale 
eliminates any basis step-up potential at death unless the sale is 
structured to occur on or after the death of the first parent. Plus, the 
purchaser (either the insiders, a trust for the insiders, or the company) 
must fund the principal payments on the note with after-tax dollars, and 
the parents have a wasting asset (the promissory note) that may not 
sustain them, let alone provide anything for the outside children. For 
these reasons and others, an insider installment sale during the life of the 
parents, although preferred in select situations, often is not the solution. 
Many parents prefer a strategy that will allow them to retain control and 
stay in the driver’s seat, while ensuring that each child will ultimately 
receive a fair share of their estate. 
B. Other Asset Equalizing 
The second strategy is simple and attractive if the numbers work. The 
solution is to leave the outside children assets other than the family 
business. The family business stock owned by the parents passes to the 
inside children, and other assets of equal value per child pass to the 
outside children. Any remaining assets after this equalizing allocation 
are allocated among all the children in equal shares. The result is that the 
inside children receive all of the interests in the business, plus possibly 
some other assets, and the outside children do not receive any stock in 
                                                     
252. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). See related discussion supra IV.B. 
253. Any remaining payments on the note that are paid to the children will be taxed to the 
children as income in respect of a decedent under I.R.C. § 691(a). 
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the family business, but end up with property having a value equal to 
that received by the inside children. In this situation, it is important to 
carefully coordinate the provisions of the parents’ wills or living trust 
with the disposition of other assets that will pass outside such 
documents, such as the proceeds on life insurance policies, retirement 
plan benefits, and other similar assets. These other assets must be 
considered in determining equality among the children and in properly 
structuring how the business interests are to be distributed to the inside 
children. 
There is a common obstacle to the simple strategy of giving the 
business to the inside children and other assets of equal value to outside 
children. In many situations, the business constitutes the bulk of the 
parents’ estate. There are not enough other assets to cover the outside 
children. In Earl and Betty’s situation, the business, valued at $10 
million, represents more than 55 percent of their $18 million estate and 
they have three children. The math does not work. In situations like this, 
often the preferred solution is to provide in the parents’ wills or living 
trust that the estate of the parents will be divided among the children 
equally and that, in making the division, the inside children will first be 
allocated equity interests in the family business. To the extent that the 
value of total business equity interests owned by the estate exceeds the 
value of the equity shares allocated to the inside children, the inside 
children are given the option to purchase the additional business interests 
from the estate, before the final distributions are made to all children. 
This enables the inside children to acquire all of the equity business 
interests owned by the estate, while at the same time passing an equal 
date-of-death value to each child. 
In creating the option, the two most critical elements are the price of 
the business interests to be acquired by the inside children and the terms 
of payment. The price may be set at the value finally determined for 
federal estate tax purposes. If there is no federal estate tax return 
required, or if the parents want a more specific basis for determining the 
purchase price, they may specify a valuation formula or an appraisal 
procedure, similar to what is often included in a buy-sell agreement 
among co-owners. The key is to make sure that there is either a value 
established or a method for determining the value so that there is little or 
no basis for a dispute over price. In rare cases, the parents may choose to 
name a non-child as the personal representative of the estate and allow 
that “independent” personal representative to determine the price, using 
whatever assistance he or she deems appropriate. In determining the 
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method of payment for the option price, care should be taken to make 
sure that the required cash flow payments do not jeopardize the ongoing 
success of the business. For many businesses, the death of the owner 
may create a significant disruption in cash flow, apart from the need to 
make large cash payments to the outside children. One obvious solution 
is to provide for a long-term installment payout of the price, securing the 
payment obligation with the pledge of the stock being purchased. Since 
the inside children will be purchasing only a portion of the equity 
business interests owned by the estate, often the installment payment 
method will fit within the cash flow parameters of the business. 
In some cases, it may be prudent to fund the buy-out price in whole or 
in part with life insurance on the parents. The inside child, Jeff in our 
case, owns the policies and uses the proceeds collected on the parents’ 
deaths to buy the equity business interests from the estates. Often, the 
inside children do not have enough surplus cash flow to fund the 
premiums on the life insurance policies. So in many cases, the company 
bonuses the inside children sufficient amounts to cover the premiums 
and any tax hit on the bonuses. Some parents view this insider insurance 
funding bonus mechanism as a deviation from the overall objective to 
treat all children equally even though it ultimately provides the outside 
children with cash instead of an installment note from the insiders. If the 
parents share this view, the parents’ wills or living trust may be 
structured to equalize such insurance bonuses among the children by 
requiring that, for allocation purposes only, all bonus insurance 
payments to the insiders must be added to the total estate value and be 
treated as payments already credited to the inside children. 
The parents may prefer to have the company itself fund the insurance 
premiums, own the policy, collect the death benefit, and use the 
proceeds to redeem from the estate the business interests that exceed the 
equal shares of the estate allocable to the inside children. This approach 
has a few significant disadvantages. It eliminates the ability of the inside 
children to benefit from the stepped-up basis in the stock that would 
result if they purchased the stock directly. Plus, if the company is a 
sizable C corporation (annual gross receipts in excess of $7.5 million), 
the company’s receipt of life insurance proceeds may trigger an 
alternative minimum tax.254 
                                                     
254. I.R.C. §§ 55(e), 56(g). 
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C. Real Estate and Life Insurance Trade-Offs 
A partial solution to the inside-outside child dilemma may exist when 
a portion of the value of the family business is real estate owned by the 
parents directly. Often the parents own business-related real estate 
outright or in a separate pass-through entity, such as a partnership or an 
LLC. The real estate is leased to the operating business, usually a 
corporation. In those situations where the value of the overall business, 
including the real estate, exceeds the value of the estate shares allocable 
to the inside children at the death of the parents, the preferred solution 
may be to leave the outside children the business real estate and the 
inside children the business. If the value of the real estate exceeds the 
equal shares allocable to the outside children, a portion of the real estate 
may also be allocated to the insiders so that the overall shares passing 
through the estate are equal. If the value of the real estate is not 
sufficient to equalize the shares (the more common scenario), this 
strategy may be combined with one of the other strategies to achieve an 
overall equal allocation. 
When this real estate strategy is used, care needs to be taken to 
mitigate conflicts that may surface between the insiders who own the 
business and need use of the real estate and the outside children who 
own the real estate and want to maximize its earning potential. If the real 
estate is essential to the success of the business, leaving the real estate to 
the outside children creates the potential for conflict. The solution is to 
make sure that, at the appropriate time, the operating company enters 
into a lease that secures its rights to the use of the real estate. The lease 
should be for a long term and provide the company with a series of 
renewal options. The lease payment obligation of the company should be 
adjusted periodically to reflect a fair market rent for a long-term single 
user tenant. This will help ensure that the outside children realize the 
benefits of the income and value elements of the real estate that is left to 
them. The lease, for example, may require that, unless the parties agree 
otherwise, independent appraisers will be used every five years to adjust 
the rent to reflect current market values and to set annual escalators in 
the rent for the next five years. The lease should spell out the rights and 
obligations typically included in commercial leases between unrelated 
parties, including the parties’ respective obligations to maintain and 
repair the building and to pay real estate taxes and insurance premiums. 
A similar trade-off opportunity may exist if one or both of the parents 
are insurable and there is no desire to hassle with the complexities of the 
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other options. Life insurance may provide a solution. The parents 
acquire a life insurance policy through an irrevocable trust. It may be a 
second-to-die policy that pays off on the death of the surviving spouse. 
The beneficiaries of the life insurance trust are the outside children. The 
amount of the life insurance is based on the mix and value of the other 
assets in the parents’ estate to ensure that there will be sufficient assets 
to fund the tax and liquidity needs of the estate and to provide each 
outside child with a benefit equal to the value of the family business 
interest that will pass to each inside child. 
D. King Solomon Solution255 
In select situations, the best solution to the inside-outside children  
conflict may be to do what King Solomon proposed—cut the baby into 
two pieces. One piece of the business goes to the inside children, who 
can manage and grow it. The other piece is sold for the benefit of the 
outside children. Of course, the solution has merit only in those 
situations where the business can be divided into profitable pieces, one 
of which can be sold. It is not a viable option for most businesses, but it 
may be attractive in those situations where the business has separate 
divisions or facilities, only some of which are of interest to the inside 
children or, because of their size, are incapable of being purchased by 
the inside children. Also, it may be the answer in those situations where 
there are conflicts among different inside children who work in separate 
divisions of the family business. Instead of forcing the insiders to coexist 
in the same company, the company may be divided, and each insider 
may be given his or her own company to manage. 
In cases where a division makes sense, the tax challenge is to divide 
the company into pieces without triggering a taxable event. For 
partnership-taxed entities, there is seldom a problem. Corporate entities 
also can make it work if the division is structured as a spin-off, split-off, 
or split-up that qualifies as a tax free D reorganization.256 
                                                     
255. The biblical King Solomon, when faced with two women each claiming to be the mother of 
a baby, proposed the ultimate solution⎯divide the baby in half. 1 Kings 3:16–28. 
256. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D). If done right, the assets of a C corporation (referred to as the 
“distributing corporation”) can be transferred to multiple C corporations (referred to as “controlled 
corporations”), and the stock of the controlled corporations can be distributed to the shareholders of 
the distributing corporation, all tax free. I.R.C. §§ 355(a), 361(a), 1032(a). Six requirements must be 
satisfied: (1) A control requirement governed by I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(A) and 368(c); (2) A complete 
distribution requirement governed by I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D); (3) A five-year active trade or business 
requirement governed by I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C) and Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3 (2007); (4) A 50 percent 
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The foregoing strategies are geared at providing the outside children 
with a fair share of the parents’ estate without them ever acquiring an 
interest in the business. Often it is inevitable that the outside children are 
going to end up owning an interest in the company on the death of the 
parents. There may be insufficient other assets and insufficient cash flow 
to implement a strategy that gives each child an equal share while 
keeping the outsiders out of the business. Or it may be one of those 
situations where the family business is an integral part of the family 
culture that binds everyone, and the parents and the children want all 
family members to own a part of the culture. Whatever the reason, the 
parents want a strategy that will enable each child to own an interest in 
the business and that will reduce or eliminate potential conflicts between 
the insiders and the outsiders. The following strategies are potential 
candidates in those situations. 
E. Preferred Stock Recapitalization 
One option is for the parents to leave preferred stock to the outside 
children and common stock to the inside children. The value of the 
preferred stock often is capped so that all of the future growth in the 
business shifts to the owners of the common stock⎯the inside children. 
The preferred stockholders typically are given a priority right to receive 
their share values on liquidation before any amounts are paid to common 
stockholders (hence the name “preferred”), thus shifting all value losses 
first to the common stockholders (the insiders). This shifting of the 
future risk of loss to the common stock usually is regarded as an 
appropriate tradeoff for also shifting the future growth to the common 
stock. Generally, preferred stockholders are given a fixed cumulative 
income right, although there are a wide variety of income rights that can 
be granted to preferred stockholders. 
One advantage of using preferred stock for the outside children is that 
it reduces the potential conflict between the insiders and outsiders 
regarding income distributions being structured as compensation or 
dividends payments. If the insiders and outsiders both own common 
stock, the outsiders will have a vested interest in dividends, while the 
insiders will favor compensation payments. With preferred stock, the 
dividend rights of the preferred stockholders (the outside children) are 
                                                     
continuity of interest requirement governed by Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(2); (5) A business purpose 
requirement governed by Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2); and (6) A no dividend “device” requirement 
governed by I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) and Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d). 
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fixed and are not dependent on the payment of dividends on the common 
stock. So the outsiders have no incentive to push for more common 
stock dividends and less compensation for the insiders. In fact, as 
owners of preferred stock, the outsiders may prefer the compensation 
characterization for all payments to the insiders because of the tax 
savings to the company. Although the outsiders’ concern over the 
characterization of the insider payments is gone, the amounts paid to the 
insiders, however characterized, may still be a source of conflict to the 
extent there is any uncertainty regarding the company’s capacity to pay 
dividends on the preferred stock, now or in the future. Excessive 
compensation payments or common stock distributions to insiders in 
early years may hinder the corporation’s ability to fund preferred stock 
dividend payments in later years. A solution to this potential conflict 
may be a shareholders’ agreement between the parties that conditions 
additional payments to the insiders on the company maintaining defined 
liquidity ratios (e.g. current ratio or acid-test ration) and debt-to-equity 
ratios. Such ratio conditions, if fairly structured, may provide the 
outsiders with comfort that the insider payments will not impair the 
company’s ability to fund preferred dividends and provide the insiders 
with the desired flexibility to increase their incomes free of outsider 
hassles, as they grow the business. 
Preferred stock can either be voting or nonvoting. If the objective is to 
keep control in the hands of the insiders while the outsiders collect their 
preferred dividends, nonvoting preferred may seem to be the obvious 
choice. But with nonvoting preferred, the inside children have control 
over whether and when preferred dividends get paid and, absent an 
agreement to the contrary, their own compensation levels. Of course, 
dividends on the insiders’ common stock must take a back seat to 
preferred dividends to the outsiders, but this likely will be an irrelevant 
concern because of the double tax hit on dividends generally and the 
insiders’ capacity to set their own compensation and bonus levels. 
Often there is a need for creativity in this situation. As described 
above, one option is ratio requirements, contractually protected through 
an agreement between all the shareholders. Another option is to make 
the preferred stock nonvoting only so long as the dividends on the 
preferred stock are timely paid. If the dividends ever become delinquent, 
then the preferred stockholders acquire voting rights that remain forever 
or until specified conditions are satisfied. This option gives the insiders a 
strong incentive to always keep the preferred dividends current. But if 
things get bad, the preferred stockholders have voting rights and can 
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involve themselves in the challenges of the business. 
With this preferred stock strategy, there are three tax issues to 
consider. First, the conversion of the parents’ common stock to both 
common and preferred stock should be structured to qualify as a tax-free 
recapitalization.257 Second, after such a recapitalization, any gifts of 
common stock to the insiders by the parents during life will be subject to 
the valuation rules of section 2701.258 Generally, the value of the 
preferred (determined by appraisal) will be based on its fixed dividend 
rate, and the value of the common will equal the total equity less the 
value of the preferred. Third, and usually of greater significance, 
dividends on the preferred stock will be subject to a double tax⎯one at 
the corporate level and one at the preferred shareholder level. The most 
common solution to the double tax problem, the election of S 
corporation status, is not available because S corporations cannot have 
preferred stock.259 So although the preferred stock solution addresses 
some of the conflicts of passing business interests to both inside and 
outside children, it does so at a tax cost. 
F. Preferred Interests in a Limited Partnership or LLC 
In select situations, a family limited partnership or family LLC may 
be used to transfer preferred units to the outside children and growth 
units to the inside children and avoid the double tax burdens of a C 
corporation. The preferred interest for the outside children is in the form 
of a preferred limited partnership or LLC interest rather than a preferred 
stock interest. The preferred partnership or LLC interest can be 
structured to have all of the elements of C corporation preferred stock: 
capped liquidation rights; preferred liquidation rights; and fixed, 
preferred income distribution rights. Also, the limited partnership or 
LLC agreement may be structured to give the preferred partnership 
interest holders voting rights in the event the preferred income 
distributions become delinquent, just as discussed in connection with 
preferred stockholders. 
There are a few principal distinctions between the preferred interest 
approach using a family limited partnership or LLC and the preferred 
stock approach using a C corporation. The first difference is the 
                                                     
257. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E). See related discussion supra note 140. 
258. See generally I.R.C. § 2701. See related discussion supra section IV.A.4. 
259. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). 
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elimination of the double tax problem. With the family partnership or 
LLC, the payment of preferred partnership distributions to the outside 
children does not result in double taxation because the partnership is not 
a tax-paying entity. A second distinction is a negative factor that can be 
neutralized with a little added complexity. When there is a family 
limited partnership, the general partners have personal liability exposure 
for the debts of the company. If the inside children are the general 
partners, they will have personal liability exposure. One solution to this 
liability problem is to have the inside children hold their general partner 
interests through an S corporation. This introduces another entity into 
the equation, but the added expense and complexity usually are minimal. 
Another alternative is to use an LLC rather than a limited partnership. 
The LLC can be structured to eliminate personal liability exposure for 
all its members while spelling out the preferred and limited rights of the 
outside children. A potential negative of the LLC is that the limited 
rights of the outside children are a function of negotiation and 
agreement. In a limited partnership, the status of being a “limited 
partner” usually does the job automatically. 
There is a huge obstacle, often insurmountable, to this strategy of 
using a family partnership or LLC when the business has been operated 
as a C corporation. That obstacle is the tax cost of converting from a C 
corporation to a partnership-taxed entity. Such a conversion triggers a 
tax on all built-in gains for the corporation, followed by a tax at the 
shareholder level.260 The impact of these taxes often makes it 
prohibitively expensive to even consider converting from a corporate 
form to a partnership or LLC form.261 For this reason, the strategy is 
limited to those situations where the business is already operated in a 
partnership or LLC or as a sole proprietorship. 
G. S Corporation Voting and Nonvoting Stock 
An S corporation may issue voting and nonvoting common stock, but 
not preferred stock.262 If the family business has been operated in an S 
corporation or has recently converted from C to S status, the transition 
plan may be structured to have the parents transfer nonvoting common 
                                                     
260. I.R.C §§ 331, 336. 
261. If, for example, the corporation is subject to a 34 percent marginal tax rate and the 
shareholder pays a 15 percent capital gains rate, the combined tax burden on any distributed 
appreciation in the liquidation will be 43.9 percent [34 + (15 x (1-34))]. 
262. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(1). 
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stock to the outside children and voting common stock to the inside 
children. Often when nonvoting stock is used, the outside children are 
given limited control rights through a shareholder agreement that kicks 
in under defined conditions. Usually income distributions are the biggest 
challenge with this S corporation strategy. The primary advantage, of 
course, is that dividends of S corporation earnings can be distributed to 
both the insiders and the outsiders free of any double tax concerns. But if 
the insiders have control, they will have the ability to pull out 
substantially all of the earnings of the corporation, or at least a 
disproportionately large amount, in the form of compensation payments. 
A solution is for the parents, either during life or through their estate 
plan, to impose contractual compensation limitations on the insiders. 
Usually this is done with mandated employment agreements. The 
insiders’ compensation under the employment agreements can be based 
on a formula that provides strong incentives for the insiders to grow the 
business, while ensuring that the income interests of the outsiders are 
protected. 
Two keys factors should be considered in the planning process 
whenever equity interests are given to both the inside and outside 
children. First, future value growth may be a concern of the insiders. 
Depending on the nature and terms of the interest given to the outsiders, 
the outsiders may have a right to participate in equity growth generated 
by the business. This may dilute the insider’s incentive to grow the 
business. The issue may be addressed, although usually not completely 
solved, by special compensation incentives for the insiders. The inside 
children may be granted stock appreciation or phantom stock deferred 
compensation rights that give them a larger stake in the future growth of 
the enterprise. Second, any strategy that passes ownership interests to 
multiple family members should include a properly structured buy-sell 
agreement to ensure that all interests are maintained within the family 
and that adequate exit options exist when a family members dies, 
becomes disabled, gets divorced, encounters credit problems, or wants 
out. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Every family business transition plan should be a custom job. Stock 
solutions do not work and often will do more harm than good. The initial 
driving force in the planning process should be those factors that shape 
the non-tax needs and objectives of the family—the parents’ financial 
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security; the expectations and aspirations of the children (both insiders 
and outsiders); the retirement plans of the parents; the strength, 
durability, and cash needs of the business; the relative ages, health and 
life expectancies of the parents; realistic assessments of future 
opportunities for value growth; the nature and scope of non-business 
assets; the liquidity needs of the family; life insurance options; and all 
the other concerns and desires of the particular family. Certain elements 
need to be carefully evaluated in every plan, including transition timing, 
the smart use of the marital deduction, entity restructuring options, and 
compensation planning for those family members who make the 
business their career. Care must be exercised to anticipate and avoid 
various traps that can trigger unpleasant surprises and dilute the entire 
planning effort. 
Usually the driving tax fear is the potential impact of a large estate tax 
bill on the death of the surviving parent. In select situations, a tax-
protected life insurance policy owned by an irrevocable trust will 
squelch the fear. But many families want or need something more than 
just a funding mechanism for the ultimate tax bill; they want to 
implement strategies that will meaningfully reduce the bill. Certain 
strategies, particularly those that leverage the parents’ gift tax annual 
exclusions and generate favorable valuation discounts, will produce 
positive tax savings even if the future growth in the value of the business 
is modest or nonexistent. These strategies should be given high priority 
in the tax design of any plan. The tax value of other strategies, including 
many of the most complicated, is predicated entirely on the extent of the 
future value growth of the business. If there is no significant value 
growth, the strategy may produce little or no estate tax saving, trigger 
needless income and gift tax consequences, and create useless 
complications for the family. Some families will want and need to 
explore every available tax savings option. For many others, less will be 
more. In each situation, the challenge is to carefully develop and 
implement over time the best mix of tax strategies that realistically 
reflect the prospects for the business, address the family’s non-tax 
objectives, and conform to the family’s tolerance for complexity. 
 
